Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Ajayi, an electrical engineer, wanted to start a business selling MRI products in Africa. He incorporated GRI in Illinois and another company in Africa and sought investors. While traveling, he solicited a $45,000 investment from Brown. After returning home, Ajayi received a $344,657.84 check, payable to another company . He called Brown, who explained that the accounting department had made an error, told Ajayi to deposit the check, and stated that they would work out a way for Ajayi to refund the difference. Ajayi deposited the check through an ATM into his GRI account, which previously had a balance of $90.08, After the check cleared, Brown flew to Chicago and demanded repayment. Pursuant to Brown’s instructions, between December 9 and December 12, 2009, Ajayi wrote at least five checks to himself from the GRI account and cashed them. Ajayi was convicted of five counts of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344(1) and (2) and money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957(a) and was sentenced to 44 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit found that there was sufficient evidence that Ajayi knew that the check was altered and upheld the exclusion of the emails, but concluded that four bank fraud counts were multiplicitous. View "United States v. Ajayi" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant, a former Massachusetts state trooper, was convicted of knowingly participating in the use of extortionate means to attempt to collect an extension of credit. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court’s finding of discrimination with respect to the government’s attempt to strike one juror and the court’s chosen remedy was not inadequate under Batson v. Kentucky; (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for acquittal based on insufficiency of evidence; and (3) the district court did not err in instructing the jury, and even assuming that the district court committed error, the error was harmless. View "United States v. Analetto" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to fraud consisting of having abused her position as a Chicago public-school board member by accepting kickbacks of more than $500,000 from bus companies to which she steered transportation contracts worth $21 million. The parties stipulated that the value of the benefit received from the fraud was $7-$20 million, and so the guidelines range would have been 360 months to life. The guidelines in effect at the time required a 20-level enhancement for honest services fraud when “the value of the payment, the benefit received or to be received in return for the payment, the value of anything obtained or to be obtained by a public official or others acting with a public official, or the loss to the government from the offense, whichever is greatest,” was between $7 and $20 million, U.S.S.G. 2C1.1(b)(2), 2B1.1(b), but the statutory maximums for the two counts were 20 years and 3 years respectively, and that changed the range to 276 months. The judge imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 120 months, ordered the defendant to pay restitution of $7.2 million, and imposed a year of supervised release, which the judge may have thought mandatory. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the district court’s explanation inadequate. View "United States v. Harper" on Justia Law

A jury found Ferrell, a licensed psychologist, and Bryce, Ferrell’s employee, guilty of six counts of healthcare fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347. Ferrell was sentenced to 88 months of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s refusal to admit two out-of-court statements made by Bryce’s brother (also Ferrell’s employee), and contained in a voicemail and an email. The district court held that these statements were hearsay and did not fall within Rule 804(b)(3)’s hearsay exception. The district court held that although the brother was unavailable to testify, the statements were not against his interest and the corroborating circumstances did not indicate that his statements were trustworthy. The court also upheld admission of testimony by another doctor concerning Ferrell’s conduct while in Texas. The court found that the testimony did not constitute impermissible character evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). View "United States v. Ferrell" on Justia Law

Defendant, the CFO of Inno Vida, was convicted of two counts of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, one count of conspiracy to engage in financial transactions with criminally derived property, three counts of wire fraud, one count of major fraud against the United States, and three counts of making false statements to a federal agency. The government presented evidence that defendant maintained two sets of financial statements and used one set to mislead investors and the United States. The company's controller testified that, when the two sets of statements were prepared, he believed only the other set complied with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the controller's testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701 because the testimony was rationally based on his own personal experiences. The court also concluded that the government presented sufficient evidence to convict defendant of each charge. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Toll" on Justia Law

