Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to eight counts of a sixteen count indictment that included wire fraud, money laundering, and tax evasion. Defendant appealed his sentence of 111 months in prison and 5 years of supervised release. The court affirmed the sentence but remanded the forfeiture order for further proceedings. The district court, upon rehearing, ordered forfeiture of the entirety of defendant's Castlerock property under 18 U.S.C. 982(a)(1). The court held that the evidence satisfied the requisite nexus between defendant's money-laundering convictions and the entirety of the property at issue. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Beltramea" on Justia Law

Defendant, a former mortgage loan officer and real estate broker, appealed his convictions and sentence for nine counts of wire fraud and one count of aggravated theft. Defendant's convictions stemmed from his involvement in a complex mortgage fraud scheme. The court held that negligence is not a defense to wire fraud, and evidence of lender negligence is not admissible as a defense to mortgage fraud; intentional disregard of relevant information is not a defense to wire fraud, and evidence of intentional disregard by lenders is not admissible as a defense to mortgage fraud; evidence of individual lender behavior is not admissible to disprove materiality, but evidence of general lending standards in the mortgage industry is admissible to disprove materiality; and the district court did not deny defendant the opportunity to present a complete defense. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. The court concurrently filed a separate memorandum disposition rejecting other challenges to the convictions and sentences. View "United States v. Lindsey" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of seven counts of wire fraud and one count of making false statements to an FBI agent. Defendant's convictions stemmed from his involvement in a fraudulent scheme involving the alleged development of a Disney theme park in Celina, Texas. The court rejected defendant's evidentiary challenges, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence that defendant met the individual who informed him of the Disney development at a methadone clinic because the true nature of the relationship that defendant had with the person he claimed to be his source for the Disney information was inextricably intertwined with the fraudulent scheme. The court also concluded that, even assuming that new information regarding the involvement of defendant's uncle, the uncle's participation does not undermine the conclusion that defendant was involved in the scheme. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant a new trial on these bases. Finally, the court rejected defendant's objections to the admission of portions of his deposition testimony through the summary-evidence testimony of a government agent. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Lucas, Jr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of illegal insider trading. The conviction arose from Defendant’s act of receiving material, nonpublic information about a local bank from a fellow member of the Oakley Country Club and then using that information to make a substantial trading profit. Defendant appealed, arguing, in part, that the district court wrongly instructed the jury on the mens rea element of his offense. Defendant did not object to these instructions at trial. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the government presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict; and (2) the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury regarding the mens rea element of Defendant’s offense, but Defendant failed to establish that the error was plain error. View "United States v. Bray" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of both conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud and healthcare fraud. The convictions arose from Defendant’s role in an extensive scheme to defraud Medicare by billing the program for services provided to patients falsely presented as eligible to receive them. Defendant was sentenced to thirty-six months of imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she acted with the required culpable state of mind. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable fact-finder to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant conspired to commit, and committed, healthcare fraud. View "United States v. Troisi" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, healthcare fraud, and money laundering. Defendant appealed, alleging trial error. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) failing to sua sponte give a limiting instruction as to testimony by Defendant’s associate that the associate had pled guilty to one count of healthcare fraud arising from the same scheme; (2) permitting witness testimony about Medicare regulations; and (3) denying Defendant’s preferred jury instruction as to the meaning of a particular certification requirement in the relevant Medicare provisions. View "United States v. Galatis" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Bruce Wright of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and of eleven counts of bank fraud arising from his participation in a scheme to submit false draw requests and invoices to obtain bank loans. The district court sentenced Wright to thirty-three months’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay over $1 million in restitution. Wright raised several issues on appeal, concerning jury instructions, withheld impeachment evidence, and bank loss and restitution amounts. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

Black called Knarr to suggest a real estate investment. Knarr gave Black $124,456, documented by a May 2006 promissory note. Knarr testified that he would not have invested without a promised 10 percent return if sale or development of the property failed. The parties modified the note in May 2007 to reflect Knarr’s additional investment of $155,474 and extended the maturity date of the note several times, through mid-January 2012. Knarr obtained information inconsistent with what Black had told him and asked Black for his money. Receiving no response, Knarr initiated an investigation. In 2013, Black was charged with five counts (there were other investors) of using false statements in the offer or sale of a security (Corp. Code, 25401, 25540(b)). The trial court set aside two counts, finding that the note was not a security. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the promissory notes offered for Knarr’s investment in the real estate development scheme were not securities within the meaning of the Corporate Securities Law. The evidence of other investors was insufficient to meet the public offering prong of the risk-capital test and there was insufficient evidence that Knarr was “led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter.” View "People v. Black" on Justia Law

Defendant was ordered to pay restitution of almost $500,000 after he pled guilty to bank fraud and aggravated identity theft. The court concluded that, although the district court missed the 90-day deadline, the district court retained its power to order restitution; the government failed to provide sufficient evidence of the ultimate losses defendant caused the victim banks; and since more than four years have passed after defendant was originally sentenced, and in the interest of finality, the court declined to remand for a third restitution proceeding. Therefore, the court vacated the restitution amount. View "United States v. Adejumo" on Justia Law

The defendants were indicted for committing and conspiring to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343 & 1349, by extracting money from lenders (including Bank of America) that had financed the sale of defendants' Gary, Indiana properties. The defendants had represented that buyers of the properties were the source of the down payments; the defendants had actually given the buyers the money to enable them to make the down payments. They had also helped the buyers provide, in loan applications, false claims of creditworthiness. The judge ordered restitution of $893,015 to Bank of America. The Seventh Circuit remanded, directing the court to consider an alternative remedy. Restitution is questionable because Bank of America, though not a coconspirator, did not have clean hands. It ignored clear signs that the loans were “phony.” The court referred to a history of “shady” practices and characterized the Bank as “reckless.” The court acknowledged that the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act requires “mandatory restitution to victims,” 18 U.S.C. 3663A, for “an offense resulting in damage to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense,” but stated that Bank of America was deliberately indifferent to the risk of losing its own money, because it intended to sell the mortgages and transfer the risk of loss to Fannie Mae for a profit. View "United States v. Tartareanu" on Justia Law