Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Former Virginia Governor McDonnell, and his wife were indicted on honest services fraud and Hobbs Act extortion charges related to their acceptance of $175,000 in loans, gifts, and other benefits from Williams, the CEO of Star Scientific, which developed Anatabloc, a nutritional supplement made from a compound found in tobacco. Williams wanted McDonnell’s assistance in getting public universities to perform research studies on the product. The government asserted that McDonnell committed (or agreed to commit) an “official act” in exchange for the loans and gifts. An “official act” is “any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or profit,” 18 U.S.C. 201(a)(3). The claimed “official acts,” included “arranging meetings” for Williams with other Virginia officials, “hosting” events at the Governor’s Mansion, and “contacting other government officials” concerning the studies. The district court instructed the jury that “official act” encompasses “acts that a public official customarily performs,” including acts “in furtherance of longer-term goals” or “in a series of steps to exercise influence or achieve an end.” The court declined to give McDonnell’s requested instruction that “merely arranging a meeting, attending an event, hosting a reception, or making a speech are not, standing alone, ‘official acts.’” The Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions. A unanimous Supreme Court vacated. An “official act” involves a decision or action (or an agreement to act or decide) on “question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy,” by a formal exercise of governmental power. The pertinent matter must be more focused and concrete than “Virginia business and economic development,” and a decision or action is more than merely setting up a meeting, hosting an event, or calling another official. The government’s expansive interpretation of “official act” would raise significant constitutional concerns. Conscientious public officials arrange meetings for constituents, contact other officials on their behalf, and include them in events all the time. The jury instructions, therefore, were significantly overinclusive. View "McDonnell v. United States" on Justia Law

Before the 2008 presidential election, federal agents were investigating then-Governor Blagojevich and obtained warrants authorizing the interception of his phone calls. When Barack Obama, then a Senator from Illinois, won the election, Blagojevich was to appoint his replacement. Interceptions revealed that Blagojevich viewed the opportunity to appoint a new Senator as a bonanza. After two trials, Blagojevich was convicted of 18 crimes, including attempted extortion from campaign contributors, corrupt solicitation of funds, wire fraud, and lying to federal investigators. The district court sentenced Blagojevich to 168 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated convictions on five counts, concerning Blagojevich’s proposal to appoint Valerie Jarrett to the Senate in exchange for an appointment to the Cabinet, and remanded. The court rejected a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, but concluded the instructions permitted the jury to convict even if it found that his only request of Obama was for a Cabinet position. A proposal to trade one public act for another, logrolling, is unlike the swap of an official act for a private payment. The instructions do not ensure that the jury found that Blagojevich offered to trade the appointment for a private salary. Because the court affirmed on most counts and concluded that the sentencing range lies above 168 months, Blagojevich is not entitled to release pending further proceedings. View "United States v. Blagojevich" on Justia Law

From 2005-2007, Wright, a real estate agent and the chief of staff for Philadelphia councilman Kelly, received gifts from Chawla, a developer, and attorney Teitelman, who got most of his work from Chawla's company, World Acquisition. Wright received a free stint in an apartment, free legal services, and was promised commissions. Wright shepherded a bill that Chawla favored through Kelly’s office, arranged meetings about a World Acquisition development, and communicated with city offices for World Acquisition. In 2008, a grand jury returned a 14-count indictment, charging honest services fraud, traditional fraud, conspiracy to commit both kinds of fraud, and bribery in connection with a federally funded program. The jury convicted Chawla, Teitelman, and Wright of: conspiracy to commit honest services and traditional fraud and honest services and traditional fraud for the apartment arrangement and convicted Chawla alone of honest services for offering Wright liaison work. It acquitted on the other counts. After remand, the defendants moved, unsuccessfully, to preclude the government from relitigating certain issues under the Double Jeopardy Clause and from constructively amending the indictment. the Third Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction because the ruling is not a “collateral” order subject to immediate review and was not otherwise a “final decision” under 28 U.S.C. 1291. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

Salahuddin was Newark’s Deputy Mayor for Public Safety. He allegedly conspired to use his official position to obtain charitable and political contributions and to direct Newark demolition contracts to Cooper, with whom Salahuddin was allegedly in business. Both were convicted of conspiring to extort under color of official right, under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a). The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting Salahuddin’s claims that the government failed to prove that one of the alleged co-conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; that the district court erred in omitting an overt act requirement from its jury instructions; and that the rule of lenity requires that his conviction be vacated. The court rejected Cooper’s claim that the jury’s guilty verdict as to the Hobbs Act conspiracy charge was against the weight of the evidence. View "United States v. Salahuddin" on Justia Law

Illinois legalized riverboat casino gambling in 1990. Since then, the state’s once‐thriving horseracing industry has declined. In 2006 and 2008, former Governor Blagojevich signed into law two bills that imposed a tax on in‐state casinos of 3% of their revenue and placed the funds into a trust for the benefit of the horseracing industry. Casinos filed suit under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1964, alleging that defendants, members of the horseracing industry, bribed the governor. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the racetracks, finding sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that there was a pattern of racketeering activity; that a jury could find the existence of an enterprise‐in‐fact, consisting of Blagojevich, his associates, and others; sufficient evidence that the defendants bribed Blagojevich to secure his signature on the 2008 Act; but that the casinos could not show that the alleged bribes proximately caused their injury. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, there was enough to survive summary judgment on the claim that the governor agreed to sign the Act in exchange for a bribe. View "Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Johnston" on Justia Law

