Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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Sawyer, with co-defendants, formed A&E to recover salvageable materials (copper, steel, aluminum) from the 300-acre Hamblen County site of the former Liberty Fibers rayon plant, which contained buildings, a water treatment facility, and extensive above-ground piping. The defendants knew that many of the buildings contained regulated asbestos-containing material (RACM), such as pipe-wrap, insulation, roofing, and floor tiles, much of which was marked. Demolition did not comply with National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) governing the handling and disposal of asbestos. Workers were not provided with proper respirators or protective suits; some were asked to remove or handle friable asbestos without adequately wetting it. In a 2008 consent agreement, A&E agreed to correct the violations and comply with NESHAP during future removal and demolition. In 2009, the EPA terminated the agreement and issued an immediate compliance order. Federal agents searched the site, seized documents, and took samples of RACM. EPA, acting under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), cleaned up the site, at a cost of $16,265,418. In 2011, Sawyer and his co-defendants were charged. Sawyer pled guilty to conspiring to violate the Clean Air Act, 18 U.S.C. 371. His PSR calculated a guideline sentencing range of 87-108 months. The statutory maximum under 18 U.S.C. 371 is 60 months, so his effective range was 60 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Sawyer’s 60-month sentence and an order holding the co-defendants jointly and severally liable for $10,388,576.71 in restitution to the EPA. View "United States v. Sawyer" on Justia Law

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Bankston was charged wire fraud, mail fraud, bank fraud, money laundering, identity theft, and a false statement offense in connection with three separate fraudulent schemes. In each scheme, she unlawfully obtained the personal identification information of individuals and used it to defraud commercial banks and the state and federal government. Before trial, Bankston wrote a letter to the judge complaining of a disagreement with her attorney: Bankston wanted to present as a defense her theory that evidence recovered from her home had been planted by a federal agent. Based on the letter, Count 23 charged Bankston with making false statements in matters within the jurisdiction of the judiciary, 18 U.S.C. 1001. The Sixth Circuit vacated her Count 23 conviction and remanded for resentencing, affirming her other convictions, despite claims of insufficient evidence, judicial bias, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance, and invalid waiver of counsel. Bankston’s Count 23 conduct did not clearly constitute a crime: “judicial function exception” applies when the defendant was a party to a judicial proceeding, his statements were submitted to a judge, and his statements were made in that proceeding. View "United States v. Bankston" on Justia Law

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In 2009, Patel opened a pharmacy in the building where Dr. Fowler’s clinic operated and hired Shah as the manager. Shah paid Fowler to write prescriptions and send patients to Patel’s pharmacy. Patel introduced Fowler to Taylor, a “marketer” who would bring additional patients to Fowler’s clinic. Thoran, another marketer, would visit Patel’s pharmacy, to pick up prescriptions for 5-10 patients several times per week. The fraudulent prescriptions were resold on the street. Fowler and Thoran were convicted of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, and conspiracy to pay or receive health-care kickbacks. During Fowler’s sentencing hearing, the district court failed to calculate the Guidelines range and failed to make findings about why the sentence that served as its “starting point” was appropriate. At Thoran’s sentencing hearing, the court agreed to the parties’ stipulated Guidelines range without making any findings about why it was appropriate. The court relied on erroneous factual findings in determining the restitution amount for each defendant and sentenced Fowler to 72 months’ imprisonment and payment of restitution of $1,752,957. Thoran’s sentence was 108 months with restitution of $2,632,854. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentences and restitution orders, but affirmed Thoran’s convictions. View "United States v. Thoran" on Justia Law

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Martin, Kentucky Mayor Thomasine Robinson, sought reelection. Her challenger, Howell, won by three votes. Husband James confronted and threatened to kill Howell; he was convicted in state court of terroristic threatening and menacing. Thomasine was charged with bribery, coercion, and intimidation. Testimony indicated that: Thomasine gave a woman $20 to vote for her and coerced voters to vote for her by absentee ballot; that her son Steven attempted to intimidate a voter; that James paid $10 for a vote; and that James gave an individual money with which to purchase votes. The jury returned a guilty verdict on conspiracy and vote-buying (52 U.S.C. 10307(c)) charges, but the court granted James acquittal on the conspiracy charge. Thomasine was convicted of vote-buying and conspiracy to violate civil rights (18 U.S.C. 241); Steven was found guilty of conspiracy and two counts of vote-buying, but acquitted of a third count. The court assessed a leadership enhancement to James for directing another to purchase votes and an obstruction of justice enhancement for behaving menacingly during a trial recess and sentenced him to an above-guidelines 40 months in prison. Steven was sentenced to 21 months and three years of supervised release, with a condition requiring him to abstain from the consumption of alcohol. Thomasine was sentenced to 33 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

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In 2008, Javidan shadowed Shahab, who was involved with fraudulent home-health agencies. Javidan, Shahab, and two others purchased Acure Home Care. Javidan managed Acure, signing Medicare applications and maintaining payroll. She had sole signature authority on Acure’s bank account and, was solely responsible for Medicare billing. Javidan illegally recruited patients by paying “kickbacks” to corrupt physicians and by using “marketers” to recruit patients by offering cash or prescription medications in exchange for Medicare numbers and signatures on blank Medicare forms. Javidan hired Meda as a physical therapist. Meda signed revisit notes for patients that he did not visit. He told Javidan which patients were not homebound and which demanded money for their Medicare information. The government charged both with health care fraud conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 1347) and conspiracy to receive kickbacks (18 U.S.C. 371). At trial, Javidan testified that she did not participate in and was generally unaware of Acure’s fraudulent business practices. Meda called no witnesses. Javidan and Meda were sentenced to terms of 65 and 46 months of imprisonment, respectively. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Meda’s claims that his conviction violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and that he was subjected to prosecutorial vindictiveness for refusing to plead guilty and requesting a jury trial in prior case and Javidan’s claims of improper evidentiary rulings and sentence calculation errors. View "United States v. Javidan" on Justia Law

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From 2006 to 2008, Andrews asked friends and colleagues to loan him money, roughly two million dollars in total, explaining that he needed money to purchase property in Indianapolis or to improve property that he owned in the area. Andrews never owned, bought, or improved property in Indianapolis. Andrews mostly used the money to fund a day-trading account with TD Ameritrade. Most of the money vanished. Andrews’s victims lost over 1.4 million dollars. Andrews was convicted of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, sentenced to 87 months in prison and ordered to repay the full amount his victims had lost. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that all of the loans were part of a single “scheme . . . to defraud.” The court noted a common false statement of a need for funds, usually related to nonexistent Indianapolis property; a common group of victims, usually friends or colleagues, who loaned money to Andrews repeatedly; and a common purpose for the funds, usually the need to fund Andrews’s day-trading account. The final loan occurred on September 25, 2008, fewer than five years before the government indicted Andrews, so prosecution of the entire scheme was not time-barred. View "United States v. Andrews" on Justia Law