Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Pu, a 28-year-old quantitative finance professional, worked for two financial institutions that traded stock and other assets for clients: “A” and Citadel. While working at each company, Pu copied proprietary software from his employer’s computer system to personal storage devices . The software allowed them to execute strategic trades at high speeds and were company trade secrets. Pu’s copying of the files was a significant data breach. Normally, crimes involving the theft of computer trade secrets lead to the sale of the data to, or the thief being hired by, a company that will use the data. Pu, however, used the data to conduct computerized stock market trades for himself and lost $40,000. Pu pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a trade secret belonging to A and unlawful transmission of a trade secret belonging to Citadel and was sentenced to 36 months in prison and ordered him to pay over $750,000 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence, stating that the district court’s factual findings did not support its conclusion that Pu intended to cause a loss of approximately $12 million and that the court erred by awarding restitution without evidence that reflected a complete accounting of the victims’ investigation costs. View "United States v. Pu" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to making false statements to government authorities, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2). Plaintiff was told by her managers at Blackhawk to certify that Blackhawk guards had received training that they had not in fact received, thereby enabling Blackhawk to charge more for each guard’s services. As part of her sentence, she was jointly and severally liable for $442,330 in restitution. But, the district court also expressed a clear intention that the actual restitution amount should be much smaller, perhaps as little as $0. A federal court had already entered judgment against Blackhawk for more than $1 million. And the district court said, in sentencing defendant, that she would not be on the hook at all if Blackhawk paid its fine. Even in the absence of such a payment, defendant would only have to pay “at a rate of not less than $50 each month.” In 2013, defendant found out that the Treasury Department had seized tax refunds due her and that it had acted under the Treasury Offset Program (TOP), 31 U.S.C. 3716, 3720A. Defendant then filed a Motion for Clarification or Modification of Supervised Release in the sentencing court, asking that the tax refunds be returned and future seizures stopped. At the first hearing, the district court vacated defendant’s sentence, stating that it had not anticipated or intended that she be subject to such a harsh sentence. At the second and third hearings, the district court entertained further arguments about the resentencing. At the fourth hearing, the district court reimposed its original sentence. The court held that the sentence manifested a clerical error which the district court should have corrected. The court also held that, in light of the necessary corrections in the sentence, the district court’s refusal to remedy the TOP collection was error. Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court to require the government to return defendant's tax refunds and to cease withholding payments. View "United States v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Defendant, a lawyer and real estate broker, appealed the district court's imposition of criminal forfeiture in the amount of $1,273,285.50, arguing that the district court erred when it declined to consider defendant’s age, health, and financial condition when it issued the forfeiture order. Defendant was convicted of charges related to his participation in a kickback scheme involving the construction of new Dick Sporting Goods stores. The court held that the court reviewing a criminal forfeiture under the Excessive Fines Clause may consider - as part of the proportionality determination required by United States v. Bajakajian - whether the forfeiture would deprive the defendant of his future ability to earn a living. However, the court held that courts should not consider a defendant’s personal circumstances as a distinct factor. In this case, the court concluded that the challenged forfeiture is constitutional because it is not “grossly disproportional” to the gravity of defendant’s offenses. View "United States v. Viloski" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to an offense related to a scheme to defraud the DOE and the district court ordered each defendant involved in the scheme to pay restitution. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of the Government's proposed application of restitution payments to a codefendant (Otto). The court concluded that a more appropriate mechanism for the court to apply is a hybrid approach to restitution payments where multiple defendants are held liable for injuries caused by a common scheme. In this case, the district court’s concern - that requiring payment from Otto would render both Otto and another codefendant (Reed) responsible for restitution in excess of the loss attributable to their conduct - is misplaced. Payments requested by the defendants encompass overlapping injuries due to each defendant's conduct. The court concluded that any funds received by the defendants should be applied to the total sum owed by all defendants. In doing so, payments from Otto would also reduce the overall sum owed by defendant. Further, the district court's analysis similarly does not align with the Mandatory Victim's Restitution Act's (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A, rules regarding liability apportionment. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Sheets" on Justia Law

Martin, Kentucky Mayor Thomasine Robinson, sought reelection. Her challenger, Howell, won by three votes. Husband James confronted and threatened to kill Howell; he was convicted in state court of terroristic threatening and menacing. Thomasine was charged with bribery, coercion, and intimidation. Testimony indicated that: Thomasine gave a woman $20 to vote for her and coerced voters to vote for her by absentee ballot; that her son Steven attempted to intimidate a voter; that James paid $10 for a vote; and that James gave an individual money with which to purchase votes. The jury returned a guilty verdict on conspiracy and vote-buying (52 U.S.C. 10307(c)) charges, but the court granted James acquittal on the conspiracy charge. Thomasine was convicted of vote-buying and conspiracy to violate civil rights (18 U.S.C. 241); Steven was found guilty of conspiracy and two counts of vote-buying, but acquitted of a third count. The court assessed a leadership enhancement to James for directing another to purchase votes and an obstruction of justice enhancement for behaving menacingly during a trial recess and sentenced him to an above-guidelines 40 months in prison. Steven was sentenced to 21 months and three years of supervised release, with a condition requiring him to abstain from the consumption of alcohol. Thomasine was sentenced to 33 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The Company was organized as a limited liability company in 2007; its sole managing member was another LLC, whose sole members were the Ngs, who controlled and managed the Company. Defendant was one of the Company’s lawyers. The Company’s stated purpose was to serve as an investment company making secured loans to real estate developers. The Managers actually created the Company to perpetrate “a fraudulent scheme” by which the Company transferred the money invested in it to another entity the Managers controlled. Defendant knew that the Managers intended to and did use the Company for this fraudulent purpose and, working with the Managers, helped the Company conceal the nature of its asset transfers. The Company was eventually rendered insolvent and its investors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy trustee filed suit against Defendant, alleging tort claims based on Defendant’s involvement in the Company’s fraud. Defendant argued that the claims are barred by the in pari delicto doctrine. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal, finding that the in pari delicto applies to the trustee and rejecting an argument that the doctrine should not bar her claims because the wrongful acts of the Managers should not be imputed to the Company. View "Uecker v. Zentil" on Justia Law

