Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

abiu worked as a bank teller, 2003-2007. He searched account records for account holders with balances exceeding $100,000, then stole their information and, along with codefendants, compromised that information to divert money into fraudulently opened bank accounts. Postal inspectors lawfully searched his home and seized notes containing names, Social Security numbers, and account information of 86 customers, and an unspecified number of fake driver’s licenses and Social Security cards bearing the names of some of those customers, but only 17 customers suffered a loss. The losses were reimbursed by the banks. Rabiu pleaded guilty to bank fraud and aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1344, 1029(a)(2), 1028A(a)(1), admitting participation in the scheme, but insisting that some of the names and identifying information on the phony driver’s licenses and Social Security cards were fictitious and not from customers. The government successfully sought a four-level upward sentencing adjustment under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) based on 50 or more victims. The government cited a definition of “victim,” which, for offenses involving identity theft, was broadened in 2009, after Rabiu’s arrest, to include “any individual whose means of identification was used unlawfully or without authority.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the court overstated the number of victims, it was clear that the judge would have imposed the same sentence even had he accepted Rabiu’s calculation; the error was harmless. View "United States v. Rabiu" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted under the Economic Espionage Act (EEA), 18 U.S.C. 1832, and the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA), 18 U.S.C. 2314, after he replicated his former employer's (the Bank) confidential computer code to give to a competitor in exchange for money. On appeal, defendant challenged the legal sufficiency of the charges in light of United States v. Aleynikov. The court concluded that, on plain-error review of defendant's defaulted legal sufficiency challenge to his EEA conviction, defendant failed to show that purported error in the pleading of the law's jurisdictional element affected his substantial rights or the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings; on plain-error review of defendant's defaulted legal insufficiency challenge to his NSPA conviction, defendant failed to show that the theft of the computer code did not satisfy the law's goods, wares, or merchandise requirement; and defendant's remaining claims failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Agrawal" on Justia Law

Dayton Title brokered real estate closings and had a trust account at PNC Bank for clients’ funds. In 1998-1999, Dayton facilitated bridge loans from defendants to Chari, from $1.9 million to $3.2 million, for commercial real estate purchases. Defendants would deposit funds into Dayton’s PNC account, which Dayton would transfer to Chari. Chari’s loan payments would pass through Dayton’s account. The first six bridge loans were paid, but not always on time. Defendants provided Chari another bridge loan, for $4.8 million. After the due date, Chari deposited a $4.885 million check into Dayton’s account. The PNC teller did not place a hold on the check. On the same day, Dayton “pursuant to Chari’s instructions” issued checks to defendants. PNC extended a provisional credit for the value of Chari’s check, as is standard for business accounts. After the checks were paid, PNC learned that Chari’s check was a forgery drawn on a non-existing account, exercised its right of “charge back” on the Dayton account, and regained about $740,000 of the provisional credit. Dayton was forced into bankruptcy. Chari declared bankruptcy and was convicted of racketeering, fraud, and forgery. Dayton’s bankruptcy estate and PNC sued, seeking to avoid the $4.885 million transfer to defendants as fraudulent under 11 U.S.C. 548 and Ohio Rev. Code 1336.04(A)(2). The bankruptcy court held that all but $722,101.49 of the transfer was fraudulent. The district court held that all but $20,747.13 of the transfer was not fraudulent. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court, reinstating the bankruptcy court holding. Dayton did not hold the provisional credit funds in trust; the funds were not encumbered by a lien at the time of transfer. The funds were “assets” held by Dayton, so the transfer satisfied the statutory definition of “fraudulent.” View "In re: Dayton Title Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

Trek was the importer of record for 72 entries of men’s suits in 2004. Mercantile was the consignee. Shadadpuri is president and sole shareholder of Trek, and a 40% shareholder of Mercantile. Trek and Mercantile provided a number of fabric “assists” to manufacturers outside the U. S. An assist refers to “materials, components, parts, and similar items incorporated in the imported merchandise,” 19 U.S.C. 1401a(h)(1)(A)(i). Customs determined that the entry documentation failed to include the cost of the fabric assists in the price paid for the suits which lowered the amount of duty payable by Trek. Shadadpuri had previously failed to include assists in entry declarations when acting on behalf of a corporate importer. The Court of International Trade found Shadadpuri liable for gross negligence in connection with the entry of imported merchandise and imposed penalties under 19 U.S.C. 1592(c)(2). The Federal Circuit reversed the penalty assessment, holding that corporate officers of an “importer of record” are not directly liable for penalties. Shadadpuri is not liable, absent piercing Trek’s corporate veil to establish that Shadadpuri was the actual importer of record, as defined by statute, or establishing that Shadadpuri is liable for fraud or as an aider and abettor. View "United States v. Trek Leather, Inc." on Justia Law

