Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from a restitution order imposed by the district court after a jury convicted her of various crimes associated with her involvement in a fraudulent real estate investment scheme. The court held that the district court failed to provide an adequate explanation of its reasoning in calculating the amount of restitution owed to two of the victims and, therefore, vacated that portion of the restitution order. The court remanded for recalculation and explanation of the award pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A. View "United States v. Yeung" on Justia Law

Defendant, a medical doctor, was convicted of distributing fentanyl, a Schedule II narcotic controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and obtaining morphine by misrepresentation, fraud, and deception, 21 U.S.C. 843(a)(3) and was sentenced to 48 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.The government was not required to present expert testimony, in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's unprecedented and undocumented prescriptions of profoundly addicting and potent painkillers, which he personally administered in multiple, private houses and hotel rooms The district court properly enhanced his sentence for obstruction of justice because defendant lied to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents.View "United States v. Pellmann" on Justia Law

Defendant owned and operated a beauty salon in downtown Boston that was lightly damaged by a fire in 2005. Investigators concluded that defendant had set the fire in order to collect insurance proceeds, and he was convicted of attempted arson, 18 U.S.C. 844(i). The First Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in admitting testimony about defendant's conversation about his plan to commit arson and his involvement in an earlier arson and in refusing to declare a mistrial after the prosecutor began a line of questioning concerning polygraph evidence. View "United States v. Mare" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, seven couples who sent money to the defendants (adoption agency and individuals) to facilitate adoptions, in some cases of specific children, believed they had been defrauded and filed federal claims. The case was stayed, pending resolution of state criminal charges. The district court subsequently dismissed claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962. The complaint identified the agency as the enterprise; identified predicate violations of mail fraud and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 341 and 1343, extortion, 18 U.S.C. 1951; transmitting or transferring in interstate commerce goods, wares, merchandise, or money knowing the same to have been stolen, converted, or taken by fraud, 18 U.S.C. 2314; and traveling in interstate or foreign commerce with the intent to distribute the proceeds of extortion, 18 U.S.C. 1952; and alleged a conspiracy among the individual defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Four of plaintiffs' claims adequately alleged predicate acts of mail or wire fraud and adequately alleged a threat of continued criminal activity and, therefore, a pattern of racketeering activity. View "Heinrich v. Waiting Angels Adoption Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of mail fraud and money laundering charges related to two separate fraudulent schemes: the River Shore Scheme and the GenSpec Scheme. On appeal, defendant challenged his convictions and sentences on various grounds. The court concluded that the proof presented at trial in connection with the River Shores mail fraud count materially varied from the allegations contained in the superseding indictment and this variance substantially prejudiced defendant. Therefore, the court reversed his conviction on this count. The court also reversed defendant's money laundering convictions because they were predicated on the River Shores mail fraud count. The court affirmed defendant's mail fraud convictions related to the GenSpec Scheme. Finally, the court held that defendant's other assertions of error lacked merit. View "United States v. Lander" on Justia Law

Defendant, a businessman, was convicted on 10 counts of bank fraud (18 U.S.C. 1344) involving creation of 10 fraudulent entries on the books of a small bank in Benton, Tennessee. At trial, the government offered the theory that defendant and the bank's president jointly created the phony entries in an effort to disguise earlier, troubled loans to defendant's business. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the evidence was insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court improperly excluded evidence that the bank president had, unassisted, previously engaged in a large number of identical frauds. The prosecutor suggested to the jury that acquittal would deliver a financial windfall to defendant. The government offered no direct evidence and insufficient circumstantial evidence to show that defendant knew about or participated in the bank president's fraud, a fraud that the bank president had independent reasons for creating. View "United States v. Parkes" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of numerous offenses relating to her involvement in a fraudulent "high-yield investment program." Before defendant was indicted and before the applicable statute of limitations had run, the district court granted a government application to suspend the statute of limitations pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3292 while the government sought the assistance of the Hungarian government in recovering records relating to transfers of the scheme's proceeds into Hungarian bank accounts. On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that the indictments should have been dismissed because insufficient evidence supported the district court's order to suspend the running of the statute of limitations. The court held (1) that the evidence in this case was sufficient to support the district court's order; (2) that section 3292 did not require that the foreign evidence sought be necessary for an indictment, nor that it be obtainable only through an official request to a foreign government; and (3) that district courts could rely on ex parte proceedings when deciding to issue section 3292 orders. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Lyttle" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of 14 counts of willfully assisting in preparation of tax returns containing materially false and fraudulent claims, including phony medical and business expenses and charitable donations. The evidence at trial proved tax loss of $31,849. At sentencing, the government proposed a tax loss figure of $1.6 million by identifying 662 returns that contained materially false claims similar to those proven at trial and eliminating contested returns. The district court discounted the loss to $400,000- to $1-million to compensate for possible selection bias in a sample of 100 returns and imposed a sentence of 42 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The tax loss figure was not outside the realm of permissible computations. The district court considered defendant's family circumstances as well as substantial aggravating circumstances, including her education, financial and intellectual abilities, knowledge of the tax code and duty to provide truthful information, and that her actions caused the IRS to audit her clients. Defendant also failed to appear for a sentencing hearing, was dishonest to the court, frivolously denied the court had jurisdiction over her, and similarly asserted she was an independent sovereign protected by the Eleventh Amendment.View "United States v. Littrice" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed from judgments following a jury trial that resulted in their convictions for racketeering and related offenses. Defendants all contended, inter alia, that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the relatedness and continuity factors required to establish a pattern of racketeering under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) and (d). The court concluded that the district court's RICO instruction was legally erroneous and this error was prejudicial with regard to Chris Cain. With regard to the racketeering convictions of David Cain, Jr. and Jamie Soha, however, applying a plain error standard of review, the court concluded that it was not reasonably likely that a properly instructed jury would have failed to find a pattern of racketeering. Accordingly, the court reversed the RICO convictions with regard to Chris Cain only and remanded for resentencing. The court affirmed the convictions in all other respects. View "United States v. Cain, Jr., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of bank fraud, his sentence was subsequently reduced, he was placed on supervised release, and his supervised release was revoked twice. Defendant appealed the second revocation of his supervised release and appealed the district court's post revocation sentence, which included a special condition of supervised release requiring him to reside in a residential reentry center for a third time upon his release. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking defendant's supervised release where he admitted to violating ten conditions of supervised release. The court also held that the district court did not plainly err when it ordered defendant to reside in a residential reentry center where that court followed the procedures set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3583. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Melton" on Justia Law