Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Patel opened a pharmacy in the building where Dr. Fowler’s clinic operated and hired Shah as the manager. Shah paid Fowler to write prescriptions and send patients to Patel’s pharmacy. Patel introduced Fowler to Taylor, a “marketer” who would bring additional patients to Fowler’s clinic. Thoran, another marketer, would visit Patel’s pharmacy, to pick up prescriptions for 5-10 patients several times per week. The fraudulent prescriptions were resold on the street. Fowler and Thoran were convicted of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, and conspiracy to pay or receive health-care kickbacks. During Fowler’s sentencing hearing, the district court failed to calculate the Guidelines range and failed to make findings about why the sentence that served as its “starting point” was appropriate. At Thoran’s sentencing hearing, the court agreed to the parties’ stipulated Guidelines range without making any findings about why it was appropriate. The court relied on erroneous factual findings in determining the restitution amount for each defendant and sentenced Fowler to 72 months’ imprisonment and payment of restitution of $1,752,957. Thoran’s sentence was 108 months with restitution of $2,632,854. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentences and restitution orders, but affirmed Thoran’s convictions. View "United States v. Thoran" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and five counts of wire fraud. Defendant's conviction stemmed from her involvement in a conspiracy to solicit participation in fake credit-repair or grant programs. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could have found defendant guilty of the conspiracy and wire fraud counts beyond a reasonable doubt; the district court properly admitted voicemail messages where defendant is heard threatening a victim that she had her social security numbers, personal information, and knew where she lived, because the evidence was relevant to show intent and was not unfairly prejudicial; the district court court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial based on a co-conspirator’s statement that defendant "killed a baby" where the statement was explained in context and was cured with further questioning; the district court's instruction sufficiently cured any potential prejudice caused by the prosecutor's comment in rebuttal closing; and the district court properly explained its reasons for defendant's sentence under the 18 U.S.C. 3353(a) factors and rejected defendant's claims that the district court should have varied downward. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Morris" on Justia Law

Defendant, former president, CEO, and chairman of the board of Bixby, was convicted of four counts of mail fraud, eight counts of wire fraud, conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, witness tampering, and three counts of tax evasion. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant had the requisite intent to defraud Bixby investors; the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of the tax evasion counts; the district court committed no clear error in reasonably estimating the actual loss resulting from defendant’s fraud offenses as equaling the total amounts lost by Bixby investors who submitted Victim Impact Statements; the district court did not err by imposing a two-level enhancement because defendant abused a position of public or private trust under USSG 3B1.3; and, because the Commission has not made retroactive the amendments on which defendant wishes to rely, 18 U.S.C. 3742(g)(1) would apply if he were resentenced, making the requested remand a futile exercise. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

In 2004 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) entered into a "Consent Judgment" with George Badger enjoining him from various activities and requiring him to pay $19.2 million. The government was only able to recover $6,548. It then sought a declaration that American Resources and Development, Inc. (ARDCO), Springfield Finance and Mortgage Company, LLC (Springfield), SB Trust, and ARDCO Leasing & Investment, LLC (ARDCO Leasing) (collectively, Defendants) were Badger’s alter egos so that their assets can be pursued to satisfy the Consent Judgment. While the claim was similar to one requesting to “pierce the veil” of a corporate entity and hold an individual liable for what on its face is a corporate debt, the Tenth Circuit saw the government's request in this case as a “reverse-piercing” claim because it sought to hold a corporation (or like entity) liable for the debt of an individual. The United States District Court for the District of Utah granted summary judgment for Defendants, ruling that the government’s reverse-piercing alter-ego theory was not available under Utah law. The Tenth Circuit rejected the district court's ruling, and held that Utah law recognizes the theory. The Court also rejected Defendants’ alternative ground for affirmance: that the claim is governed by the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act and was therefore barred as untimely. The Tenth Circuit found the Act did not apply to this action to enforce a disgorgement order. View "United States v. Badger" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction for one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States and two counts of making a false claim against the United States. Defendant's convictions stemmed from her filing of fraudulent 1099-OID forms. Defendant argued that the district court erred when it excluded a video about fractional-reserve banking from evidence that she claims supported her good-faith defense. The court concluded that the district court's exclusion of the video from the jury deliberations did not affect defendant's substantial rights and admission of the video would not have changed the verdict. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not err in excluding the video. The court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. McQuarry" on Justia Law

