Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Ung stole cryptocurrencies from multiple victims in 2018, exploiting a common website security feature: A user can prompt a website hosting an account to send a text message to the user’s phone with a security code that temporarily allows access to the account. Ung employed “SIM swapping” in which the thief tricks the victim’s phone carrier into switching the victim’s phone number to a SIM card in the thief’s phone. The thief then prompts the website hosting the victim’s financial account to send a temporary security code to the hijacked phone; the thief accesses the account and transfers the assets.In 2021, Ung pleaded no contest to identity theft, attempted grand theft, and 10 counts of felony grand theft. He admitted a white-collar crime enhancement; he committed three offenses after his bail was revoked. The court imposed a 10-year prison term, entered a general restitution order, and later ordered Ung to make restitution by transferring cryptocurrencies to the victims in the same kinds and amounts he had stolen. Ung argued the order violated his due process rights to notice. He estimates the value of the cryptocurrencies was about $1.56 million when he stole them; the value was about $15.9 million by the time of the restitution hearing.The court of appeal affirmed. Under the statute, the value of stolen property is the replacement cost of like property. By stealing the victims’ cryptocurrency, Ung deprived them of the ability to sell it for a profit after its value increased; whatever profits they lost were a direct consequence of Ung’s conduct. View "People v. Ung" on Justia Law

The Hagens (Leah and Michael) were convicted by a jury of conspiring to defraud the United States and to pay and receive health care kickbacks. Each was sentenced to 151 months of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release, plus restitution. Both Hagens appealed, arguing that the district court erred in excluding evidence, refusing to instruct the jury on an affirmative defense, and imposing a sentencing enhancement and restitution.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Hagens' convictions and sentences. The court found that the excluded evidence, which consisted of witness testimony, was irrelevant and cumulative. Thus, the district court did not err in excluding it. Even if the exclusion of the evidence wasn't warranted, the court determined that any error below was harmless.The court also held that the Hagans failed to put sufficient evidence forward justifying their requested jury charge on the safe-harbor affirmative defense. Finally, the court rejected the Hagens' claim that the lower court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement for the couple's "sophisticated money laundering scheme." The court explained that evidence suggested the Hagens manipulated their wire transfer payments to conceal the kickback scheme, which justified the enhancement. View "USA v. Hagen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied motions sought by Appellants to dismiss their misdemeanor cases on the ground that their no-bond arrest warrants, arrest, and subsequent temporary detentions were unlawful, holding that the district court did not act illegally in denying Appellants' respective motions to dismiss the assault charges filed against them.A magistrate issued arrest warrants for Appellants on charges of simple misdemeanor assault relating to an incident occurring during a business meeting. Appellants were arrested and detained overnight. Appellants made their initial appearances the next morning, posted $100 cash bond, and were released. Appellants then moved to dismiss their cases, but the district court denied their motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no basis for dismissing the indictments. View "Howsare v. Iowa District Court for Polk County" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration was whether claims brought under the Insurance Fraud Protection Act (IFPA) and the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) by plaintiffs Liberty Insurance Corp. and LM Insurance Corp. (Liberty) against defendants Techdan, LLC (Techdan), Exterior Erecting Services, Inc. (Exterior), Daniel Fisher, Robert Dunlap, and Carol Junz were subject to the apportionment procedure of the Comparative Negligence Act (CNA). Liberty issued workers’ compensation policies to Techdan from 2004 to 2007. It alleged defendants misrepresented the relationship between Techdan and Exterior and the ownership structure of the two entities and provided fraudulent payroll records to reduce the premiums for workers’ compensation insurance. Techdan was indicted for second-degree theft by deception, and Dunlap entered a guilty plea to that charge on Techdan’s behalf. The court granted partial summary judgment as to Liberty’s IFPA claim for insurance fraud against Techdan, Exterior, Dunlap, and Fisher; partial summary judgment as to Liberty’s workers’ compensation fraud claim against all defendants; and partial summary judgment as to Liberty’s breach of contract claim against Techdan and Exterior. The court denied summary judgment as to Liberty’s remaining claims. The jury found Techdan liable for $454,660 in compensatory damages and found Exterior liable for $227,330 in compensatory damages, but awarded no compensatory damages against Dunlap, Fisher, or Junz. It awarded punitive damages in the amount of $200,000 against Dunlap, $10,000 against Fisher, and $45,000 against Junz, but awarded no punitive damages against Techdan or Exterior. The trial court determined all defendants should be jointly and severally liable for the $756,990 awarded as compensatory damages. The Appellate Division held the trial court erred when it imposed joint and several liability on defendants rather than directing the jury to allocate percentages of fault to defendants in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2(a)(2). The Division concluded the trial court’s cumulative errors warranted a new trial, and it remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court concurred with the appellate court: the trial court should have charged the jury to allocate percentages of fault and should have molded the judgment based on the jury’s findings; the trial court’s failure to apply the CNA warranted a new trial on remand. The Court did not disturb the first jury’s findings on the issues of liability under the IFPA, the WCA, or Liberty’s common-law claims, or its determination of total compensatory damages. The Court found no plain error in the trial court’s failure to give the jury an ultimate outcome charge. View "Liberty Insurance Corp. v. Techdan, LLC" on Justia Law

