Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Reed, a marketing guru who sold an “antioxidant rich whole food puree,” “ViaViente,”offered training on how to replicate his success as a “self-made millionaire.” When Reed’s relationship with ViaViente ended, he tried something new, telling potential investors that he had access to a secret site in the Philippines containing gold bars buried by the Japanese during World War II. Reed raised $1.3 million, but never excavated. He spent the money on houses, cars, and cosmetic surgery. He did buy a $30,000 a gold “scanner.” When Reed’s deception was exposed, he pled guilty to wire fraud; the prosecution agreed to make a recommendation that Reed receive a three-year sentence and not to oppose Reed’s request for credit for accepting responsibility. In its sentencing memorandum and at the hearing, the government stated that Reed should receive the credit, but did not mention an appropriate sentence. The court acknowledged that the “government has agreed pursuant to the plea agreement to recommend a three-year term of custody.” Reed objected that the prosecutor had “never once recommended the three-year sentence.” The court rejected that claim and ruled that Reed should not receive credit for accepting responsibility because he continued to promote the validity of his schemes. The court sentenced Reed to over seven years. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the government honored the plea agreement. View "United States v. Reed" on Justia Law

To fix a 2004 Teamsters election, Bania and the union president diverted ballots by changing members’ addresses in the database. They collected those ballots and cast falsified votes. After an investigation, they employed the same fraud during a second election. Bania was convicted of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and theft from a labor organization (18 U.S.C. 371), four counts of mail fraud (13 U.S.C. 1341 and 1346), and six counts of embezzling, stealing, and unlawfully and willfully abstracting and converting property and other assets of a labor organization (29 U.S.C. 501(c)). In 2009, the court sentenced Bania to concurrent 40-month terms, departing from the low-end of the guidelines, 97 months, and ordered Bania to pay $900,936 in restitution, reflecting salaries paid to co-defendants and expenses of the second election. The court later rejected Bania’s 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in disregarding Bania’s instruction to appeal. In 2012, Bania completed his prison term. In 2013, the district court denied Bania’s motion for early termination of supervised release because of his outstanding financial obligation. Bania did not challenge that rationale, but argued that the restitution calculation improperly totaled the loss he intended to cause, rather than the loss actually caused. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision not to terminate supervised release. Bania filed an unsuccessful “Motion to Terminate Order of Restitution and Order of Forfeiture.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed; the court lacked jurisdiction to hear Bania’s motion. The time to appeal his sentence has long passed. View "United States v. Bania" on Justia Law

Over four years, Dade, a former licensed real estate agent, with co-defendants, facilitated loans to purchase residential real estate by knowingly providing lenders with false statements and documents. Dade referred potential buyers to loan officers and provided false payroll stubs and W-2 forms from fake companies. Dade (with help) refinanced a mortgage on his own Chicago property, stating that he was paying monthly rent of $1,450 (he did not live in the house), and provided a rental verification from “Jireh,” which did not exist. Dade received a $156,000 loan. He was charged with bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344, wire fraud, section 1343, and mail fraud, section 1341. He pleaded guilty to bank fraud, based on the fraudulent refinancing; the remaining charges were dismissed. The government sought a 2-level upward adjustment for his role as an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in the offense, U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c). When preparing the presentence report, however, the probation officer concluded that a 4-level upward adjustment would be appropriate, stating that the scheme had involved five or more participants and Dade had organized the scheme. The government adopted that position, recounting the facts underlying the charges dismissed as part of Dade’s plea agreement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his 20-month sentence, upholding the upward adjustment. View "United States v. Dade" on Justia Law

Clark’s trucking business was hired to perform hauling services on a state‐ and federally funded highway project in Missouri. Because federal funds were involved, Clark’s contract with the project’s general contractor required that he pay his truck drivers the federal prevailing wage pursuant to the Davis‐Bacon Act (then $35.45/hour). Clark did not do so, but individually contracted with his drivers for roughly $15/hour instead. Throughout the project, Clark submitted weekly payroll certifications in which he falsely attested to paying his workers $35.45/hour. After his work concluded, he submitted an affidavit to the Missouri Department of Transportation, certifying compliance with Missouri state law and its state wage order. Based on these attestations, the government charged Clark with 10 counts of making false statements,18 U.S.C. 1001. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions on nine counts, rejecting An argument that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that his false statements were material to the federal government. The court agreed that the government failed to prove that his affidavit to MODOT had a natural capability of influencing the federal government and reversed conviction on Count 10. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

Kolodesh owned a home-health services company. He approached his employee, Pugman, about starting a home-based hospice care company. Pugman's agreed. Kolodesh funded the new company, Home Care Hospice. Pugman managed the operations. Kolodesh’s wife and Pugman were listed as owning equal shares; Kolodesh was intimately involved in forming and overseeing its management. In 2000 or 2001, Kolodesh, Pugman, and Pugman's wife began giving gifts and cash “kickbacks” to doctors in exchange for patient referrals. At Kolodesh’s suggestion, Pugman placed doctors or their employees on the Hospice payroll with sham job titles and issued paychecks in exchange for patient referrals. About 90% of the revenue generated by Hospice came from Medicare reimbursements. Kolodesh and Pugman had contractors submit fake invoices Hospice would pay; the contractor would give most of the money to Kolodesh and Pugman, keeping a portion. The participants were charged with conspiracy to defraud a health care benefit program, 18 U.S.C. 1349, 21 counts of health-care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347, two counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and 11 counts of money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957. Pugman testified for the government after having pled guilty. The Third Circuit affirmed Kolodesh's sentence of 176 months’ imprisonment and a restitution order of $16.2 million. View "United States v. Kolodesh" on Justia Law

