Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in White Collar Crime
JP Morgan Chase Bank NA v. First Am. Title Ins. Corp.
Patriot was authorized to issue title policies underwritten by First American in Michigan. In 2007, Patriot closed a transaction and provided title insurance and a closing protection letter (CPL) when which WaMu loaned $4,543,593.07 to Truong for the purchase of property in Grosse Ile. In the CPL, First American agreed to indemnify WaMu for actual losses arising from Patriot’s fraud or dishonesty in connection with the closing. In 2008, First American discovered that the Truong transaction was a sham, orchestrated by Patriot’s owner, and obtained title to the property. During negotiations concerning sale of the property, federal regulators closed WaMu. The FDIC became its receiver and sold most of WaMu’s assets to Chase, including the title insurance commitment issued in connection with the Truong transaction. Attempting to resolve the claim, First American tendered a quitclaim deed. Chase refused to accept that deed. First American sought a declaration that First American had fulfilled its obligations under the commitment by tendering a deed to the property. Chase sought a declaration that the deed was void and requested money damages. The FDIC intervened, alleging breach of contract against First American based on the CPL. After the property was sold, First American and Chase stipulated to dismissal of Chase’s claims against First American and First American’s claims against Chase. Chase and the FDIC entered into a stipulation that Chase did not acquire the CPL claim that the FDIC was pursuing. A jury awarded the FDIC $2,263,510.78. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "JP Morgan Chase Bank NA v. First Am. Title Ins. Corp." on Justia Law
United States v. Sadler
Nancy and Lester's Kentucky pain-management clinic closed after the DEA confiscated the doctor’s license for overprescribing narcotics. They then opened two clinics in Ohio. Patients would arrive before they opened, filling the parking lot, where they used drugs and traded prescription forms. Patients often traveled long distances (in groups), although most lived closer to other clinics. After paying their $150 appointment fee (cash only), patients would meet an “assessor” who would review their “day sheet” and provide a completed prescription form for hydrocodone, oxycodone, or other pain medication. Staff completed day sheets and prescription forms in advance. Patients then met the doctor for a minute. About 100 people per day completed this “five minute” process. The clinics also treated phantom patients. Nancy supervised the updating of files for people who had never visited the clinics. The doctor would sign prescriptions for phantom patients, staff would fill the prescriptions, and the pain pills were sold on the street by a Sadler relative. The clinics ordered drugs directly from pharmaceutical companies, but never obtained a license to dispense controlled substances. The Sadlers were convicted of conspiring to distribute controlled substances illegally and maintaining a premises for distributing the substances; Nancy was also convicted of wire fraud and money laundering. The district court sentenced Lester to 151 months and Nancy to 210 months. The Sixth Circuit vacated the wire fraud conviction, but otherwise affirmed. Nancy may have had many bad motives in buying the pills, but unfairly depriving the distributors of their property was not among them; she ordered pills and paid the asking price. View "United States v. Sadler" on Justia Law
United States v. Bencivengo
Bencivengo, former Mayor of Hamilton Township, New Jersey, was convicted of violating, the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a) and section 2, and the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 1952(a)(1) and (3) and section 2, premised on the New Jersey bribery statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2.2, for accepting money from Ljuba in exchange for agreeing to influence members of the Hamilton Township School Board to refrain from putting the School District’s insurance contract up for competitive bidding. Ljuba, the district’s insurance broker and a friend of Bencivengo’s, personally earned between $600,000 and $700,000 in commissions from insurance contracts with the district in 2011 alone. Bencivengo, facing financial difficulties , persuaded Ljuba to have her husband write a check with a memo line that the check was for a “cherry bedroom set” and to give him money during a trip to Atlantic City so that it would appear that he won the money gambling. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of double jeopardy and a challenge to the conduct of the judge. View "United States v. Bencivengo" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law, White Collar Crime
United States v. Kumar
Kumar was 19 years old and in his first year in the Aviation Technology Program at Bowling Green State University when he was assigned to fly alone from Wood County Airport near Bowling Green to Burke Lakefront Airport in Cleveland, and back, after 10:00 p.m. The flight plan required him to fly over part of Lake Erie. On the return trip, Kumar observed what he believed to be a flare rising from a boat. He reported this sighting to Cleveland Hopkins International Airport and was instructed to fly lower for a closer look. Kumar could not then see a boat. Fearful of hurting his chances of one day becoming a Coast Guard pilot, he reported that he saw additional flares and described a 25-foot fishing vessel with four people aboard wearing life jackets with strobe lights activated. Kumar’s report prompted a massive search and rescue mission by the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Canadian Armed Forces. A month later, Kumar admitted that his report had been false. He pleaded guilty to making a false distress call, a class D felony per 14 U.S.C. 88(c)(1), which imposes liability for all costs the Coast Guard incurs. He was sentenced to a prison term of three months and ordered to pay restitution of $277,257.70 to the Coast Guard, and $211,750.00 to the Canadian Armed Forces. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Kumar" on Justia Law
United States v. Smith
The Smith brothers and others operated Target Oil, which conducted speculative resource drilling in Kentucky, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. Wells they represented as sure-fire investments often produced virtually no oil and many wells were never completed. From 2003 to 2008, Target Oil received about $15,800,000 in investor funds but, according to the postal inspector, distributed only $460,000 in royalties. The brothers were arrested and accused of conspiring with others to defraud investors of millions of dollars. Michael was convicted of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349, and of 11 substantive counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and sentenced to 120 months in prison and ordered to pay $5,506,917 in restitution. Christopher was convicted by the same jury on seven counts of mail fraud and was sentenced to 60 months in prison and ordered to pay $1,652,075 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that: the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions; the government offered evidence that constructively amended or varied the indictment; their sentences are procedurally and substantively unreasonable; one of the forfeiture judgments was excessive; the district court erred in excluding a defense expert witness; and items of evidence relating to the alleged fraud were erroneously admitted. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law
