Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Count One of the multi-count indictment in this case charged Robert and Patrick Singletary, and others, with conspiring between 1997 and September 16, 2004, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, to commit three offenses: (1) to defraud a federally insured bank, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1344; (2) to make false representations with respect to material facts to the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001; and (3) to defraud purchasers of residential property and mortgage lenders, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343. The Singletarys eventually pled guilty to Count One to the extent that it alleged a conspiracy to commit the section 1343 offense in addition to the section 1001 offense. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in ordering restitution in the sum of $1 million. The court held that the district court failed to determine by a preponderance of the evidence which of the 56 mortgages the loan officers handled was obtained through a false "gift" letter, a false "credit explanation" letter, or a false employment verification form; and where fraud was found, to determine the extent of the actual loss HUD could have incurred due to the mortgage's foreclosure. Accordingly, the court vacated the restitution provisions and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant-Appellant Michael Cooper was convicted by jury on one count of conspiracy to defraud, and multiple counts of mail and wire fraud, money laundering and engaging in transactions derived from unlawful activity. Defendant filed several motions with the district court including motions for a judgment of acquittal, a post-verdict motion for a new trial, and a motion to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied them all. On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court's denial of those motions. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit found Defendant failed to prove that the evidence presented against him at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Therefore the Court affirmed the district court's denials of Defendant's motions for judgment of acquittal, for a new trial, and to suppress evidence, and affirmed Defendant's convictions.

Defendant Jodi Hoskins was convicted of tax evasion after she and her husband failed to pay taxes for income they earned through their Salt Lake City escort service. The government contended the Hoskins' failed to account for more than one million dollars in income generated in cash payments and credit card receipts. At sentencing, the government's tax loss was relevant to potential jail time and restitution under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. To minimize the tax loss for sentencing purposes, the Hoskins' offered hypothetical tax returns to account for the unreported income and attempted to take deductions they claimed they would have been entitled to but for the tax evasion. The district court rejected the hypothetical tax returns and accepted the government's tax-loss estimate. Defendant appealed her eventual sentence, arguing the sentencing judge abused his discretion in establishing the lost taxes. Furthermore, Defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against her and the reasonableness of her sentence. Finding no abuse of discretion, and that the evidence presented at trial sufficient to support her sentence, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction.

This appeal arose from an earlier trial relating to the Enron scandal. The government alleged that Enron loaned out the stake in the barges that it owned off the Nigerian coast to Merill Lynch, risk-free and with a guaranteed return, but made it seem like a sale so that it could book a pretend profit. Defendant, a managing director at Merrill Lynch and the head of its Strategic Asset and Lease Finance group at the time of the transaction, challenged his convictions related to the sale on the grounds that the government violated his right to due process by withholding materially favorable evidence that it possessed pre-trial. The court affirmed and held that the district court did not clearly err in holding that the evidence at issue was not material.

Defendants were convicted of mail fraud and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341, 1346) for participating in a fraudulent scheme to obtain mortgage loans. The scheme involved: recruiters, who enlisted buyers to buy properties with fraudulently obtained funds; financiers, who provided funds to buyers to facilitate the transactions; administrators, who bought fake documents to enable buyers to obtain mortgages; loan officers, who prepared fraudulent applications and sent them to lenders. Between 2003 and 2005, the group acquired more than 70 properties for which lenders provided $7.2 million in loans. Most of the properties went into foreclosure, resulting in losses to the lenders of $2.2 million. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences. The use of the term "straw buyer" in the confession of a nontestifying co-defendant did not obviously refer to the defendant and violate his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation under the "Bruton" doctrine. The court properly applied a "sophisticated means" sentence enhancement and gave an "ostrich" instruction concerning defendant's knowledge.

This case arose when defendant was charged with one count of embezzlement and theft of labor union assets. At issue was whether the district court's employment of supplemental arguments impermissibly coerced a guilty verdict and whether the district court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury regarding defendant's defense that her actions were authorized by the union's president. The court held that the district court neither coerced a guilty verdict nor abused its discretion by ordering supplemental closing arguments under the circumstances presented in this case. The district court also did not commit reversible plain error by failing to instruct the jury on an authorization defense, as the evidence presented and relied on by defendant at trial did not support a finding that her actions were authorized by the union. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of four counts of tax evasion and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed his convictions, arguing that the government constructively amended the indictment through the evidence presented at trial; the instructions erroneously defined "taxable income" and "good faith"; and the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The government appealed defendant's sentence, contending that the district court erroneously relied on a fact rejected by the jury in imposing a sentence below the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range. The court held that neither a constructive amendment nor a variance occurred; the jury was properly instructed and defendant's arguments to the contrary were rejected; and there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict defendant. The court also held that the district court did not commit a procedural error and that the sentence was substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendants ran the township trustee's office, which provides various social services. They defrauded the office by taking substantial payments for work they did not perform, deposited checks made out to the office into their personal bank accounts. They were convicted of two counts of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341, 1346). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While evidence of mailing was circumstantial, based on usual office practice, it was sufficient. The 2010 Supreme Court decision in Skilling v. U.S. did not mandate acquittal; even if honest services fraud is erased from the picture, the jury would have convicted defendants on a monetary fraud theory. The jury was properly instructed on both theories.

In this political corruption case, Larry P. Langford, formerly a Commissioner for Jefferson County, Alabama and mayor of Birmingham, Alabama, appealed his convictions for multiple counts of bribery, conspiracy, money laundering, mail fraud, tax fraud, and criminal forfeiture. Langford broadly argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for mail and wire fraud; the district court fatally erred in some of its evidentiary rulings; the district court wrongfully charged the jury about the bribery statute; and the district court mistakenly denied his post-voir-dire motion for a change of venue. After thorough review, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

This case involved serious allegations against Robert E. Stark, the auditor-controller of Sutter County where the Sutter County District Attorney's Office claimed that Stark violated statutes, county rules, and Sutter County Board of Supervisors (Board) resolutions detailing the requirements of his office. At issue were four provisions of Penal Code section 424, all of which proscribe general intent offenses. Three of those provisions criminalize acting without authority or failing to act as required by law or legal duty. The court held that those offenses additionally required that defendant knew, or was criminally negligent in failing to know, the legal requirements that governed the act or omission. The court also held that a claim of misinstruction on the mens rea of a crime could be challenged under Penal Code section 995, subdivision (a)(1)(B) where it raised the possibility that, as instructed, the grand jury could have indicted on less than reasonable or probable cause. The court further held that based on the record, the court need not decide the question of whether willful misconduct under Government Code section 3060 required a knowing and purposeful refusal to follow the law. Stark did not disagree with the instruction on mental state given by the district attorney and accompanying PowerPoint slides invalidated the instruction on mental state, requiring that the accusation be set aside. The court addressed these claims as to the district attorney's argument and PowerPoint slides and concluded that it was without merit. The court finally held that, in a motion to set aside an indictment or accusation, a defendant claiming that the district attorney suffered from a conflict of interest during the grand jury proceeding must establish that his right to due process was violated. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.