Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Petters orchestrated a $3.65 billion Ponzi scheme, operating a sham business, PCI, which purportedly purchased electronics in bulk and resold them. Ritchie advanced $189 million to PCI, in exchange for promissory notes. Ritchie assigned notes with face values totaling $25 million to VICIS. PCI and Petters made payments to Ritchie, who used part of the funds to pay VICIS $17,703,227.39 toward the assigned notes. After Petters’s scheme ended in 2008, Kelley was appointed as receiver, sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief, and was appointed as trustee. Kelley and the bankruptcy trustee for Petter’s wholly-owned company, Polaroid, entered into a coordination agreement. Kelley commenced an adversary proceeding against Ritchie, VICIS, and others, to recover alleged fraudulent and preferential transfers. VICIS held a claim against PCI for amounts outstanding on the promissory notes. The parties reached a settlement: VICIS paid $7.5 million to Kelley for release of all claims. The unsecured creditors’ committee supported the settlement and Kelley’s allocation, but Ritchie objected to the allocation. The bankruptcy court approved the t agreement, finding the allocation reasonable because Kelley applied an objective mathematical calculation, the unsecured creditors committee participated in the process and approved the allocation, and the circumstances in the case dealt with complex issues, unsettled law, and massively complicated factual disputes. The district court and Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Eagan, Minnesota, assisted in apprehending Procknow, who had absconded while serving supervised release imposed by a Wisconsin state court for forgery. Authorities had received information that Procknow and his girlfriend were staying at an Eagan hotel. The girlfriend was registered at the hotel. Officers spotted Procknow’s car, chased Procknow through the lobby, and arrested him. Through the windows of Procknow’s car, they saw a scanner or copier. Learning of the arrests, the hotel manager stated that the their stay was being terminated and asked the officers to collect a dog, believed to be in their room and ensure that there were no other occupants. Officers knocked, and announced. No one answered, so they used a hotel key and found a dog. Entering to ensure that there were no other occupants, officers saw, in plain view, an electric typewriter, a credit card issued in the name of “Smith,” and financial forms bearing various names and social security numbers. Officer photographed the room, sealed it, and obtained search warrants for the room and car. They seized blank W‐2 forms, partially completed tax forms, lists of business employer identification numbers, and prepaid debit cards (tax refunds) in the names of different people. Further investigation revealed that Procknow had obtained the personal identifying information of at least 40 individuals, which he used to file fraudulent tax returns and claim refunds. Procknow pleaded guilty to theft of government money and aggravated identify theft. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained by the warrantless entry into the hotel room and evidence obtained by grand jury subpoena following the withdrawal of IRS administrative summonses requesting the same information. View "United States v. Procknow" on Justia Law

In 2007, Suarez, a 75-year-old widower from Mexico, opened a checking account at an Illinois Chase Bank. DeMarco, the branch manager, assisted him. The two became friends. Suarez was trying to sell his three acre property, listed for $1.8 million. DeMarco convinced Suarez to break his listing contract, indicating that he had a buyer. DeMarco told Suarez that he needed a home equity line of credit (HELOC) to complete the sale. DeMarco obtained a $250,000 HELOC, under Suarez’s name, secured by Suarez’s property. DeMarco caused the lender to transfer the proceeds into a joint checking account, which he opened in his and Suarez’s name. After the transfer, DeMarco withdrew $245,000 and deposited the funds into his personal account. After Chase terminated his employment, DeMarco transferred the funds into new accounts and spent most of the proceeds to pay off his credit card debt, improve his home and on cars and vacations. He used a small fraction of the money to pay off Suarez’s debts. Suarez later noted irregularities in his bank statement and contacted the FBI. DeMarco was convicted of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343 and sentenced to 48 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings and to the sentence, claiming that the court erred by applying a two-level increase to his base offense level for abuse of a position of trust, U.S.S.G. 3B1.3, and the use of sophisticated means, U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1). View "United States v. DeMarco" on Justia Law

In 2005, Lee, a Sevierville contractor, owed a substantial debt to Whaley, for loans that financed houses being built by Lee. Whaley proposed to recruit straw buyers for sham purchases of the properties. Eight straw buyers were referred to Bevins, a mortgage broker with whom Whaley had previously dealt. Whaley prepared the contracts and set the prices. Bevins prepared loan applications that falsely inflated the buyers’ incomes and assets and stated that they would bring funds to closing. The closings were conducted by Kerley’s title company. Although none of the buyers brought funds to the closings, Kerley signed HUD-1 forms, indicating that they did. The properties later went into foreclosure. The lenders incurred substantial losses. Lee and Bevins pled guilty and agreed to cooperate. The judge denied Kerley’s motion to sever, concluding that proposed redactions to Whaley’s statement remedied potential violation of Kerley’s Confrontation Clause rights and held that Whaley was not entitled to introduce his own hearsay statements. Both were convicted of money laundering, conspiracy to commit wire fraud affecting a financial institution and bank fraud, wire fraud affecting a financial institution, bank fraud, and making a false statement to a financial institution. They were sentenced to 60 months and 48 months imprisonment, respectively, and ordered to pay $1,901,980.31 in restitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and Kerley’s sentence, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, evidentiary rulings, and the court’s refusal to sever. View "United States v. Whaley" on Justia Law

