Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Davis, a nurse and assistant professor of nursing at Chicago State University, ran several public health programs aimed at improving the health care of the African-American community. As program director for the Chicago Chapter of the National Black Nurses Association (CCBNA), Davis solicited and oversaw public and private grants, contracts, and funds awarded to CCBNA. Between December 2005 and March 2009, Davis solicited and obtained contracts and grants totaling approximately $1,062,000 from Illinois state agencies. Davis diverted approximately $377,000 by writing checks to herself, friends, and family members; concealing conflicts of interest; hiring unqualified family members and other acquaintances for positions in projects; forging co-signatures; and falsifying information. Davis pleaded guilty to mail fraud and money laundering. In the plea agreement, the parties concurred that based on the factors contained in 18 U.S.C. 3553, Davis could be sentenced to, and the government would recommend, no higher than a below-guidelines sentence of 41 months’ imprisonment. The advisory guidelines range was 57–71 months. Davis waived the right to appeal the reasonableness of the sentence but reserved the right to challenge any procedural error at sentencing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the district court erred procedurally by failing to adequately take into account her mental health in considering mitigating factors. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Reid was the Executive Director for State and Federal Programs for the River Rouge School District. One of the vendors who received contracts for the district was Flaggs, owned by Reid’s brother-in-law. In a scenario typical of their relationship, Reid made a false representation that the program was mandatory, parents enrolled their children, Flaggs received a total of $75,000 for a “Jump Start” program, and Flaggs returned $2,500 to Reid as an individual. Reid ultimately admitted that she had received $10,000 to $20,000 from Flaggs for providing preferential treatment to his company. The Sixth Circuit affirmed her convictions for bribery and mail fraud, rejecting, as having not been timely raised, claims that the prosecution committed a Batson violation when it struck jurors for cause after asking them whether they would be prejudiced against the government’s use of information from Reid’s prayer journal and that the government violated Miranda in questioning Reid without a Miranda warning. The court also rejected her claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the sentencing guidelines computation and in failing to timely raise objections to the other claims. View "United States v. Reid" on Justia Law

Castaldi, involved in fraudulent schemes since high school, operated a Ponzi scheme that collapsed in 2008. Net losses to investors and the IRS totaled about $40 million. When the scheme was near collapse, Castaldi turned himself in to the government. He eventually pled guilty to just one count of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and one count of corruptly impeding the IRS, 26 U.S.C. 7212(a). The district court imposed the longest prison sentence possible under the plea agreement: consecutive sentences of 20 years on the mail fraud charge and three years on the tax charge, about 50percent longer than the high end of the agreed Sentencing Guideline range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence, finding that the court adequately considered the fact that Castaldi told the government about his scheme and cooperated with its investigation, but also considered the devastating financial harm Castaldi inflicted on family members, friends, and neighbors of modest financial means.View "United States v. Castaldi" on Justia Law

When purchasing a house, the defendants submitted loan documents containing false incomes and bank statements, and failed to disclose that husband’s company was selling and his wife was buying. The company received $750,000 and rebated money paid above that amount to husband. The $1 million in loans they received resulted in $250,000 extra that was not disclosed as going to the couple. They were able to sell the house four months later for the same inflated amount, without raising any concerns. They failed to disclose on the HUD-1 forms in the second transaction that they would be giving the buyer kickbacks. The buyer received $1,090,573.06 in loans, but defaulted without making a payment. The lender eventually sold the house for $487,500. Defendants were convicted of three counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343 and aiding and abetting wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 2. The Presentence Investigation Report determined that the lender’s loss was $603,073.06 and recommended a 14-point enhancement under USSG 2B1.1(b)(1)(H). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions but remanded for explanation of why the loss was “reasonably foreseeable” and why the sentencing enhancement was proper. Involvement in a fraudulent scheme does not necessarily mean it was reasonably foreseeable that all the subsequent economic damages would occur; there was no evidence that defendants knew they were selling to what turned out to be a fictional buyer. View "United States v. Domnenko" on Justia Law

Illinois legalized riverboat casino gambling in 1990. Since then, the state’s once‐thriving horseracing industry has declined. In 2006 and 2008, former Governor Blagojevich signed into law two bills that imposed a tax on in‐state casinos of 3% of their revenue and placed the funds into a trust for the benefit of the horseracing industry. Casinos filed suit under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1964, alleging that defendants, members of the horseracing industry, bribed the governor. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the racetracks, finding sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that there was a pattern of racketeering activity; that a jury could find the existence of an enterprise‐in‐fact, consisting of Blagojevich, his associates, and others; sufficient evidence that the defendants bribed Blagojevich to secure his signature on the 2008 Act; but that the casinos could not show that the alleged bribes proximately caused their injury. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, there was enough to survive summary judgment on the claim that the governor agreed to sign the Act in exchange for a bribe. View "Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Johnston" on Justia Law