Klund purports to supply electrical parts. In 1991 and in 1993, he was convicted for fraudulent misrepresentations involving defense contracts. Disqualified from the award of government contracts, from 2011-2019, Klund bid on defense contracts using shell corporations, aliases, and the names of employees and relatives. He certified that one shell company was a woman-owned business, eligible for special consideration. Klund bid on 5,760 defense contracts and was awarded 1,928 contracts worth $7.4 million. Klund satisfactorily performed some of his contracts; the Department paid $2.9 million for these goods. But he knowingly shipped and requested payment for 2,816 nonconforming electrical parts and submitted invoices for parts that he never shipped.Klund pleaded guilty to wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and money laundering. The PSR calculated the intended loss at $5.7 million and the actual loss at $2.9 million. Since Klund fraudulently obtained contracts intended for woman-owned businesses, the PSR did not apply an offset for the cost of goods actually delivered under those contracts. An 18-level increase in Klund’s offense level applied because the loss was more than $3,500,000 but not more than $9,500,000, U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1)(J). With an advisory range of 87-108 months, Klund was sentenced to 96 months’ imprisonment with a mandatory consecutive sentence of 24 months for aggravated identity theft. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the loss calculations. View "United States v. Klund" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the restitution order entered by the district court holding Defendant jointly and severally liable for all sums illicitly obtained by the charged conspiracy in this case, holding that the restitution order was not an abuse of the district court's discretion.Defendant, a lawyer formerly licensed in Florida, and his co-conspirators organized a scheme designed to defraud investors of millions of dollars. The conspirators convicted at least five people to invest substantially in the scheme. One of the victims eventually contacted authorities, and Defendant and his co-conspirators were charged with a single count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Defendant pleaded guilty. The district court sentenced Defendant to twenty-nine months of immurement followed by supervised release and ordered him to pay restitution in the amount of $3,473,701. The First Circuit affirmed the restitution order, holding that where a defendant is convicted as a member of a wire-fraud conspiracy, a district court has discretion to order him to reimburse the victims of the scheme, jointly and severally with his co-conspirators, for all reasonably foreseeable losses created by the fraudulent scheme. View "United States v. Ochoa" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a qui tam action against Prime Healthcare Services—Encino Hospital, LLC (Encino Hospital) and others to impose civil penalties for violation of the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (IFPA), Insurance Code section 1871 et seq. The State of California and relator (Plaintiffs) appealed from a judgment entered after a bench trial in which the court found insufficient evidence to support their allegations that Defendants engaged in insurance fraud by billing insurers for services performed in a detox center for which they had no appropriate license, and by employing a referral agency to steer patients to the center.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the judgment. The court explained that, CDI alleged that Encino Hospital misrepresented to insurers that it was properly licensed to provide detox services when it was not. The trial court found no evidence suggesting that Defendants presented a false claim to any insurer. The court agreed, reasoning that no authority of which it is aware or to which it has been directed obligates Encino Hospital to hold any license other than its license as a general acute care hospital. Because Encino Hospital needed no separate license or approval, and no evidence showed it concealed any provider, the CDI’s cause of action for false claims failed for lack of a predicate. View "State of Cal. v. Encino Hospital Medical Center" on Justia Law