Jason Dvorin appealed his conviction of conspiracy to commit bank fraud. Dvorin's appeal has been consolidated with the appeal of Mindy Sauter, the attorney who prosecuted defendant during his first trial. Dvorin asserted that the district court erred in: (1) denying his request for an apparent-authority jury instruction; (2) denying his request for a special unanimity jury instruction; (3) overruling his objections under Federal Rules of Evidence 701 and 704 to the government counsels’ and witnesses’ use of the terms “fraud,” “fraudulent check,” or “conspiracy”; (4) excluding extrinsic evidence of and cross-examination regarding the district court’s findings that Chris Derrington, Pavillion Bank's executive vice president, testified falsely in a prior proceeding; (5) declining to award sanctions for prosecutorial discovery misconduct; (6) admitting the testimony of Chase Bank representative Arthemis Lindsay despite the government’s failure to timely designate Lindsay as a possible witness on its witness list; and (7) permitting the government to add a forfeiture count to the second superseding indictment before the second trial and entering a forfeiture judgment at sentencing without having a jury find the facts essential to that judgment. Sauter contends that the district court erroneously found that she violated Brady, Giglio, and Napue and acted “recklessly” by failing to timely disclose Derrington’s plea agreement supplement. The court reversed the district court’s denial of Dvorin’s motion to dismiss the forfeiture account for prosecutorial vindictiveness because the presumption of vindictiveness applied in this case where the government added a forfeiture notice in the second superseding indictment, and the government failed to overcome this presumption. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Dvorin" on Justia Law

Defendant Marvin Iverson was convicted by jury of engaging in a scheme to defraud JPMorgan Chase and Big Horn Federal Savings. The statute under which he was convicted required that the victims be “financial institutions.” To establish that element of the offense, the government offered the testimony of an FBI agent to try to prove that JPMorgan and Big Horn were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). On appeal Defendant argued that the agent’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay and violated the best-evidence rule. He also argued that even if the evidence was admissible, it was insufficient to prove that JPMorgan and Big Horn had FDIC insurance at the time of the offense. Despite the government’s concession to the contrary, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the agent’s testimony was not inadmissible hearsay; it was either not hearsay or fell within a hearsay exception. As for the best-evidence rule, Defendant did not raise the issue below and he had not shown plain error. The Court also rejected defendant’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. View "United States v. Iverson" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Keith Courtney was convicted by jury of three counts of wire fraud, for which he received a 24-month prison sentence followed by three years’ supervised release and ordered to forfeit $1,601,825.84, the full value of the fraudulent wire transfers at issue in the underlying case. In addition, the court imposed $493,230.88 in restitution. On appeal, defendant argued that: (1) the forfeiture order must be reduced by the amount the lenders received from the properties through mortgage payments and the sale of the properties; and (2) he should have been allowed to inform the jury of the possible sentence and its power to acquit him if they believed the conviction would be unjust. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with defendant on his first contention and reversed, and affirmed on the second. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Courtney" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to mail fraud and aggravated identity theft pursuant to a written plea agreement. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his multi‐year scheme to fraudulently obtain and use credit cards. On appeal, defendant alleged that the government materially breached the plea agreement by presenting evidence of twenty‐eight victims when only four were referred to by name in the agreement. The court enforced defendant's appellate waiver and dismissed the appeal, concluding that the plea agreement made clear that the named victims were either an example or just one of the companies he defrauded and therefore the government did not commit a material breach by introducing evidence that there were more victims than those specifically named. View "United States v. Malone" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and several counts of mail and wire fraud. The district court sentenced Defendant to a thirty-month term of immurement for the fraud offenses. The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions but vacated his sentence for securities fraud after finding procedural error in the district court’s calculation of the loss amount. On remand, the court below again sentenced Defendant to a term of thirty months’ imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain expert testimony at sentencing; and (2) did not commit clear error in determining the amount of the loss attributable to the offense of conviction. View "United States v. Jordan" on Justia Law