Defendant, while incarcerated, participated in a fraudulent scheme to obtain tax refunds by using the personal information of other inmates. Defendant pleaded guilty to 41 of the 46 counts with which he was charged. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court should amend its written judgment to conform to its oral pronouncement at sentencing that forfeited funds would be applied toward his restitution obligation. In light of the statutory framework governing restitution and forfeiture, the court held that a district court generally had no authority to offset a defendant's restitution obligation by the value of the forfeited property held by the government which was consistent with the approach taken by the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. Because the district court had no authority to offset defendant's restitution obligation by the amount of funds forfeited to the government, its oral pronouncement directing such was contrary to law. Therefore, defendant could not avail himself of the general rule that discrepancy between an oral pronouncement at sentencing and a written judgment was to be resolved in favor of the oral pronouncement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's written judgment.View "United States v. Joseph" on Justia Law

A financial advisor with more than 20 years of experience, McGee met Maguire between 1999 and 2001 while attending Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. McGee assured Maguire that their conversations were going to remain private. Maguire never repeated information that McGee entrusted to him. In 2008, Maguire was closely involved in negotiations to sell PHLY, a publicly-traded company. During this time, Maguire experienced sporadic alcohol relapses. McGee saw Maguire after a meeting and inquired about his frequent absences. In response, Maguire “blurted out” inside information about PHLY’s imminent sale. He later testified that he expected McGee to keep this information confidential. Before the information became public, McGee borrowed $226,000 to finance the purchase of 10,750 PHLY shares. Shortly after the public announcement of PHLY’s sale, McGee sold his shares, resulting in a $292,128 profit. After an SEC investigation, McGee was convicted of securities fraud under the misappropriation theory of insider trading (15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and 78ff), and SEC Rules 10b-5 and 10b5-2(b)(2), and of perjury (18 U.S.C. 1621). The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) is invalid because it allows for misappropriation liability absent a fiduciary relationship between a misappropriator of inside information and its source; that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions; and that the court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. View "United States v. McGee" on Justia Law

Thomas and Chapman were part of a scheme to fleece real estate lenders by concocting multiple false sales of the same homes and using the loan proceeds from the later transactions to pay off the earlier lenders. They were convicted of multiple counts of wire fraud. Thomas was also convicted of aggravated identity theft for using an investor’s identity without permission to craft a phony sale of a home that the victim never owned. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting: challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence; a claim by Thomas that there was no proof that he created or used the falsified documents at issue; Chapman’s claim that there was no evidence that he was the Lamar Chapman identified by the evidence, because no courtroom witness testified to that effect; Chapman’s claim that his due process rights were violated when the government dropped a co-defendant from the indictment; and a claim that the government failed to turn over unspecified exculpatory evidence. The court noted testimony from several victims, an FBI investigator, an auditor, and an indicted co-defendant who had already pleaded guilty. View "United States v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Defendant, the former policy director of the House Transportation Committee, appealed his convictions on three counts relating to his receipt of illegal gratuities from Jack Abramoff's lobbying group. The court concluded that, because the indictment alleged that defendant accepted the World Series trip for or because of his official assistance in influencing the language of the federal highway bill, the charge on Count 2 contained the required element, and the district court correctly denied defendant's motion to dismiss. Further, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant on all counts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Verrusio" on Justia Law

The Halims own named WR Property Management. The company’s predecessor had contracted to buy natural gas from CES for the Halims’s 41 Chicago-area rental properties. CES delivered, but the company stopped paying and owed about $1.2 million when CES cut off service and filed suit. An Illinois court awarded $1.7 million, including interest and attorney fees. The company did not pay; the Halims had transferred all of its assets to WR. CES filed a diversity suit under the Illinois Fraudulent Transfer Act. The district court granted CES summary judgment and entered a final judgment for $2.7 million on fraudulent‐conveyance and successor‐liability claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating: “If the Halims are wise, they will start heeding the adage: if you’re in a hole, stop digging.”View "Centerpoint Energy Servs., Inc. v. WR Prop. Mgmt., LLC" on Justia Law