Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Fadden earned over $100,000 per year but did not submit tax returns. After an audit, the IRS garnished his wages. Fadden filed for bankruptcy, triggering an automatic stay. Fadden claimed that he had no interest in any real property nor in any decedent’s life insurance policy or estate. Fadden actually knew that he would receive proceeds from the sale of his mother’s home (listed by the executor of her estate for $525,000) and would receive thousands of dollars as a beneficiary on his mother’s life insurance policies. A week later, Fadden mentioned his inheritance to a paralegal in the trustee’s office and asked to postpone his bankruptcy. When Fadden finally met with his bankruptcy trustee and an attorney, he confirmed that his schedules were accurate and denied receiving an inheritance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions under 18 U.S.C. 152(1) for concealing assets in bankruptcy; 18 U.S.C. 152(3) for making false declarations on his bankruptcy documents; and 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2) for making false statements during the investigation of his bankruptcy. Counts 1 and 2 required proof of intent to deceive. Fadden proposed a theory-of-defense instruction based on his assertion that his conduct was “sloppiness.” The Seventh Circuit upheld the use of pattern instructions, including that “knowingly means that the defendant realized what he was doing and was aware of the nature of his conduct and did not act through ignorance, mistake or accident.” View "United States v. Fadden" on Justia Law

El-Bey, a "Moorish national," created an EIN for the Trust, naming himself as the trustee and fiduciary. El-Bey filed six tax returns for the Trust, each seeking a $300,000 refund, signing each return, identifying himself as the fiduciary, and listing his date of birth as the date of trust creation. The IRS flagged these returns as frivolous and notified El-Bey that he would be assessed a $5,000 penalty per return if he failed to file a corrected return. El-Bey returned the letters to the IRS, including vouchers and tax forms bearing no relation to the returns. Based on the fourth and fifth tax returns, the IRS mailed two $300,000 refund checks, which El-Bey deposited, using the funds to purchase vehicles and to buy a house. After the sixth return, El-Bey was indicted on two counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and six counts of making false claims to the IRS, 18 U.S.C. 287. The district court allowed El-Bey to proceed pro se and appointed standby counsel over El-Bey’s objection. El-Bey advanced irrelevant arguments, interrupted the judge, and made it challenging to manage the trial. The court expressed frustration, but later instructed the jurors, who indicated that they could continue to be impartial. The Seventh Circuit remanded for a new trial. Statements by the court in the presence of the jury conveyed that El-Bey was guilty or dishonest and impaired El-Bey’s credibility in the eyes of the jury. View "United States v. El-Bey" on Justia Law

El-Bey, a "Moorish national," created an EIN for the Trust, naming himself as the trustee and fiduciary. El-Bey filed six tax returns for the Trust, each seeking a $300,000 refund, signing each return, identifying himself as the fiduciary, and listing his date of birth as the date of trust creation. The IRS flagged these returns as frivolous and notified El-Bey that he would be assessed a $5,000 penalty per return if he failed to file a corrected return. El-Bey returned the letters to the IRS, including vouchers and tax forms bearing no relation to the returns. Based on the fourth and fifth tax returns, the IRS mailed two $300,000 refund checks, which El-Bey deposited, using the funds to purchase vehicles and to buy a house. After the sixth return, El-Bey was indicted on two counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and six counts of making false claims to the IRS, 18 U.S.C. 287. The district court allowed El-Bey to proceed pro se and appointed standby counsel over El-Bey’s objection. El-Bey advanced irrelevant arguments, interrupted the judge, and made it challenging to manage the trial. The court expressed frustration, but later instructed the jurors, who indicated that they could continue to be impartial. The Seventh Circuit remanded for a new trial. Statements by the court in the presence of the jury conveyed that El-Bey was guilty or dishonest and impaired El-Bey’s credibility in the eyes of the jury. View "United States v. El-Bey" on Justia Law

