Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Defendant was prohibited from possessing a computer or accessing the internet while on home confinement, after being released from prison following a 2005 plea of guilty to wire, mail, and bank fraud. He nonetheless used the internet for a check-kiting scheme and, in 2010, was charged under 18 U.S.C. 1344 (bank fraud), 18 U.S.C. 1341 (mail fraud) and with escape. He was found guilty and sentenced to concurrent terms of 80 months, followed by supervised release with limits on internet and computer use. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that a jury could reasonably infer that the banks were FDIC-insured at the time of the offenses and that defendant used the mail as part of his schemes. The special conditions imposed on release are reasonably related to the goals of supervised release. The calculation of loss, including a fraudulent $1.4 million check that did not result in any actual loss, was not clear error. View "United States v. Stergio" on Justia Law

Defendant, the former Chief Executive Officer of Brocade Communications (Brocade or the Company), a company the developed and sold data switches for networks, appealed his conviction in a second criminal trial for securities fraud and making false filings; falsifying corporate books and records; and making false statements to auditors in violation of securities laws. Defendant was previously convicted of violating the securities laws but the court vacated that conviction because of prosecutorial misconduct and remanded for a new trial. In this appeal, the court held that there was no evidence of sufficient facts in the record to support any allegation of prosecutorial misconduct. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence of materiality to support defendant's conviction. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not giving defendant's proposed jury instruction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Reyes" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed his conviction and sentence on two counts of attempted tax evasion. Appellant argued that the government failed to prove the element of tax loss because it relied upon a flawed calculation under the "cash method of proof" and attributed to appellant $1.9 million of alleged gain when those funds, as a matter of law, belonged to his two corporations. Appellant challenged his sentence to the extent it rested upon the allegedly incorrect calculation of tax loss. The court found no error in the district court's denial of defendant's motions for judgment of acquittal. The court also held that, because a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt a tax was due and owing on $300,000 of income, the court left for another day how best to interpret the dictum in James v. United States. The court affirmed the sentence because the district court made sufficient factual findings at sentencing to support the inclusion of the $1.9 million in the calculation of tax loss. View "United States v. Khanu" on Justia Law

The same day that debtor discharged his debts in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, his mother, died, leaving debtor and his brother equal shares in an estate. Debtor signed a disclaimer of his interest, but never told the trustee about his inheritance. Following a series of transactions between the brothers and various accounts, the U.S. Attorney's office launched an investigation, and the brothers were charged with bankruptcy fraud (18 U.S.C. 157(3)). Debtor was also charged with impeding a bankruptcy trustee in the course of his duties (18 U.S.C. 152(1)) and fraudulently concealing assets. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The circumstantial evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the brothers engaged in a fraudulent scheme. The court also rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "United States v. Persfull" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of two federal offenses: one count of aiding and abetting a violation of the so-called Medicare anti-kickback statute, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(b)(2) and 18 U.S.C. 2, and one count of aiding and abetting the falsification of a document, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1519 and 2. Defendant raised several claims on appeal. The court held that the district court did not err in admitting testimony concerning statements made by defendant's wife during her interview with the FBI; in admitting evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) that defendant stole funds from previous employers in the healthcare industry; in denying defendant's motion to dismiss count one of the second superseding indictment, which charged a violation of the anti-kickback statute; by refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to suppress statements and to declare his proffer agreement unenforceable; and by granting in part the spouse's attorneys' motion to quash a subpoena requiring one of the representatives to produce his entire file regarding the representation of the spouse who was now deceased. The court also held that the district court's jury instructions regarding count one were not erroneous. The court held, however, that the district court erred in calculating the amount of loss under Guidelines 2B4.1 when it used the loss to the victims, rather than the benefit to defendant, as the measure of loss. Therefore, the court concluded that there was procedural error and defendant's sentence was vacated. The court finally vacated the restitution order and remanded for further proceedings. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims. View "United States v. Yielding" on Justia Law