Roy was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349; three counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343; and conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that proof of an overt act is required for a conviction under the two section 1349 conspiracy charges. Proof of an overt act is not required for a conspiracy conviction under 18 U.S.C. 1349. View "United States v. Roy" on Justia Law

In 2008, an explosion and fire substantially damaged the Hereford House, a well-known restaurant in downtown Kansas City. Surveillance footage from immediately before the incident showed individuals entering with containers of gasoline and setting an ignition device. The suspects used the security code of a former Hereford House employee to deactivate the security system. Between the employee’s firing and the fire, the same code had been used twice by Anderson, a part owner of the Hereford House, in what appeared to be practice for the arson. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives investigated Anderson, who had infused $380,000 into the business, from cash advances on personal and business credit cards, withdrawals from his mother’s IRA and his 401(k), and a loan from his brother-in-law. In an email, Anderson had stated: “We were unable to pay our payroll taxes of $50,000. Things are not getting any better.” Anderson, Pisciotta, and Sorrentino were convicted and sentenced to 180, 240, and 180 months’ imprisonment, respectively. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that conspiracy to commit arson cannot be a predicate to convictions for the use of fire to commit another felony under 18 U.S.C. 844(h); that the convictions constituted double jeopardy; that the trials should have been severed; and challenging evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Retired seamstress, Joseph, never had annual household income exceeding $40,000; her condominium, worth $169,990, was foreclosure. Joseph was born in Haiti. She did not speak English well. Jean referred Joseph to the Diverse insurance agency for a fee. In 2008, Diverse applied for a $10 million life-insurance policy on Joseph’s life to PHL. The application falsely stated Joseph’s net worth was $11,906,000 and her income was $497,000. The application listed a 2008 Irrevocable Trust as the proposed beneficiary and owner. Joseph signed an agreement establishing the Trust and appointed BNC as the trustee and Jean as the trust protector. Joseph did not know of the misrepresentations and likely signed blank documents. The Trust financed the premiums through a loan from PFG. In 2010, Jean directed BNC to surrender the Policy to PFG in satisfaction of the loan obligations. PHL sought to rescind the Policy for fraud. After Joseph died in 2011, the new policy owner claimed the proceeds. The district court granted rescission and held that PHL could keep the premium. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that PHL could not rescind the Policy because its own agent completed the application and that PHL was estopped from rescinding the Policy because it had reason to know of the misrepresentations. View "PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Midas Life Settlements LLC" on Justia Law

France had a Chicago dental business and fraudulently billed insurers for city employees. France closed his practice after being injured in an accident and started collecting benefits from a disability income policy. In 1999, he exchanged monthly payments, for a limited time, for a lump sum of $300,000. He transferred this money to other people, including his wife, Duperon, before filing a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. He failed to disclose the payment or transfers. He later pleaded guilty to mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and to knowingly making a false declaration under penalty of perjury, 18 U.S.C. 152(3). The district court sentenced France to 30 months in prison and ordered him to pay $800,000 in restitution. The bankruptcy trustee obtained title to ongoing disability insurance payments. France and Duperon divorced. A California court approved a settlement with payments for child support from the disability payments. France’s insurance company sued in California to resolve conflicting claims. The parties reached an agreement, which the bankruptcy court approved, purporting to control all other judgments, but did not mention the criminal restitution lien. The government filed Illinois citations to discover assets. France moved to quash, but the insurance company responded and began withholding $9,296 that had been going to France. The government moved to garnish the entire distribution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3613(a). The Seventh Circuit affirmed a ruling allowing the government to garnish the entire disability payment. View "United States v. France" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted and sentenced for conspiracy to obstruct justice, accessory after the fact to mail fraud and securities law violations, altering documents to influence a federal investigation, and aiding and abetting false testimony at an SEC deposition. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err at sentencing by applying both the “Broker-Dealer” enhancement and the “Special Skill” enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines; (2) the district court did not err in calculating loss and victim amounts, as required under the Sentencing Guidelines; (3) Defendant was competent to waive his right to a jury trial, and his waiver was knowing and intelligent; and (4) the district court did not plainly err in (a) excluding a non-lawyer’s testimony reciting facts and the legal conclusion that Defendant did not break the law; (b) determining that the district court was capable of understanding an expert’s opinion regarding Defendant’s professional and ethical duties as an attorney; and (c) admitting coconspirator nonhearsay testimony. View "United States v. Tamman" on Justia Law

Pursuant to written plea agreements, defendants Yolanda Sosa and Adrian Velazquez pled guilty to conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud. For a five month period in 2011, Defendants met with a "cooperating doctor" and paid the doctor for prescriptions that Defendants could use to fraudulently bill Medicare. Specifically, Defendants provided the cooperating doctor with Medicare beneficiary information and paid the doctor thousands of dollars to write prescriptions for expensive medications that were not actually given to any patients. The doctor never saw or evaluated the patients, and instead wrote the prescriptions for whatever medications Defendants requested. Defendants gave the fraudulent prescriptions to various pharmacies, which submitted false claims to Medicare based on the prescriptions. As a result, Medicare paid the pharmacies approximately $753,430 based on the false claims. The pharmacies paid Defendants over $60,000 for obtaining the fraudulent prescriptions. Defendants appealed two forfeiture orders entered by the district court after it imposed joint-and-several restitution against them, specifically challenging the restitution amount and the forfeiture of two cars. After careful review of the record and the parties' briefs, and with the benefit of oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed the district court. View "United States v. Velazquez" on Justia Law