George Schussel’s former company fraudulently transferred millions of dollars to him in order to avoid paying income taxes. The IRS, which is authorized by statute to collect a person’s tax debt by reclaiming assets the debtor has transferred to someone else, claimed that Schussel was liable as a transferee for the company’s tax deficiencies. The United States Tax Court held Schussel liable for the company’s back taxes of over $4.9 million plus interest of at least $8.7 million. Schussel appealed, disputing the amount he owed the IRS as a result of the fraudulent transfers. The First Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the tax court erred in calculating prejudgment interest on the fraudulently transferred funds under the federal tax interest statute rather than assessing the prejudgment interest at the Massachusetts rate; (2) the tax court did not err in accepting as a proper measure of the assets Schussel received the actual amount transferred from the company into Schussel-controlled accounts; and (3) Schussel’s loans to the company to pay Schussel’s litigation expenses did not reduce the net amount transferred to him. View "Schussel v. Werfel" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission indicted Stanford for operating a multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme. The government seized most of his assets rendering him an indigent defendant. Court-appointed counsel obtained authorization for legal services under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), 18 U.S.C. 3006A(e), and employed Marcum for forensic accounting and litigation support, with an estimated budget of $4.5 million. The district court approved the budget, but Marcum did not obtain the Fifth Circuit's approval, as required by the CJA. Marcum’s work far exceeded the budget. Marcum received payment for work performed in June- August 2011,then submitted vouchers for work performed in September-November totaling $845,588.48. The district court certified only the September and October vouchers. Marcum attempted to resign from the case. Chief Judge Jones of the Fifth Circuit issued a Service Provider Continuity and Payment Order, authorizing payment of $205,000 for the September and October vouchers and ordered Marcum to continue working because “[i]t would be neither feasible nor economical to obtain a replacement.” Under threat of contempt sanctions, Marcum continued to work through the end of trial and claims unpaid fees of $1.2 million. Marcum filed an emergency motion for reconsideration, an emergency application for a stay before the U.S. Supreme Court, an emergency motion for a stay or a petition for writ of mandamus before the Fifth Circuit, and a petition for mandamus to the Supreme Court. All were denied. Marcum sued the Court of Federal Claims, which dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Because the CJA provides its own remedial scheme, Marcum cannot collaterally attack the Fifth Circuit’s determination of Marcum’s fee awards under the Tucker Act. View "Marcum LLP v. United States" on Justia Law

From 1998 to 2010, Dimora was one of three elected Cuyaho County commissioners. From 2005 to 2010, Gabor worked for the county weights-and-measures office, which inspects gas pumps, grocery store scanners, truck scales and the like for accuracy. In 2007, the FBI began investigating public corruption in Cuyahoga County and discovered that Dimora handed out public jobs, influenced Cleveland decision-makers and steered public contracts in return for about 100 bribes worth more than $250,000. Gabor bought his job for $5,000 and spent most of his time on errands for Dimora that were unrelated to the job, including acting as a go-between in arranging kickback schemes on county projects. When Gabor learned that the FBI was investigating him, he warned his co-conspirators about the investigation and tried to convince them to lie. After a 37-day trial, they were convicted of 39 violations of anti-corruption laws. The district court sentenced Dimora to 336 months in prison and Gabor to 121 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to a jury instruction for the RICO charge, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), (d); to the sufficiency of the evidence; and to various evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Dimora" on Justia Law

Crundwell, Comptroller of Dixon, Illinois since 1983, pleaded guilty to embezzling about $53 million from the city between 1990 and 2012. She used the money to support more than 400 quarter horses and a lavish lifestyle, which she had previously claimed to be the fruit of the horses’ success. During the last six years of her scheme, the embezzlement averaged 28% of the city’s budget. In exchange for her plea, the prosecutor limited the charge to a single count of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The crime’s impact on the population of Dixon played a major role in the district court’s decision to sentence her to 235 months’ imprisonment, substantially above the Guideline range of 151 to 188 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court pronounced a substantively reasonable sentence after giving Crundwell full opportunity to present evidence and arguments. The judge considered deterrence and addressed every one of her arguments. That he thought less of her cooperation than Crundwell herself did, and gave a lower weight to her age than she requested does not undermine the sentence’s validity. View "United States v. Crundwell" on Justia Law

Philpot, former Clerk of Lake County, Indiana, took $25,000 in incentive payments from a federally funded child‐support fund (42 U.S.C. 658a(a)) without the required approval of the county fiscal body. The Indiana Department of Child Services disburses those federal funds to the counties, Ind. Code 31‐25‐4‐23(a), which have a relatively free hand in directing the money, although “amounts received as incentive payments may not, without the approval of the county fiscal body, be used to increase or supplement the salary of an elected official.” Philpot had used the funds to provide himself and staff members with bonuses. Convicted of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and theft from a federally funded program 18 U.S. 666(a)1A, he was sentenced to 18 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, despite claims concerning whether Philpot “knowingly” violated the statute and the fact that Philpot had voluntarily returned the funds. View "United States v. Philpot" on Justia Law