Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Volkman, a University of Chicago M.D. and Ph.D. (pharmacology), board-certified in emergency medicine, was in financial distress after lawsuits. Hired by Tri-State, a cash-only clinic, he was paid $5,000 to $5,500 per week. Soon, pharmacies refused to fill his prescriptions, citing improper dosing. Volkman opened a dispensary in the clinic. The Ohio Board of Pharmacy issued a license, although a Glock was found in the drug safe. Follow-up inspections disclosed poorly maintained logs; that no licensed physician or pharmacist oversaw the actual dispensing process; and lax security of the drug safe. Patients returned unmarked and intermixed medication. The dispensary did a heavy business in oxycodone. A federal investigation revealed a chaotic, unclean environment. Tri-State fired Volkman, who opened his own shop; 12 patients died. Volkman and Tri-State’s owners were charged with conspiring to unlawfully distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); maintaining a drug-involved premises, 21 U.S.C. 856(a)(1); unlawful distribution of a controlled substance leading to death, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 24(c). The owners accepted plea agreements and testified against Volkman, The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction on most counts, and a sentence of four consecutive life terms. On remand from the Supreme Court, in light of Burrage v. United States (2014), the Sixth Circuit again found the evidence of but-for causation sufficient. View "United States v. Volkman" on Justia Law

The six-month trial of former Detroit mayor Kilpatrick and Detroit contractor Ferguson, included almost 100 government witnesses and over 700 exhibits. The government’s main theory was that Kilpatrick and Ferguson conspired to extort money from other Detroit-area contractors by pressuring them to include Ferguson’s companies in their city contracts—even when Ferguson’s companies were not the most qualified candidates and even when Ferguson’s companies did no work. Kilpatrick was convicted of 24 counts: RICO conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d); four counts of extortion, 18 U.S.C. 1951; attempted extortion, 18 U.S.C. 1951; bribery, 18 U.S.C. 666(a); 11 counts of mail and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343; five counts of subscribing a false tax return, 26 U.S.C. 7206(a); and income tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. 7201. Ferguson was convicted of nine counts: RICO conspiracy, six counts of extortion, attempted extortion, and bribery. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions but vacated a restitution order, rejecting arguments that Kilpatrick was denied conflict-free counsel because his lead attorneys had recently become “of counsel” to a firm that was suing Kilpatrick for alleged conduct related to his criminal charges; extensive testimony by two case agents violated the Rules of Evidence; and the court erred in allowing witnesses to report what other people had told them about Kilpatrick and Ferguson as evidence that witnesses feared the defendants. View "United States v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Calhoun (and two co-conspirators) prematurely sought to appeal a district court order denying his motion to quash the indictment against them. The 60-count indictment arose out of Defendant’s grand jury testimony. In it, Defendant was charged with 50 counts of mail and wire fraud and conspiracy to commit the same. Absent a “final decision,” the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for want of subject matter jurisdiction. On remand, Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the Government, whereby Defendant pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire or mail fraud and reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to quash. The district court sentenced Defendant to five years probation. The court did not impose a fine or order restitution. Defendant again appealed, arguing that a “division of loyalties,” i.e., conflict of interest, on the part of his retained counsel prompted his incriminating grand jury testimony, thus tainting the indictment. Specifically, Defendant asserted that his criminal counsel, Tom Mills (hired and paid by Texas Capital Bank on the recommendation of his civil counsel Larry Friedman) encouraged Defendant to incriminate himself before the grand jury for the purpose of assisting the Bank in its efforts to overturn a $65 million civil judgment related to the scheme. Defendant says the conflict rendered his criminal counsel ineffective in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, thereby requiring suppression of his grand jury testimony and quashing of the indictment. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. "Precedent, both our own and that of the Supreme Court, provides us no alternative but to recognize that Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not attach until August 15, 2012, the date he was formally charged by way of indictment. Unfortunately for Defendant, his right to counsel claim centers on his counsel’s conduct prior to that date. Defendant has no remedy without a right. [. . .] Sure, Defendant did not want to be indicted . . . But the Government made no such promise." Defendant acknowledged at the hearing on his motion to quash that "'after I had given substantial help, then I would be granted probation.' Defendant understood this to mean 'a deal had been made and I would get probation at worst.' Then, after the prosecutor advised him that he would receive a downward departure for his assistance, Defendant testified before the grand jury. Defendant may not have received the deal he had hoped for, but he undoubtedly received the deal he expected." View "United States v. Calhoun" on Justia Law