Trudeau “spent his career hawking miracle cures and self-improvement systems of dubious efficacy.” The FTC sued him under consumer-protection laws. Trudeau entered a consent decree, promising not to misrepresent his books in TV infomercials. Later, Trudeau published The Weight Loss Cure “They” Don’t Want You to Know About and promoted it in infomercials, as “simple” and “inexpensive,” able to be completed at home, and not requiring food restrictions or exercise. The book described a regimen mandating prescription hormone injections and severe dietary and lifestyle constraints. The court imposed a civil contempt sanction and issued an order to show cause why Trudeau should not face imprisonment of up to six months. At Trudeau’s request, the case was reassigned. The new judge issued a new show-cause order, removing the six-month cap. Trudeau was sentenced to 10 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument based on the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161. More than 70 nonexcludable days elapsed between the date the government agreed to prosecute the first show-cause order and the commencement of trial. The Act applies only to crimes punishable by more than six months’ imprisonment. Because the first show-cause order capped the potential penalty at six months, the Act did not apply. The second show-cause order removed the cap, starting the clock, but Trudeau’s trial began within 70 days from that date. The court also rejected challenges to jury instruction on “willfulness,” the sufficiency of the evidence, evidentiary rulings, and the reasonableness of his sentence. View "United States v. Trudeau" on Justia Law

Defendant was the mastermind of a Ponzi scheme that defrauded more than 230 investors out of over $22 million. Defendant pled guilty to bank fraud and to conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The district court sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of sixty months’ imprisonment on the wire fraud conspiracy count and 242 months on the bank fraud count. Restitution was also ordered in the amount of $10,629,021. Defendant appealed, arguing that his 242-month sentence was too high. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the 242-month sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Reyes-Rivera" on Justia Law

Musacchio resigned as president of ETS in 2004, but with help from the former head of ETS’s information-technology department, he accessed ETS’s computer system without authorization through early 2006. In 2010, Musacchio was indicted under 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2)(C), which makes it a crime if a person “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access” and thereby “obtains . . . information from any protected computer.” A 2012 superseding indictment changed the access date to “[o]n or about” November 23–25, 2005. Musacchio never raised the 5-year statute of limitations. The government did not object to jury instructions referring to: “intentionally access a computer without authorization and exceed authorized access” although the conjunction “and” added an additional element. The jury found Musacchio guilty. In affirming his conviction, the Fifth Circuit assessed Musacchio’s sufficiency challenge against the charged elements of the conspiracy count rather than against the heightened jury instruction, and concluded that he had waived his statute-of-limitations defense. The Supreme Court affirmed. A sufficiency challenge should be assessed against the elements of the charged crime, not against the elements set forth in an erroneous jury instruction. Sufficiency review essentially addresses whether the case was strong enough to reach the jury. Musacchio did not dispute that he was properly charged with conspiracy to obtain unauthorized access or that the evidence was sufficient to convict him of the charged crime. A defendant cannot successfully raise section 3282(a)’s statute-of-limitations bar for the first time on appeal. The history of section 3282(a)’s limitations bar confirms that the provision does not impose a jurisdictional limit. View "Musacchio v. United States" on Justia Law

Segal, a lawyer, CPA, and insurance broker, and his company, were indicted for racketeering, mail and wire fraud, making false statements, embezzlement, and conspiring to interfere with operations of the IRS. Convicted in 2004, Segal was sentenced to 121 months in prison. After further proceedings, in 2011, he was resentenced to time served and ordered to pay $842,000 in restitution and to forfeit to the government his interest in the company and $15 million. In 2013, the parties entered a binding settlement that specified the final disposition of Segal’s assets. After the district judge approved the settlement the parties disagreed and returned to court. The agreement gave Segal two of eight insurance policies on his life outright and an option to purchase the others, but required that he exercise the option within six months of approval of the settlement. He opted to purchase one policy before the deadline and asked for an extension, claiming that the government had not promptly released money owed to him and had delayed his efforts to obtain information from the insurance companies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed refusal to extend the deadline, but reversed with respect to claims relating to Segal’s right to repurchase his shares of the Chicago Bulls basketball team. View "United States v. Segal" on Justia Law