Defendant Kathleen Stegman was convicted by a jury of two counts of evading her personal taxes for the tax years 2007 and 2008. Stegman was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 51 months, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release. The district court also ordered Stegman to pay a $100,000 fine, plus restitution in the amount of $68,733. Stegman established several limited liability corporations pertaining to a “medical aesthetics” business she owned, using these corporations to effectively launder client payments. As part of this process, Stegman would use the corporations to purchase money orders, typically in denominations of $500 or less, that she in turn used to purchase items for personal use. In 2007, Stegman purchased 162 money orders totaling $77,181.92. In 2008, she purchased 252 money orders totaling $121,869.99. And in 2009, she purchased 157 money orders totaling $73,697.31. Notably, Stegman reported zero cash income on her federal income tax returns during each of these years. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury convicted Stegman of evading her personal taxes for the tax years 2007 and 2008 (Counts 4 and 5), as well as evading corporate taxes for the tax years 2008 and 2009 (Counts 1 and 2). The jury acquitted Stegman of evading corporate taxes for the tax year 2010 (Count 3). The jury also acquitted Stegman and Smith of the conspiracy charge (Count 6). Stegman moved for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial. The district court granted the motion as to the two counts that related to the evasion of corporate taxes (Counts 1 and 2), but denied the remainder of the motion. In doing so, the district court chose to acquit Stegman of the corporate tax evasion counts not due to a lack of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt that this corporation evaded taxes,” but rather because “the indictment itself was flawed in attributing the loss as due and owing by Ms. Stegman, when actually it was due and owing by the corporation.” Stegman raised five issues on appeal, four of which pertain to her convictions and one of which pertained to her sentence. Although several of these issues require extensive discussion due to their fact-intensive nature, the Tenth Circuit concluded that all of these issues lacked merit. View "United States v. Stegman" on Justia Law

DiCosola started a business that produced compact discs in novelty shapes, for use as promotional items. The business morphed into a full‐service printing business, reaching about $1 million in gross annual sales and employing up to 10 people, including DiCosola’s immigrant father, who invested his retirement savings. In 2005, DiCosola started a side business for producing music, which sapped cash from the printing business. DiCosola’s 2007 loan application was rejected. He reapplied in 2008, providing fabricated tax returns that inflated his income by hundreds of thousands of dollars. Citibank issued DeCosola a loan of $273,500. DiCosola similarly used fabricated tax returns to obtain loans from Amcore, for $450,000 and $300,000. In 2009, after a few payments, DiCosola defaulted on the loans. In 2009, DiCosola falsified IRS forms to claim a refund of $5.5 million. In 2012, DiCosola was indicted for bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344; making false statements to a bank, 18 U.S.C. 1014; wire fraud affecting a financial institution, 18 U.S.C. 1343; filing false statements against the United States, 18 U.S.C. 287. DiCosola was found guilty, sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment, and ordered to pay restitution of $822,088.00. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges relating to the testimony of DiCosola’s accountant. View "United States v. DiCosola" on Justia Law

Unreliable corporate meeting minutes were properly excluded in tax fraud trial. Petrunak was the sole proprietor of Abyss, a fireworks business regulated by ATF. In 2001, ATF inspectors inspected Abyss and reported violations. An ALJ revoked Abyss’s explosives license. Abyss went out of business. Five years later, Petrunak mailed the inspectors IRS W-9 forms requesting identifying information and then sent them 1099s, alleging that Abyss had paid each of them $250,000. Because the inspector’s tax return did not include the fictional $250,000, the IRS audited her and informed her that she owed $101,114 in taxes; she spent significant time and energy unraveling the situation. Petrunak submitted those sham “payments” as business expenses; he reported a loss exceeding $500,000 in his personal taxes. Petrunak admitted to filing the forms and was charged with making and subscribing false and fraudulent IRS forms, 26 U.S.C. 7206(1). He sought to introduce corporate meeting minutes under the business records exception, claiming that the records would have demonstrated his state of mind in preparing the forms. The minutes included statements bemoaning that the IRS was not more helpful, and declarations that the ATF agents perjured themselves. The Seventh Circuit upheld exclusion of the records, noting that the records contained multiple instances of hearsay and had no indicia of reliability. View "United States v. Petrunak" on Justia Law