Zada sold fake investments in Saudi Arabian oil, raising about $60 million from investors in Michigan and Florida. Zada gave investors promissory notes that, on their face, say nothing about oil-investment. They say that Zada will pay a principal amount plus interest (at rates far lower than Zada had promised). Zada stated that the notes were necessary only to ensure that investors would be repaid by Zada’s family if something happened to him. Little of what Zada said was true. Zada paid actors to pose as a Saudi royalty. Zada never bought any oil; he used investors’ money to pay his personal expenses. When Zada paid investors anything, he used money raised from other victims. The SEC discovered Zada’s scheme and filed a civil enforcement action, alleging violation of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 77. The district court granted the SEC summary judgment, ordering Zada to pay $56 million in damages and a civil penalty of $56 million more. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the investments were not securities and that the civil penalty improperly punishes him for invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. View "Secs. & Exch. Comm'n v. Zada" on Justia Law

In 1973, Doe organized his medical practice as a “professional association,” a type of corporation doctors are permitted to form under New Jersey law. Since its creation, Doe has operated his practice through that entity. As of 2011, the entity employed six people. The government alleges that Doe entered into an illicit agreement with OTE, a blood laboratory, whereby it paid him monetary bribes for referring patients to it for blood testing. A grand jury subpoena was served on the entity’s custodian of records, directing it to turn over documents, including records of patients referred to OTE, lease and consulting agreements, checks received by it for reasons other than patient treatment, correspondence regarding its use of OTE, correspondence with specified individuals and entities, and basic corporate records. The district court denied Doe’s motion to quash. Doe persistently refused to let the entity comply; the court found it in civil contempt. Meanwhile, the entity fired its employees and hired independent contractors, tasked with “[m]aint[aining] accurate and complete medical records, kept in accordance with HIPAA and Patient Privacy standards,” and assisting with billing practices. The Third Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Supreme Court precedent indicated that corporations may not assert a Fifth Amendment privilege, and that the subpoena was not overbroad in violation of the Fourth Amendment. View "In Re: The Matter Of The Grand Jury" on Justia Law

The Medocks’ company, MAS, transported patients to kidney dialysis for Medicare reimbursement. Reimbursement of non-emergency ambulance transport is allowed only if medically necessary for bedridden patients; both a driver and an EMT must accompany any such passenger. Certification of medical necessity (CMN) must be signed by a doctor. A “run sheet” is reviewed by a Medicare contractor other than the ambulance company, such as AdvanceMed, to reduce fraud. AdvanceMed identified MAS as a high biller in Tennessee for dialysis ambulance transport and audited MAS. MAS’s records were missing some CMNs. Covert surveillance resulted in videotapes of patients walking, riding in the front seat, being double-loaded, being driven by single-staffed ambulances, or being transported by wheelchair. MAS had billed the transports as single-passenger and “stretcher required.” Executing a search warrant at the Medlocks’ home, agents seized CMNs and run tickets; some had been altered or forged. The Sixth Circuit reversed a conviction for aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A, agreeing that misrepresentations that certain beneficiaries were transported by stretcher did not constitute a “use” of identification, but affirmed health-care fraud convictions, rejecting arguments that the court should have instructed the jury that Medicare, not merely a prudent person, was the relevant decision-maker; that Medicare would have reimbursed MAS without their misrepresentations; and that refusal to sever a defendant was prejudicial. View "United States v. Medlock" on Justia Law

In 2006-2009, the five defendants’ partial Ponzi scheme received more than $193 3 million from hundreds of investors. Only $49 million was returned, all from new investors’ money. Some investors lost their life savings. Each defendant took between $432,000 and $12.2 million. Defendants described investing in foreign currency trading, which was guaranteed and had a fixed rate of return. Some money was invested in foreign currencies, but none was invested in a safe, guaranteed currency product. They also promised instant liquidity and that each investor’s account would be “segregated.” Defendants, who used fund names such as “Oxford” and “UBS” were apparently sued by the Swiss bank, UBS. After the scheme collapsed, two pled guilty. A jury found the others guilty of committing or aiding and abetting commission of wire fraud or mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and 1343; conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349; and money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 2 and 1957. Defendant Beckman, individually, was also convicted for his interactions with elderly victims; his attempt to purchase an interest in an NHL hockey team; filing false tax returns; and tax evasion. The district court sentenced Beckman to 360 months and the others to 240 months imprisonment. The Eight Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, View "United States v. Beckman" on Justia Law

Beltramea solicited investments to open a Subway restaurant franchise, but used the funds for personal expenses and for a real estate development, “Castlerock,” made fraudulent representations to banking institutions, and attempted to avoid paying taxes. Beltramea pled guilty to 16 counts, including: wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343; aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028(A)(a)(1); money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957, 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (a)(1)(B)(i); false statements to a financial institution, 18 U.S.C. 1014; and tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. 7201. The court imposed additional upward departures for understated criminal history and for dismissed and uncharged conduct. Beltramea's adjusted Guidelines' range was 70 to 87 months, before adding the mandatory 24 consecutive months for aggravated identity theft. He was sentenced to a total of 111 months. The court stated that, even if it erred in granting upward departures, it would impose the same sentence based on the factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The court entered a forfeiture order, 18 U.S.C. 981(a)(1)(C), 28 U.S.C. 2461(c) and 18 U.S.C. 982(a)(1) for rental properties, Castlerock parcels, $125,000 in wire fraud proceeds, and $65,472.02 in money laundering proceeds. The Eighth Circuit reversed the forfeiture order but otherwise affirmed. The government presented no facts connecting the rental properties and the lots to any offense for which Beltramea was convicted. View "United States v. Beltramea" on Justia Law