Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Defendant Roger Barnett served as Second Chief of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation in 2013 and 2014. He pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma to embezzling funds from the Tribe by appropriating to his own use money withdrawn from ATM machines. The sole issue on this appeal was whether the district court properly determined the amount of money embezzled for purposes of calculating Defendant’s offense level and the amount he owed the Tribe in restitution. Defendant argued that the court’s reliance on the presentence report (PSR) and Addendum was improper because the government failed to present at sentencing any evidence of the amount of loss. The Tenth Circuit disagreed: the district court could properly rely on the PSR and Addendum because Defendant did not adequately challenge their recitations of the evidence concerning his defalcations. The only issue that he preserved for appeal was whether the recited evidence sufficed to support the court’s determination of the amount of loss, and the Tenth Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient. View "United States v. Barnett" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of charges related to his role as a closing attorney in several real estate transactions in upstate New York from approximately 2001 until 2007. The court focused primarily on defendant's challenge to the three substantive counts of conviction involving activity directed at BNC. The court held that evidence of fraudulent activity directed at BNC is not enough to support convictions under 18 U.S.C. 1344 (bank fraud) and 1014 (false statements) solely by virtue of the fact that BNC was owned by a federally insured financial institution. Therefore, the court reversed defendant's convictions on the three substantive counts. However, the court concluded that the conspiracy to violate section 1014 count of conviction involved fraudulent misstatements made directly to a federally insured bank. Therefore, the court affirmed defendant's conviction on that count and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Bouchard" on Justia Law

Defendants Rivernider and Ponte plead guilty to charges arising from their orchestration of a Ponzi scheme and a related real estate scheme, in which defendants induced victims to purchase properties using mortgages based on an inflated appraisal price while pocketing the difference between the actual sales price and appraisal price as a “marketing fee,” without disclosing the fee to the buyer. The court concluded that the district court did not err in failing to appoint new counsel to represent Rivernider with respect to his motion to withdraw, or in denying his pro se motion, because there was a sufficient factual basis for Rivernider’s plea and because Rivernider did not sufficiently allege an actual conflict of interest between himself and his attorney. The court also rejected defendants’ challenges to their sentences and to the $22,140,765.99 restitution order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Rivernider" on Justia Law

Defendant conspired with former Korn/Ferry employees whose user accounts had been terminated, but who nonetheless accessed trade secrets in a proprietary database through the back door when the front door had been firmly closed. The court concluded that defendant knowingly and with intent to defraud Korn/Ferry blatantly circumvented the affirmative revocation of his computer system access. This access falls squarely within the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act's (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. 1030, prohibition on access “without authorization.” The court concluded that “without authorization” is an unambiguous, non-technical term that, given its plain and ordinary meaning, means accessing a protected computer without permission. Therefore, the court affirmed defendant’s conviction for violations of section 1030(a)(4) of the CFAA. The court also affirmed defendant's convictions under the Economic Espionage Act (EEA), 18 U.S.C. 1832(a)(2) -(a)(4), for downloading, receiving and possessing trade secrets in the form of source lists from the former employer's database. The court vacated in part and remanded the restitution order for reconsideration of the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees award. View "United States v. Nosal" on Justia Law

Stoller, the beneficiary of a trust that holds title to a house, assigned his beneficial interest to his daughter but reserved a “power of direction” with the right to obtain loans for himself, secured by the property. He directed the trust to rent out the property; he received the income. IStoller filed for bankruptcy. None of his filings mentioned the property. A question specifically asked about “all property owned by another person that [he] [held] or control[led].” Under penalty of perjury, he answered “none.” Stoller was charged with two counts of knowingly and fraudulently concealing property that belonged to a bankruptcy estate, 18 U.S.C. 152(1), and seven counts of knowingly and fraudulently making a false statement in a bankruptcy proceeding, 18 U.S.C. 152(3). Represented by an appointed lawyer, he pled guilty to one count of making a false statement; the government dismissed the remaining counts. Before sentencing, Stoller considered moving to withdraw his plea on the ground that he was not mentally competent. A new lawyer was appointed. Stoller was examined by a board‐certified neuropsychologist, who concluded that Stoller was competent to plead guilty. Stoller’s lawyer then unsuccessfully moved to withdraw the plea based on alleged defects in the plea colloquy. Stoller was sentenced to 20 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Stoller was competent to plead guilty, his plea was not coerced, the colloquy included most of the basics, and Stoller was not prejudiced by any deficiency. View "United States v. Stoller" on Justia Law

