Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Doolittle was a registered securities broker/dealer, and a registered investment advisor. He or his corporations held licenses, permits, or certificates to engage in real estate and insurance brokerage and tax preparation. Around 1990 his primary business became “trust deeds investments,” in which he “would arrange groups of investors together to buy those loans or to fund those transactions for different types of individuals and institutional borrowers.” After investors lost money, Doolittle was convicted and sentenced to 13 years in prison for three counts of theft by false pretenses; six counts of theft from an elder or dependent adult; nine counts of false statements or omissions in the sale of securities; selling unregistered securities; and sale of a security by willful and fraudulent use of a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud The appeals court reversed in part, holding that Doolittle’s challenge that the trial court’s implied finding of timely prosecution was not supported by substantial evidence required remand with respect to two of the charges. A further hearing may be necessary with respect to applicability of a sentence enhancement for aggregate losses over $500,000. Doolittle’s conviction for sale of unregistered securities and sale of securities by means of a fraudulent device did not rest on the same conduct as his convictions for fraud against specific victims; his sentence on the former counts therefore does not offend the proscription against duplicative punishment. View "People v. Doolittle" on Justia Law

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a complaint alleging that Defendants fraudulently marketed and sold debt-related services, failed to provide those services, and retained money as upfront fees in violation of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a); the Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. 310; and the Mortgage Assistance Relief Services Rule, 12 C.F.R. 1015. The FTC also sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, and provided more than 1,000 pages of exhibits. Defendants sought to stay proceedings, asserting that a criminal investigation had been launched into their business activities, as evidenced by a raid conducted by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police that resulted in seizure of records they claim were necessary to defend against the FTC’s allegations. The district court denied the motion; the FTC and Defendants entered into a stipulated preliminary injunction. Defendants later renewed the motion for a stay, claiming that they were unable to access critical records. Without explanation, the district court denied the motion and later granted the FTC’s motion for summary judgment, ordering Defendants to jointly pay restitution in the amount of $5,706,135.48 to injured consumers. The Sixth circuit affirmed, finding clear evidence of the violations. View "Fed. Trade Comm'n v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2001, Mirando pleaded guilty to mail fraud, money laundering, and tax evasion relating to the 1995 and 1996 tax years. Following his 2003 release from prison, the IRS assessed additional tax, interest, and penalties for the 1995 and 1996 tax years and for unpaid tax liabilities for 2000 and 2004. In 2007, Mirando was indicted for conspiracy to defraud the United States and four counts of tax evasion, one for each of the 1995, 1996, 2000, and 2004 tax years. He again pleaded guilty. The parties stipulated that as of June 2007, the total tax liability, including interest and penalties, amounted was $448,776.13. Mirando made payments to the IRS before entering his plea, totaling $467,686.04, inexplicably paying $18,909.91 more than the agreed amount. He was sentenced to 50 months’ imprisonment. In 2008, Mirando and his ex-wife filed amended returns, claiming refunds for the taxable years 1995, 1996, and 2000 in the amounts of $38,871, $54,112, and $32,332, respectively. The IRS denied the claims. Mirando filed a tax refund suit. The IRS argued that judicial estoppel barred Mirando from challenging the amount; Mirando argued that the government waived its estoppel argument because it failed to assert it as an affirmative defense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the IRS.View "Mirando v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury" on Justia Law

In 2009 Betty and Wayne submitted a tax return on behalf of a Betty Phillips Trust, signed by Betty, who was listed as the trustee, claiming income of $47,997. A second return on behalf of a Wayne Phillips trust, was signed by Wayne, but Betty was listed as trustee. This return reported income of $1,057,585. Both returns claimed that all income had gone to pay fiduciary fees, so that the trusts had no taxable income. The Wayne Trust claimed a refund of $352,528. The Betty Trust claimed $15,999. The IRS issued a check for $352,528. They endorsed the check and deposited it into a joint account. The returns were fraudulent. The IRS had no record of any taxes being paid by the trusts. In December, the IRS served summonses. That month, the couple withdrew $244,137 remaining from their refund proceeds using 13 different locations. They followed the same strategy the next year, but did not receive checks. A jury convicted Betty of conspiracy to defraud the government with respect to claims (18 U.S.C. 286), and of knowingly making a false claim to the government (18 U.S.C. 287.1). The district court sentenced her to 41 months’ imprisonment and ordered them to pay $352,528 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the court improperly admitted evidence, and that the government constructively amended the indictment and violated Betty’s right against self‐incrimination.View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Durham, Cochran, and Snow took control of Fair Finance Company, a previously well-established and respected business, and used money invested in Fair to support their lavish lifestyles and to fund loans to related parties that would never be repaid. When auditors raised red flags, the auditors were fired. When Fair experienced cash-flow problems, it misled investors and regulators so it could keep raising capital. One of the company’s directors, under investigation in a separate matter, alerted the FBI that Fair was being operated as a Ponzi scheme. The FBI seized Fair’s computer servers and, after an investigation uncovered more than $200 million in losses to thousands of victims, many of them elderly or living on modest incomes, arrested the three. A jury convicted them of conspiracy, securities fraud, and wire fraud. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, except with respect to Durham’s wire fraud convictions. The government failed to enter into the trial record key documentary evidence supporting those counts. The court rejected arguments relating to sufficiency of the evidence; sufficiency of the wiretap application; the court’s refusal to give a proposed theory-of-defense jury instruction on the securities fraud count; alleged prosecutorial misconduct during the rebuttal closing argument; and claimed sentencing errors. View "United States v. Durham" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to wire fraud and making a false statement on a loan application. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's imposition of a 16-level increase to defendant's base offense level based on that court's calculation that the banks suffered a loss of over a million dollars. The court held that, in a mortgage fraud case, loss under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b) is calculated in two steps. First, calculating actual or intended loss allowed for a reasonable foreseeability analysis although the actual loss generally consisted of the entire principal of the fraudulently obtained loan. Second, crediting against the actual or intended loss the value of any collateral recovered or recoverable, did not permit a foreseeability analysis. Rather, the value of the collateral was credited against the amount of the loss calculated at the first step, whether or not the value of the collateral was foreseeable. The court affirmed the sentence because the district court followed this rule in calculating the loss attributable to defendant as $1,033,500.View "United States v. Morris" on Justia Law