Defendants Binday, Kergil, and Resnick, insurance brokers, appealed their convictions stemming from their involvement in an insurance fraud scheme where they induced insurers to issue life insurance policies that defendants sold to third‐party investors, by submitting fraudulent applications indicating that the policies were for the applicants’ personal estate planning. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence that defendants contemplated a cognizable harm under the mail and wire fraud statutes; the indictment was not constructively amended because the allegations in the indictment and the government’s proof at trial substantially correspond; and some aspects of the defendants’ challenge to the jury instruction are waived, while the remainder fail on the merits. The court rejected defendants' remaining challenges to their sentences and to the obstruction of justice convictions. The court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Binday" on Justia Law

From 2006 to 2008, Andrews asked friends and colleagues to loan him money, roughly two million dollars in total, explaining that he needed money to purchase property in Indianapolis or to improve property that he owned in the area. Andrews never owned, bought, or improved property in Indianapolis. Andrews mostly used the money to fund a day-trading account with TD Ameritrade. Most of the money vanished. Andrews’s victims lost over 1.4 million dollars. Andrews was convicted of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, sentenced to 87 months in prison and ordered to repay the full amount his victims had lost. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that all of the loans were part of a single “scheme . . . to defraud.” The court noted a common false statement of a need for funds, usually related to nonexistent Indianapolis property; a common group of victims, usually friends or colleagues, who loaned money to Andrews repeatedly; and a common purpose for the funds, usually the need to fund Andrews’s day-trading account. The final loan occurred on September 25, 2008, fewer than five years before the government indicted Andrews, so prosecution of the entire scheme was not time-barred. View "United States v. Andrews" on Justia Law

Faruki, a computer technology consultant, met Tishfield in 2006 while Tishfield was working as a portfolio manager at SAC Capital, a Connecticut-based hedge fund. In 2010, Faruki informed Tishfield that he had launched his own investment fund, Neural Markets, using mathematically-driven trading strategies. Faruki stated that he was currently investing his own money in the fund to establish a trading history he could pitch to prospective investors. He told Tishfield that in December 2009 his fund had achieved investment returns exceeding 12%, and that his investment return in January 2010 was 32%. Faruki made several other false statement about the fund and about his own credentials. In December 2010, Tishfield received his first account statement, which reported significant losses associated with his $1 million investment. Faruki was charged with seven counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The Seventh CIrcuit affirmed his conviction, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Faruki" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud after he and his associates conspired to defraud lending institutions out of more than $7 million by submitting fraudulent loan applications. At issue was whether the district court exceeded its authority under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) and the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) of 1996, 18 U.S.C. 3663A-3664, by eliminating, sua sponte, defendant’s obligation to jointly and severally pay more than $4 million in mandated restitution based upon his substantial assistance. The court held that the district court did not have the legal authority to eliminate defendant’s restitution obligation based on a Rule 35(b) motion. The court concluded that the MVRA makes restitution mandatory for certain crimes, like the fraud offense to which defendant pled guilty, “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law.” The court read this provision as a clear indication from Congress that the MVRA was intended to trump Rule 35. Because the district court was not free to reduce defendant's restitution as a reward for his substantial assistance, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate defendant's obligation to make restitution to the victims. View "United States v. Puentes" on Justia Law

Defendants-appellants James Riley and Ryan Robinson appealed their convictions on three counts each of commercial bribery. The charges were based on the premise that Riley, who was the insurance broker for Pechanga Resort and Casino, paid bribes to Robinson, who was the chief financial officer of the casino, in order to permit Riley to charge excessive fees for insurance products he obtained for the casino. On appeal, defendants argued that there was insufficient evidence that they acted “corruptly” (i.e., with the specific intent to injure or defraud Robinson’s employer, as required by the statute). They also argued, in response to the Court of Appeal's request for supplemental briefing, that there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions on two of the counts against each of them because the evidence showed that as of the date of those charged offenses, Robinson was no longer employed by Pechanga Resort and Casino. The Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence that Robinson was not employed by Pechanaga Resort and Casino as of the dates alleged in counts 6 through 9 compelled reversal of the defendants’ convictions on those counts. However, the Court also concluded that there was substantial evidence to support their convictions on counts 4 and 5. View "California v. Riley" on Justia Law