Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Office of Investigations (OIG) found that the SEC had received numerous substantive complaints since 1992 that raised significant concerns about Madoff’s hedge fund operations that should have led to a thorough investigation of the possibility that Madoff was operating a Ponzi scheme. The SEC conducted five examinations and investigations, but never took the steps necessary to determine whether Madoff was misrepresenting his trading. The OIG found that had these efforts been made, the SEC could have uncovered the Ponzi scheme. Madoff’s clients filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671, to recover damages resulting from the SEC’s failure to uncover and terminate the scheme in a timely manner. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the claims were barred by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. The Third Circuit affirmed, reasoning that SEC regulations afford examiners discretion regarding the timing, manner, and scope of investigations and that there is a strong presumption that the SEC’s conduct is susceptible to policy analysis. View "Baer v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendants in this case were a Puerto Rico legislator and a Commonwealth businessman who were charged with unlawfully exchanging favorable action on legislation for a trip to Las Vegas to attend a prize fight. After a jury trial, Defendants were convicted of, inter alia, federal program bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. 666. Defendants appealed, contending, among other issues, that the district court erred in instructing the jury to find guilt on the section 666 counts based on a gratuity theory rather than a bribery theory. The First Circuit Court of appeals (1) vacated Defendants' section 666 convictions, holding that because section 666 does not criminalize gratuities in addition to bribes, the district court erred in its instructions; and (2) directed the district court to enter a judgment of acquittal on Defendants' conspiracy charges, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause entitled both men to acquittal on their respective conspiracy charges. View "United States v. Bravo-Fernandez" on Justia Law

Defendants, former executives of the retail drugstore chain Duane Reede, appealed their convictions for securities fraud. Defendants had executed a number of schemes to inflate the company's earnings in quarterly and annual financial statements filed with the SEC. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of non-expert witnesses. The court also concluded that Defendant Tennant's claims that his conviction should be overturned for insufficient evidence to prove his knowledge of the fraud and that it was error for the district court to give a conscious avoidance jury instruction were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Cuti" on Justia Law

FBI agents Freeman and Howell investigated the Hinds, who worked for Indiana criminal defense attorney Alexander, for bribery of witnesses, including Kirtz. They equipped Kirtz and Chrisp with recording devices for a meeting, during which Alexander stated that he did not know about Hinds’s bribery and would attempt to find out what was going on. Although Kirtz and Chrisp later confirmed that this meeting occurred and that they delivered the recordings, the agents never produced the recordings and claimed that the meeting never occurred. Months later, McKinney, who had a grudge against Alexander, became the new prosecutor. Alexander claims that McKinney conspired with Kirtz and Chrisp (then under investigation for participation in an arson ring) to destroy the recording and manufacture evidence against Alexander. Alexander was acquitted of bribery charges and filed a Notice of Tort Claim with the FBI, stating his intention to sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671-2680. The FBI declined to act. Alexander filed suit, alleging malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed, based on failure to state a claim for malicious prosecution and untimely filing of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Alexander alleged specific events that fell within the limitations period. View "Alexander v. United States" on Justia Law

The Comptroller is sole trustee and chooses investments for the employee pension fund of the state of New York and its local governments. The Comptroller’s general counsel recommended against investing in a fund managed by FA; the general counsel then received anonymous e-mails demanding that he recommend the investment and threatening to disclose information about the general counsel’s alleged affair. Some of the e-mails were traced to the home computer of Sekhar, a managing partner of FA, who was convicted of attempted extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a). The Act defines “extortion” as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.” The jury specified that the property at issue was the general counsel’s recommendation to approve the investment. The Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. Attempting to compel a person to recommend that his employer approve an investment does not constitute “the obtaining of property from another” under the Hobbs Act. Congress generally intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses. Extortion historically required the obtaining of items of value, typically cash, from the victim. The Act’s text requires not only deprivation, but the acquisition of property; the property, therefore, must be transferable. No fluent English-speaker would say that “petitioner obtained and exercised the general counsel’s right to make a recommendation,” any more than he would say that a person “obtained and exercised another’s right to free speech.” View "Sekhar v. United States" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of seventeen counts of mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and aggravated identity theft. Appellant appealed, arguing (1) the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him by admitting testimony of a forensic examiner about another examiner's prior examination; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his aggravated identity theft convictions. The First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Appellant's convictions on all counts, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty of aggravated identity theft; and (2) the district court did not plainly err in admitting the testimony of the forensic examiner about the conclusions in another examiner's report, as the statements did not affect Appellant's substantial rights. View "United States v. Soto" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his securities fraud conviction for insider trading. The court held that the district court properly analyzed the misstatements and omissions in the government's Title III wiretap application under the analytical framework prescribed in Franks v. Delaware; the alleged misstatements and omissions in the wiretap application did not require suppression; and the district court's jury instructions on the use of inside information satisfied the "knowing possession" standard. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Rajaratnam" on Justia Law

The government alleged Defendant-Appellant Richard Clark, along with other co-conspirators, manipulated shares of several penny-stocks by using false and backdated documents to make those shares publically tradable, then coordinated the trading among themselves to create the false appearance of an active market for those shares. The shares were sold after the prices surged. The conspirators laundered the proceeds through multiple bank accounts and nominees (a "pump-and-dump" scheme). Defendant was charged and convicted on multiple counts for his participation in the scheme. He appealed his conviction to the Tenth Circuit, arguing: (1) the pretrial placement of a caveat on his property violated his constitutional rights; (2) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; (3) the district court erred in refusing to appoint additional or substitute counsel better versed in complex securities issues; (4) the district court erred by failing to sever his case from his co-conspirator's; and (5) his rights under the Speedy Trial Act were violated by a fourteen-month delay between filing of the indictment and the start of trial. The Tenth Circuit addressed each of Defendant's contentions in its opinion, but found no discernible error. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 federal habeas corpus petition based upon the Supreme Court's decision in Skilling v. United States, which narrowed the scope of the honest services fraud theory. Defendant,a former attorney and trustee of private trusts, pleaded guilty to honest services fraud. The government conceded that defendant was actually innocent of honest services fraud in light of Skilling, which confined the reach of the offense to cases of bribes and kickbacks. The court vacated the district court's dismissal of defendant's honest services fraud claim where no evidence suggested that defendant either engaged in bribery or received kickbacks. View "United States v. Avery" on Justia Law

Loffredi’s securities brokerage firm offered investments in certificates of deposit, mutual funds, and Treasury bills. Instead of actually purchasing investments requested by customers, Loffredi diverted their money to his personal expenses and business debts. He fraudulently misappropriated about $2.8 million over four years. A customer alerted the Securities and Exchange Commission to irregularities in his financial statements. After an investigation, Loffredi was charged with five counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. He pleaded guilty to one count. The judge applied a two-level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i) for an offense involving at least 10 victims and imposed a sentence of 78 months. The presentence report counted as victims each of the 14 defrauded customers whose funds Loffredi had misappropriated. Loffredi argued that the only victim of the offense was his broker-dealer parent firm, which had reimbursed the losses of 12 of the 14 customers (Loffredi reimbursed the other two). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Loffredi never asserted that his fraud was painless for his customers and rejecting his “all-or-nothing” defense that the customers cannot be victims if they were reimbursed. View "Unted States v. Loffredi" on Justia Law