Defendant divorced his wife in order to transfer assets fraudulently and avoid some tax liability. The district court set aside the separation agreement as a fraudulent transfer and proceeded to redivide and reallocate certain assets applying Massachusetts law. The government’s tax liens attached directly to any assets allocated to Defendant, but the government argued that its tax liens also attached indirectly to certain assets allocated to Defendant’s wife. This appeal concerned the district court’s allocation of two assets that the district court divided more or less evenly. The First Circuit vacated in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) with regard to funds that were directly traceable to the tax shelter that Defendant used to reduce his taxable income for several years, it was not clear whether the district court considered fourteen factors required by Massachusetts law in order to arrive at an equitable division of the parties’ assets; and (2) the government was not entitled to Defendant’s wife’s half of the proceeds from the sale of property owned by Defendant and his wife in Massachusetts on a lien-tracing theory. Remanded. View "United States v. Baker" on Justia Law

The Internal Revenue Service classified Ballard, a securities broker, as a non-filer in 2008 and investigated. Ballard lied about his income, hid money in family members’ bank accounts, and filed then dismissed several Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions, attempting to avoid paying $848,798 in taxes arising from his income between 2000 and 2008. He eventually pled guilty to violating 26 U.S.C. 7212(a), which prohibits “corruptly . . . obstruct[ing] or imped[ing] . . . administration of [the tax laws].” Ballard urged the court to use the U.S.S.G. for obstruction of justice. The district court rejected Ballard’s argument that he never intended to evade paying his taxes but was merely delaying the payments and used the tax evasion guideline to calculate a higher offense level and an increase in the sentencing range from eight–14 months to 24–30 months. Ballard was sentenced to 18 months’ incarceration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. What matters in the choice between guidelines sections is which section is more precisely tailored to reflect offense characteristics—like tax evasion and tax loss—and which section covers a more closely related group of crimes. What Ballard did, and what the government charged, was a lie to the tax collector about his earnings. View "United States v. Ballard" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, defendant-appellant Eldon Boisseau was convicted of tax evasion The district court determined that Boisseau, a practicing attorney, willfully evaded paying his taxes by: (1) placing his law practice in the hands of a nominee owner to prevent the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from seizing his assets; (2) causing his law firm to pay his personal expenses directly given an impending IRS levy, rather than receiving wages; and (3) telling a government revenue officer that he was receiving no compensation from his firm when in fact the firm was paying his personal expenses. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and argued that the district court wrongly convicted him: (1) without evidence of an affirmative act designed to conceal or mislead; and (2) by concluding that proof satisfying the affirmative act element of tax evasion was sufficient to prove willfulness. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Boisseau" on Justia Law

Defendant, the owner and operator of a freight service that couriered items to and from the United States and Canada, was found guilty of nine counts of tax-related offenses. Defendant was charged with violating 26 U.S.C. 7212(a), which imposes criminal liability on one who ʺcorruptly or by force or threats of force . . . endeavors to intimidate or impede any officer or employee of the United States acting in an official capacity under this title.” Another portion of the statute, often referred to as the ʺomnibus clause,ʺ imposes criminal liability on one who ʺin any other way corruptly . . . obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title.ʺ On appeal, defendant argued that the court, like the Sixth Circuit, should construe the phrase ʺthe due administration of this titleʺ in the omnibus clause to include only a pending IRS action of which a defendant was aware. The court rejected defendant's argument and joined three of its sister circuits in concluding that section 7212(a)ʹs omnibus clause criminalizes corrupt interference with an official effort to administer the tax code, and not merely a known IRS investigation. The court also concluded that an omission may be a means by which a defendant corruptly obstructs or impedes the due administration of the Internal Revenue Code under section 7212(a). Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not commit procedural error by using the manner of calculating the tax loss and restitution amounts that it did, or by deciding not to apply a two‐level reduction to defendant's base offense level for acceptance of responsibility. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Marinello" on Justia Law