Former Virginia Governor McDonnell, and his wife were indicted on honest services fraud and Hobbs Act extortion charges related to their acceptance of $175,000 in loans, gifts, and other benefits from Williams, the CEO of Star Scientific, which developed Anatabloc, a nutritional supplement made from a compound found in tobacco. Williams wanted McDonnell’s assistance in getting public universities to perform research studies on the product. The government asserted that McDonnell committed (or agreed to commit) an “official act” in exchange for the loans and gifts. An “official act” is “any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or profit,” 18 U.S.C. 201(a)(3). The claimed “official acts,” included “arranging meetings” for Williams with other Virginia officials, “hosting” events at the Governor’s Mansion, and “contacting other government officials” concerning the studies. The district court instructed the jury that “official act” encompasses “acts that a public official customarily performs,” including acts “in furtherance of longer-term goals” or “in a series of steps to exercise influence or achieve an end.” The court declined to give McDonnell’s requested instruction that “merely arranging a meeting, attending an event, hosting a reception, or making a speech are not, standing alone, ‘official acts.’” The Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions. A unanimous Supreme Court vacated. An “official act” involves a decision or action (or an agreement to act or decide) on “question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy,” by a formal exercise of governmental power. The pertinent matter must be more focused and concrete than “Virginia business and economic development,” and a decision or action is more than merely setting up a meeting, hosting an event, or calling another official. The government’s expansive interpretation of “official act” would raise significant constitutional concerns. Conscientious public officials arrange meetings for constituents, contact other officials on their behalf, and include them in events all the time. The jury instructions, therefore, were significantly overinclusive. View "McDonnell v. United States" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Robert Holloway of four counts of wire fraud and one count of tax fraud. The charges against Holloway were the result of a scheme he created through his company, US Ventures, that defrauded over 250 investors and caused losses in excess of $15 million. Holloway began soliciting investors in 2005 by guaranteeing incredible returns in futures markets due to a mathematical algorithm he had created. When Holloway failed to realize the gains he promised, he started defrauding his investors by stating that his trading was profitable even though he lost substantial amounts of money, using money from new investors to pay other investors, and fabricating reports to investors stating that his daily returns were between 0 to 1.15% and that his trading never resulted in a loss. He also diverted investor funds for his own personal use. The district court sentenced Holloway to 225 months of imprisonment on all five counts. On appeal, Holloway argued: (1) he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice; (2) the district court allowed impermissible victim impact testimony; (3) denied him his constitutional right to confront witnesses; and (4) improperly enhanced his sentence. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Holloway" on Justia Law

Defendant John G. Rowland, the former governor of Connecticut, appealed his conviction of seven counts of violating campaign-finance laws and falsifying records. The court concluded that the broad language of 18 U.S.C. 1519 encompasses the creation of 18 documents - like the contracts at issue here - that misrepresent the true nature of the parties’ negotiations, when the documents are created in order to frustrate a possible future government investigation; the court rejected defendant's assertion that principles of contract law prevent the court from concluding that documents styled as contracts are “falsified” within the meaning of the statute; the court determined that the government adequately disclosed Lisa Wilson‐Foley’s statements to defendant, and that even if it did not, he is not able to show that he was prejudiced by the deficiency; and the court rejected defendant's challenges to the District Court’s other rulings at trial and at sentencing. View "United States v. Rowland" on Justia Law

The Bickarts prepared and filed an income tax return containing false income and withholding amounts, supported by fabricated 1099‐OID forms, appearing to come from major financial institutions. The IRS paid a claimed refund of $115,412. Their legitimate refund would have been $263. The IRS discovered the fraud and sent a bill for $217,923. For years, the Bickarts engaged in obstructive conduct, sending a 1040‐V payment coupon and continuing to insist that the bill had been paid. They made baseless accusations against IRS agents. They were convicted of conspiring to file and filing a false claim to defraud the government, 18 U.S.C. 286 and 287. The Bickarts represented themselves at trial, asserting “sovereign citizen” claims and making nonsensical accusations. The PSR applied a two‐level enhancement for sophisticated means based on the fictitious Forms 1099‐OID and a two‐level enhancement for obstruction of justice, resulting in a guidelines imprisonment range of 33-41 months. Neither objected to the calculations. The court sentenced each defendant to 24 months in prison. Defendants objected to supervised release conditions requiring them to notify third parties of risks related to their criminal history when directed by the probation office. The court modified it to require the probation office to seek court approval. They also objected to the condition permitting a probation officer to visit them at home or at work at any reasonable time. The court overruled the objection. The Seventh Circuit vacated the third‐party notification condition, but otherwise affirmed the remaining conditions of supervised release and sentence. View "United States v. Bickart" on Justia Law

Penal Code section 424 applies to "[e]ach officer of this state, or of any county, city, town, or district of this state, and every other person charged with the receipt, safekeeping, transfer, or disbursement of public moneys." The court held that section 424 applies only to those public officers imbued with such responsibility over public moneys. In this case, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict finding defendant, who served as superintendent of the District, was charged with the "receipt, safekeeping, transfer, or disbursement" of public funds. The evidence demonstrated that defendant had explicit contractual responsibilities to oversee the "budget and business affairs" of the District, testimony that superintendents like defendant owe a duty to safeguard school district funds, and defendant‘s responsibility to ensure such public funds were spent in accordance with the law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "People v. Hubbard" on Justia Law