Defendant, a licensed financial adviser, pled guilty to 34 counts of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341), wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343), and bank fraud (18 U.S.C. 1344) based on his solicitation of bank clients to invest in speculative real estate transactions that he controlled, unrelated to bank products, an illegal practice in the securities industry known as "selling away." The Government accused him of collecting $1.55 million between October 2002 and January 2006. The district court denied his motion to withdraw the plea when he claimed that his prior attorney, unprepared to go to trial, had browbeaten him. The court imposed a sentence of 180 months and $1.3 million in restitution. The Third Circuit affirmed. With no evidence of actual innocence and the death of some of the government's elderly witnesses, there was no "fair and just" reason to allow withdrawal of the plea. Because defendant was an investment advisor when he initiated the fraud, the court properly applied a four-level enhancement at section 2B1.1(b)(16)(A); an obstruction of justice enhancement was justified by defendant's lies concerning his guilty plea and his contact with witnesses. View "United States v. Siddon" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for visa fraud and conspiracy to commit visa fraud, as well as his sentence. Defendant had requested specific jury instructions with respect to the government's burden of proof regarding his knowledge of the fraud for which he was indicted. The district court denied these requests and instead gave a general instruction on acting "knowingly." Defendant challenged those denials as well as the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. The court found these challenges meritless. In calculating defendant's Guidelines sentencing range, the district court relied on four enhancements, three of which defendant challenged on appeal. Though the basis of the district court's application of the leader/organizer enhancement could have been more fully elaborated, the court found that the record supported its application here. Regarding the obstruction-of-justice and number-of-document enhancements, however, the court agreed with defendant that the evidence was insufficient to sustain their use in this case. Therefore, the court vacated defendant's sentence. Defendant also challenged the order of restitution imposed by the district court under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A. Because the court found the record evidence insufficiently specific to demonstrate that each client to whom the court ordered restitution was a "victim" of the fraud, the court vacated the restitution order. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for resentencing, including reconsideration of the restitution award. View "United States v. Archer" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence of 25 months' imprisonment plus five years of supervised release following his guilty plea to ten counts of embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. 656, and eight counts of bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1344. The eighteen counts defendant pleaded guilty to related to two schemes to defraud Wells Fargo: an embezzlement scheme and a check-kiting scheme. On appeal, defendant's primary contention was that because he did not know he was the subject of a pending criminal investigation at the time he committed perjury in a civil suit concerning the very same conduct later charged in the criminal indictment, the district court erred in applying U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 to enhance his sentence for willfully obstructing justice. The court held that because the district court applied the correct legal standard and relied upon probative evidence submitted by the government, the district court did not err in calculating the intended loss at being over $200,000. The court also held that "willful" meant only that defendant had engaged in intentional or deliberate acts designed to obstruct any potential investigation, at the time an investigation was in fact pending; it did not mean that defendant had to know for certain that the investigation was pending. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Gilchrist" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty, in 1997, to multiple counts of fraud, money laundering, and perjury and was sentenced to 78 months' imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and ordered to pay $1,587,321.50 in restitution and to forfeit $337,000. The government obtained a turnover order targeting payments defendant had received from three retirement savings plans provided through his employer under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3613(a). The Seventh Circuit vacated. The targeted funds are a defined benefit plan, a 401(k) plan, and a "non-qualified" plan. The Consumer Credit Protection Act limits garnishment to 25% of the party's "aggregate disposable earnings of any individual workweek," 15 U.S.C. 1673(a), and applies to the periodic payments from a pension or retirement program.View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

Defendant, an apartment building owner convicted of bribery of building officials, (18 U.S.C. 666(a)(2)), was sentenced to 34 months of imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed and remanded for resentencing. The district court provided thorough instructions as to the elements of bribery, defining "knowingly," "corruptly," and "willfully," and was within its discretion in denying a separate instruction on intent. The court correctly excluded testimony of a defense witness and limited defense cross-examination of certain witnesses. The court was within its discretion in holding that defendant was not prejudiced by the lack of prior knowledge of a change of testimony. In sentencing, the court did not follow the correct order of steps set forth in "Gunter," did not compute a definitive loss calculation or offense level to reach its Guidelines range nor did it meaningfully consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct (18 U.S.C. 3553 (a)(6).View "United States v. Friedman" on Justia Law