The board of directors of Finjan Holdings, Inc., struck a deal with Fortress Investment Group LLC for Fortress to purchase all Finjan shares. Finjan’s shareholders approved the deal. Shareholder Plaintiff then sued Finjan, its CEO, and members of its board of directors, alleging that revenue predictions and share-value estimations sent by Finjan management to shareholders before the sale had been false and in violation of Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that to state a claim under Section 14(e), Plaintiff was required to plausibly allege that (1) Finjan management did not actually believe the revenue protections/share-value estimations they issued to the Finjan shareholders (“subjective falsity”), (2) the revenue protections/share value estimations did not reflect the company’s likely future performance (“objective falsity”), (3) shareholders foreseeably relied on the revenue-projections/share-value estimations in accepting the tender offer, and (4) shareholders suffered an economic loss as a result of the deal with Fortress. The district court ruled that the subjective falsity element of Grier’s claim required allegations of a conscious, fraudulent state-of-mind, also called “scienter.”   The panel, however, held that, for Plaintiff’s claim under Section 14(e), scienter was not required, and his allegations need to provide only enough factual material to create a “reasonable inference,” not a “strong inference,” of subjective falsity. The panel held that, nonetheless, Plaintiff’s allegations did not create even a “reasonable inference” of subjective falsity. View "IN RE: ROBERT GRIER, ET AL V. FINJAN HOLDINGS, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

After a five-day trial, a jury convicted Defendant of healthcare fraud, conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, paying kickbacks in connection with a federal healthcare program, and conspiracy to pay and receive healthcare kickbacks. The district court sentenced him to 120 months in prison. On appeal, Defendant challenged his healthcare fraud convictions—but not his kickback convictions—on a number of grounds. The charges arose out of Defendant’s involvement in the submission of claims to Medicare for genetic cancer-screening (CGx) tests for beneficiaries who did not have cancer or familial history of cancer and that were not ordered by the beneficiaries’ primary care physicians.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that given the statutory and regulatory landscape, it agreed with the district court that the indictment was sufficient to charge Defendant with healthcare fraud. The indictment charged that CGx tests in question were not for beneficiaries who were being treated for cancer or who had a familial history of cancer and were not ordered by the beneficiaries’ treating physicians. Moreover, the government did not need to present evidence excluding every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or that was wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, provided that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. View "USA v. Ivan Andre Scott" on Justia Law

Robert Bentley (Bentley) was a broker of certificates of deposits (CDs). He operated his business through two entities: Bentley Financial Services (BFS) and Entrust Group (Entrust). Entrust had a $2 million line of credit with Main Line Federal Savings Bank (Main Line). In 1996, Main Line terminated the line of credit after the bank discovered Bentley had forged his accountant’s signature on a document. Main Line demanded repayment of the outstanding $2 million balance. In order to pay back Main Line, Bentley sold $2 million of fake CDs. Thereafter, Bentley engaged in a Ponzi scheme in which he would sell fraudulent or fictitious CDs to new investors in order to pay off previous investors. In 1997, as he continued to defraud investors, Bentley opened deposit and wire transfer accounts with a new bank, Bryn Mawr Trust Company (BMT). Bentley became one of BMT’s largest customers. In 2001, the Securities and Exchange Commission commenced an action against Bentley for his Ponzi scheme. The federal court appointed David Marion (Marion) as a receiver for BFS and Entrust. In 2004, Marion initiated this case. Marion’s complaint, amended in 2012, raised claims of breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act (UFA), aiding and abetting fraud, and negligence. In 2014, the trial court granted summary judgment to BMT on the claim of aiding and abetting fraud. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted limited discretionary review to consider whether to recognize a cause of action for aiding and abetting fraud and, if so, to determine the scienter requirement for this tort. The Court held aiding and abetting fraud was a cognizable claim under Pennsylvania law, and the required state of mind was actual knowledge of the fraud. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s decision was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded to the trial court for a new trial. View "Marion v. Bryn Mawr Trust Co." on Justia Law