United States v. Daniel
Rymtech, a mortgage reduction program, purported to provide financial assistance to homeowners facing foreclosure. Daniel, its Vice President, recruited homeowners to place their properties in the program and instructed them to sign over title to straw purchasers called “A buyers.” Homeowners were told that title would be placed in trust, that A buyers would obtain financing to pay off the mortgage, and that they would regain clear title in five years. Daniel instructed loan officers to prepare fraudulent loan applications on behalf of A buyers. Even if Rymtech had invested all of the owners’ equity, implausibly high rates of return would have been required to make the mortgage payments. The equity was actually primarily used to operate Rymtech. When its finances started to disintegrate, Daniel continued to recruit homeowners. After the program failed Daniel was convicted of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343 and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and an argument that the court erred in rejecting his proposed instruction, requiring the jury to agree unanimously on a specific fraudulent representation, pretense, promise, or act. Unanimity is only required for the existence of the scheme itself and not in regard to a specific false representation. View "United States v. Daniel" on Justia Law
United States v. Auernheimer
Apple introduced the iPad in 2010. To send and receive data over cellular networks (3G), customers had to purchase a data contract from AT&T and register on an AT&T website. AT&T prepopulated the user ID field on the login screen with customers’ email addresses by programming servers to search for the user’s Integrated Circuit Card Identifier to reduce the time to log into an account. Spitler discovered this “shortcut” and wrote a program, the “account slurper,” to repeatedly access the AT&T website, each time changing the ICC-ID by one digit. If an email address appeared in the login box, the program would save that address. Spitler shared this discovery with Auernheimer, who helped him to refine the account slurper, which collected 114,000 email addresses. Auernheimer emailed the media to publicize their exploits. AT&T fixed the breach. Auernheimer shared the list of email addresses with Tate, who published a story that mentioned some names of those whose email addresses were obtained, but published only redacted email addresses and ICC-IDs. Spitler was in California. Auernheimer was in Arkansas. The servers t were physically located in Texas and Georgia. Despite the absence of any connection to New Jersey, a Newark grand jury indicted Auernheimer for conspiracy to violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2)(C) and (c)(2)(B)(ii), and identity fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(7). The Third Circuit vacated his conviction. Venue in criminal cases is more than a technicality; it involves “matters that touch closely the fair administration of criminal justice and public confidence in it.”View "United States v. Auernheimer" on Justia Law
United States v. Donelli
In 2007 Donelli’s family rented a house from the elderly Viguses. Donelli falsely told the Viguses that her minor daughter would receive a $750,000 settlement because of a car accident with an oil company employee. She persuaded them to “lend” her money 500 times, signing promissory notes for $443,000. Most was spent on vacations. None was reported to the IRS as income. The Viguses never saw any repayment. Donelli pled guilty to tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. 7201, and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The presentence report said that Donelli sought treatment for drug abuse in 2012 from a psychiatrist, who diagnosed Donelli with “Type II Bipolar Disorder.” The report included no further information about the illness or its impact on Donelli. The court adopted the report, including an uncontested guideline range of 41 to 51 months. Donelli did not submit a sentencing memorandum or any evidence. Donelli orally attributed her crime to her addiction to prescription opioids. The district judge acknowledged the reference to Donelli’s diagnosis of bipolar disorder and imposed a sentence of 60 months, stating that the guidelines did not “capture the extent of the harm here.” Donelli’s lawyer repeated that the guidelines already accounted for the nature of the harm, but did not object to the sufficiency of the court’s explanation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Donelli failed to present her diagnosis as a principal argument in mitigation and waived her claim of a Cunningham procedural error by stating that she had no objection apart from the sentence being above the guideline range. View "United States v. Donelli" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law, White Collar Crime
Dewald v. Wriggelsworth
During the 2000 presidential election, Dewald established and operated political action committees (PACs): “Friends for a Democratic White House” and “Swing States for a GOP White House.” He sent fundraising letters to political donors found on Federal Election Commission donor lists. The PACs collected about $750,000 in contributions, but Dewald remitted less than 20 percent of that amount to the political parties or to outside PACs. He funneled most the money to his for-profit corporation, which provided “consulting and administrative services” to the PACs. Dewald was convicted, under Michigan law, for obtaining money under false pretenses, common-law fraud, and larceny by conversion and ultimately sentenced to between 23 and 120 months. Rejecting Dewald’s preemption claim, the Michigan Court of Appeals reasoned that the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 USC 453 has a narrow preemptive effect. Dewald unsuccessfully sought state post-conviction relief. Dewald later obtained federal habeas corpus relief 28 U.S.C. 2254, on grounds that FECA preempted state law and that the Michigan court’s determination was objectively unreasonable. The Sixth Circuit reversed. There is no clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, holding that FECA precludes a state from prosecuting fraud in the context of a federal election. Even if federal preemption provides “clearly established federal law” in general, the state decision did not unreasonably apply those general principles to this case. View "Dewald v. Wriggelsworth" on Justia Law
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jenkins
Stephen Jenkins brought a tort action against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. alleging that a Bank teller had improperly accessed Jenkins’s confidential information and given it to her husband, allowing the husband to steal Jenkins’s identity. Jenkins claimed the Bank negligently failed to protect the information, breached a duty of confidentiality, and invaded his privacy. The trial court granted the Bank’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court of Appeals reversed as to Jenkins’s negligence claim after finding that the allegations of his complaint established the elements of negligence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that a violation of an alleged duty imposed the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act gave rise to a cause of action for negligence under Georgia law. The Supreme Court concluded that the holding was in error, and reversed that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals.View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jenkins" on Justia Law