Aleynikov is a computer programmer who worked as a vice president at GSCo in 2007 through 2009. After accepting an employment offer from another company, Aleynikov copied source code developed at GSCo into computer files and transferred them out of GSCo. He was convicted of violations of the National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. 2314, and the Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. 1832. The Second Circuit reversed the conviction. He was then indicted by a New York grand jury and that case remains pending. Aleynikov filed a federal suit, seeking indemnification and advancement for his attorney’s fees from Goldman Sachs. He claims his right to indemnification and advancement under a portion of Goldman Sachs Group’s By-Laws that applies to non-corporate subsidiaries like GSCo, providing for indemnification and advancement to, among others, officers of GSCo. The district court granted summary judgment in Aleynikov’s favor on his claim for advancement but denied it on his claim for indemnification. The Third Circuit vacated with respect to advancement. The meaning of the term “officer" in GS Group’s By-Laws is ambiguous and the relevant extrinsic evidence raises genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. The court otherwise affirmed. View "Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc" on Justia Law

Salahuddin was Newark’s Deputy Mayor for Public Safety. He allegedly conspired to use his official position to obtain charitable and political contributions and to direct Newark demolition contracts to Cooper, with whom Salahuddin was allegedly in business. Both were convicted of conspiring to extort under color of official right, under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a). The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting Salahuddin’s claims that the government failed to prove that one of the alleged co-conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; that the district court erred in omitting an overt act requirement from its jury instructions; and that the rule of lenity requires that his conviction be vacated. The court rejected Cooper’s claim that the jury’s guilty verdict as to the Hobbs Act conspiracy charge was against the weight of the evidence. View "United States v. Salahuddin" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted defendants Michael Calhoun, Tommy Davis, and William Tucker on 60 counts of wire fraud, mail fraud, and conspiracy to commit wire and mail fraud. The indictment was based on Calhoun's grand jury testimony in which he incriminated himself, Davis, and Tucker. Calhoun testified upon the advice of his counsel at the time, Tom Mills, who was paid by Texas Capital Bank (the alleged victim of the fraud). After Calhoun secured new counsel, defendants moved to quash the indictment and suppress Calhoun's grand jury testimony, arguing the indictment was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment Indictment Clause, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and Calhoun's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion. In consolidated, pretrial interlocutory appeals, the defendants challenged the denial of their motion to quash, arguing that the Tenth Circuit should exercise its jurisdiction under the "collateral order" exception to the final judgment rule, ("Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.," (337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949)). However, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the collateral order doctrine did not apply, and dismissed these appeals for lack of jurisdiction. View "United States v. Tucker" on Justia Law

A grand jury returned a three-count indictment charging Safiyyah Tahir Battles with: (1) making a false statement to a financial institution (Count I); (2) committing wire fraud (Count II); and (3) laundering money (Count III). Battles exercised her right to a jury trial, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on Counts II and III. The jury failed to reach a verdict on Count I. As a result, the district court declared a mistrial on Count I and subsequently granted the government's unopposed motion to dismiss that count without prejudice. Battles was sentenced to thirty months in prison, followed by two years of supervised release. The district court also ordered her to make restitution to the victim of her crimes. Battles appealed her convictions and sentence on numerous grounds. Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case and the district court record, the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's judgment and affirmed Battles's convictions and sentence. The Court dismissed the portion of Battles's appeal pertaining to her Brady claim for lack of jurisdiction.View "United States v. Battles" on Justia Law