Stern represented Allen in a discrimination suit, after which they became romantically involved. Allen and her husband had separated and had executed a settlement agreement awarding Allen $95,000, to be paid in installments. A month later, Allen visited a bankruptcy attorney, Losey, giving Stern’s name as “friend/referral” on an intake form. In filing for bankruptcy, Allen did not disclose the marital settlement. While her bankruptcy was pending, Allen received the money. A month after her bankruptcy discharge, Allen transferred the settlement proceeds to Stern, who opened a CD in his name. The attorney for Allen’s ex-husband informed the bankruptcy trustee that Allen failed to disclose the settlementand the discharge was revoked. Allen pleaded guilty to making a false declaration in a bankruptcy proceeding, 18 U.S.C. 152(3). She told a grand jury that Stern had not referred her to Losey and was convicted of making a material false statement in a grand jury proceeding, 18 U.S.C. 1623. The court admitted Losey’s client-intake form as evidence of perjury. Stern was convicted of conspiring to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h). The Seventh Circuit affirmed Allen’s conviction, holding that the intake form was not a communication in furtherance of legal representation and was not subject to attorney-client privilege. Reversing Stern’s conviction, the court held that the judge erred in excluding Stern’s testimony about why he purchased the CDs. View "United States v. Stern" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions for 44 counts of fraudulent behavior relating to theft of government funds, filing of their personal taxes, and actions they took as paid tax preparers. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions; the district court did not plainly err by joining defendants for trial; the district court did not err in excluding expert witnesses for the defense; taken as a whole, the district court's instructions "fairly and adequately" submitted the issue of good faith to the jury and it was not error to reject defendants' proffered good faith instruction; and the district court did not err in calculating restitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Morris" on Justia Law

Defendant Calhoun appealed her conviction of two counts of conspiracy to commit access device fraud and aggravated identity theft and making false statements to investigators. Calhoun's convictions stemmed from her purchase of several "black market" airline tickets from Defendant Ross. Ross appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit access device fraud and aggravated identity theft, access device fraud, and aggravated identity fraud. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to convict Calhoun; the district court committed no prejudicial abuse of discretion in not sua sponte excluding an inspector's testimony; and the court rejected Calhoun's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court also concluded that the district court's finding that the fraud loss exceeded $1,000,000 was not clearly erroneous; the district court did not err in imposing a 6-level enhancement for a fraud offense involving more than 250 or more victims under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)(C); and the district court did not err in imposing a 2-level enhancement for a fraud offense involving sophisticated means under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Calhoun" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343, and 1349. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their involvement in a conspiracy to defraud a non-existent investor of three billion dollars. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that any misrepresentations defendants made were material. The court concluded, however, that defendants' sentences were procedurally unsound where the court was uncertain whether the district court weighed the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions but vacated the sentences, remanding for resentencing. View "United States v. Juncal" on Justia Law

Walsh and Martin, principals of a futures and foreign currency trading company that acted as a “futures commission merchant” and as a “forex dealer member,” used customer funds for personal expenses, then concealed the company’s insolvency and their criminal conduct by misleading customers about the company’s ability to meet its obligations. Existing customers got account statements that falsely stated their available margin funds, and they solicited new customers by making false statements. They also used a Ponzi-like scheme for redemptions. Shortly before it was shut down, the company had $17,654,486 in unpaid customer liabilities and only $677,932 in assets. Walsh and Martin pleaded guilty to wire fraud, tax evasion, and to making false statements in a report to the Commodities Futures and Trading Commission, a Commodities Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 6d(a)) violation. The district court sentenced them to terms of imprisonment of 150 and 204 months, respectively, and ordered each to pay $16,976,554 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to a finding as to the amount of loss and restitution and to application of a sentencing enhancement based upon a finding that each was an officer or director of a futures commission merchant. View "United States v. Walsh" on Justia Law

Clark, the owner and president of an East St. Louis Illinois company, was charged with making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(3). Clark’s company had entered into a hauling services subcontract with Gateway, general contractor on a federally funded highway project in St. Louis, Missouri. Employers must pay laborers working on certain federally-funded projects the “prevailing wage,” calculated by the Secretary of Labor based on wages earned by corresponding classes of workers employed on projects of similar character in a given area, and maintain payroll records demonstrating prevailing wage compliance, 40 U.S.C. 3142(b) The indictment charged that Clark submitted false payroll records and a false affidavit to Gateway, representing that his employees were paid $35 per hour, when they actually received $13-$14 per hour. The district court dismissed for improper venue, finding that when a false document is filed under a statute that makes the filing a condition precedent to federal jurisdiction, venue is proper only in the district where the document was filed for final agency action. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Although the effects of the alleged wrongdoing may be felt more strongly in Missouri than in Illinois, the Southern District of Illinois is a proper venue. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law