King pled guilty in Arkansas state court to 1,577 counts of forgery and theft of property for embezzling more than $700,000 from the school district where she worked. The court sentenced King to 80 years imprisonment, within the guidelines range. King had no criminal history and claims she accepted the plea because of threats that her husband and son would also be charged. Five months later, the court reduced King’s sentence to 20 years imprisonment, under Arkansas Code 16-90-111, which allows a trial court to “correct an illegal sentence at any time” or to “correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within . . . ninety (90) days after the sentence is imposed.” The state appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court, which reinstated King’s 80-year sentence, finding the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the reduction because the 90-day period for doing so had expired. King sought federal habeas relief. Although the district court was clearly sympathetic, it found no grounds for habeas relief. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that King is not entitled to habeas relief based on her disagreement with the Arkansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of Arkansas law. View "King v. Kelley" on Justia Law

King pled guilty in Arkansas state court to 1,577 counts of forgery and theft of property for embezzling more than $700,000 from the school district where she worked. The court sentenced King to 80 years imprisonment, within the guidelines range. King had no criminal history and claims she accepted the plea because of threats that her husband and son would also be charged. Five months later, the court reduced King’s sentence to 20 years imprisonment, under Arkansas Code 16-90-111, which allows a trial court to “correct an illegal sentence at any time” or to “correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within . . . ninety (90) days after the sentence is imposed.” The state appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court, which reinstated King’s 80-year sentence, finding the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the reduction because the 90-day period for doing so had expired. King sought federal habeas relief. Although the district court was clearly sympathetic, it found no grounds for habeas relief. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that King is not entitled to habeas relief based on her disagreement with the Arkansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of Arkansas law. View "King v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of violating the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, appealed the district court's denial of a motion for a new trial and request for an evidentiary hearing. The court held that defendant was not entitled to a new trial or evidentiary hearing based on a juror’s affidavit alleging that other jurors discussed the evidence against him and made up their minds about his guilt before the start of deliberations. The court rejected defendant's contention that Rule 606(b) provides leeway for a court to delve into the internal affairs of the jury simply because the discussions took place before deliberations commenced. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Shiu Lung Leung" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of violating the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, appealed the district court's denial of a motion for a new trial and request for an evidentiary hearing. The court held that defendant was not entitled to a new trial or evidentiary hearing based on a juror’s affidavit alleging that other jurors discussed the evidence against him and made up their minds about his guilt before the start of deliberations. The court rejected defendant's contention that Rule 606(b) provides leeway for a court to delve into the internal affairs of the jury simply because the discussions took place before deliberations commenced. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Shiu Lung Leung" on Justia Law

The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) sued Arrington, Kratville, Welke, Elite Holdings, and MJM, alleging that they fraudulently induced more than 130 individuals to invest $4.7 million in commodity pools, in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), 7 U.S.C. 1. The district court granted summary judgment against Kratville. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, upholding denial of his request for more time to review purportedly new evidence; consideration affidavits from investors who signed releases and from investors who allegedly lacked credibility; refusal to consider the affidavit of an expert opining on the authenticity of emails; summary judgment on the CFTC's claim that Kratville committed fraud and related violations of the CEA and CFTC regulations in soliciting persons to invest and maintain funds in commodity investment pools; and a determination that the litigation strategy of Kratville's attorney was not excusable neglect warranting relief under FRCP 60(b)(1). Kratville's misrepresentations and omissions related to potential profit and risk, the identities of brokers, and ownership of a proprietary trading system were material. He hid from investors that pool funds were being sent out of the country and that the Nebraska Department of Banking and Finance had ordered Elite Pools to be closed and participants’ funds to be returned. View "Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Kratville" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Leslie Camick was convicted of mail fraud, wire fraud, making a material false statement to the U.S. Patent Office, three counts of aggravated identity theft, and obstruction of justice, all stemming from his unlawful use of his deceased brother’s name and identity. Following his conviction and sentencing, defendant was ordered to pay restitution. On appeal, he argued the evidence was insufficient to convict him on each count. He also challenged the district court’s restitution determination. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit reversed defendant's convictions for mail fraud, wire fraud, material false statement, and aggravated identity theft, as well as portions of the restitution award, finding that the evidence presented at trial was indeed insufficient to support those charges. But the Court affirmed the conviction for obstruction of justice. View "United States v. Camick" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Leslie Camick was convicted of mail fraud, wire fraud, making a material false statement to the U.S. Patent Office, three counts of aggravated identity theft, and obstruction of justice, all stemming from his unlawful use of his deceased brother’s name and identity. Following his conviction and sentencing, defendant was ordered to pay restitution. On appeal, he argued the evidence was insufficient to convict him on each count. He also challenged the district court’s restitution determination. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit reversed defendant's convictions for mail fraud, wire fraud, material false statement, and aggravated identity theft, as well as portions of the restitution award, finding that the evidence presented at trial was indeed insufficient to support those charges. But the Court affirmed the conviction for obstruction of justice. View "United States v. Camick" on Justia Law