Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Defendant, former president, CEO, and chairman of the board of Bixby, was convicted of four counts of mail fraud, eight counts of wire fraud, conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, witness tampering, and three counts of tax evasion. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant had the requisite intent to defraud Bixby investors; the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of the tax evasion counts; the district court committed no clear error in reasonably estimating the actual loss resulting from defendant’s fraud offenses as equaling the total amounts lost by Bixby investors who submitted Victim Impact Statements; the district court did not err by imposing a two-level enhancement because defendant abused a position of public or private trust under USSG 3B1.3; and, because the Commission has not made retroactive the amendments on which defendant wishes to rely, 18 U.S.C. 3742(g)(1) would apply if he were resentenced, making the requested remand a futile exercise. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction for one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States and two counts of making a false claim against the United States. Defendant's convictions stemmed from her filing of fraudulent 1099-OID forms. Defendant argued that the district court erred when it excluded a video about fractional-reserve banking from evidence that she claims supported her good-faith defense. The court concluded that the district court's exclusion of the video from the jury deliberations did not affect defendant's substantial rights and admission of the video would not have changed the verdict. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not err in excluding the video. The court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. McQuarry" on Justia Law

Jason Dvorin appealed his conviction of conspiracy to commit bank fraud. Dvorin's appeal has been consolidated with the appeal of Mindy Sauter, the attorney who prosecuted defendant during his first trial. Dvorin asserted that the district court erred in: (1) denying his request for an apparent-authority jury instruction; (2) denying his request for a special unanimity jury instruction; (3) overruling his objections under Federal Rules of Evidence 701 and 704 to the government counsels’ and witnesses’ use of the terms “fraud,” “fraudulent check,” or “conspiracy”; (4) excluding extrinsic evidence of and cross-examination regarding the district court’s findings that Chris Derrington, Pavillion Bank's executive vice president, testified falsely in a prior proceeding; (5) declining to award sanctions for prosecutorial discovery misconduct; (6) admitting the testimony of Chase Bank representative Arthemis Lindsay despite the government’s failure to timely designate Lindsay as a possible witness on its witness list; and (7) permitting the government to add a forfeiture count to the second superseding indictment before the second trial and entering a forfeiture judgment at sentencing without having a jury find the facts essential to that judgment. Sauter contends that the district court erroneously found that she violated Brady, Giglio, and Napue and acted “recklessly” by failing to timely disclose Derrington’s plea agreement supplement. The court reversed the district court’s denial of Dvorin’s motion to dismiss the forfeiture account for prosecutorial vindictiveness because the presumption of vindictiveness applied in this case where the government added a forfeiture notice in the second superseding indictment, and the government failed to overcome this presumption. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Dvorin" on Justia Law

Defendant Marvin Iverson was convicted by jury of engaging in a scheme to defraud JPMorgan Chase and Big Horn Federal Savings. The statute under which he was convicted required that the victims be “financial institutions.” To establish that element of the offense, the government offered the testimony of an FBI agent to try to prove that JPMorgan and Big Horn were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). On appeal Defendant argued that the agent’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay and violated the best-evidence rule. He also argued that even if the evidence was admissible, it was insufficient to prove that JPMorgan and Big Horn had FDIC insurance at the time of the offense. Despite the government’s concession to the contrary, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the agent’s testimony was not inadmissible hearsay; it was either not hearsay or fell within a hearsay exception. As for the best-evidence rule, Defendant did not raise the issue below and he had not shown plain error. The Court also rejected defendant’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. View "United States v. Iverson" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Keith Courtney was convicted by jury of three counts of wire fraud, for which he received a 24-month prison sentence followed by three years’ supervised release and ordered to forfeit $1,601,825.84, the full value of the fraudulent wire transfers at issue in the underlying case. In addition, the court imposed $493,230.88 in restitution. On appeal, defendant argued that: (1) the forfeiture order must be reduced by the amount the lenders received from the properties through mortgage payments and the sale of the properties; and (2) he should have been allowed to inform the jury of the possible sentence and its power to acquit him if they believed the conviction would be unjust. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with defendant on his first contention and reversed, and affirmed on the second. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Courtney" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to mail fraud and aggravated identity theft pursuant to a written plea agreement. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his multi‐year scheme to fraudulently obtain and use credit cards. On appeal, defendant alleged that the government materially breached the plea agreement by presenting evidence of twenty‐eight victims when only four were referred to by name in the agreement. The court enforced defendant's appellate waiver and dismissed the appeal, concluding that the plea agreement made clear that the named victims were either an example or just one of the companies he defrauded and therefore the government did not commit a material breach by introducing evidence that there were more victims than those specifically named. View "United States v. Malone" on Justia Law

Pu, a 28-year-old quantitative finance professional, worked for two financial institutions that traded stock and other assets for clients: “A” and Citadel. While working at each company, Pu copied proprietary software from his employer’s computer system to personal storage devices . The software allowed them to execute strategic trades at high speeds and were company trade secrets. Pu’s copying of the files was a significant data breach. Normally, crimes involving the theft of computer trade secrets lead to the sale of the data to, or the thief being hired by, a company that will use the data. Pu, however, used the data to conduct computerized stock market trades for himself and lost $40,000. Pu pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a trade secret belonging to A and unlawful transmission of a trade secret belonging to Citadel and was sentenced to 36 months in prison and ordered him to pay over $750,000 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence, stating that the district court’s factual findings did not support its conclusion that Pu intended to cause a loss of approximately $12 million and that the court erred by awarding restitution without evidence that reflected a complete accounting of the victims’ investigation costs. View "United States v. Pu" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to making false statements to government authorities, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2). Plaintiff was told by her managers at Blackhawk to certify that Blackhawk guards had received training that they had not in fact received, thereby enabling Blackhawk to charge more for each guard’s services. As part of her sentence, she was jointly and severally liable for $442,330 in restitution. But, the district court also expressed a clear intention that the actual restitution amount should be much smaller, perhaps as little as $0. A federal court had already entered judgment against Blackhawk for more than $1 million. And the district court said, in sentencing defendant, that she would not be on the hook at all if Blackhawk paid its fine. Even in the absence of such a payment, defendant would only have to pay “at a rate of not less than $50 each month.” In 2013, defendant found out that the Treasury Department had seized tax refunds due her and that it had acted under the Treasury Offset Program (TOP), 31 U.S.C. 3716, 3720A. Defendant then filed a Motion for Clarification or Modification of Supervised Release in the sentencing court, asking that the tax refunds be returned and future seizures stopped. At the first hearing, the district court vacated defendant’s sentence, stating that it had not anticipated or intended that she be subject to such a harsh sentence. At the second and third hearings, the district court entertained further arguments about the resentencing. At the fourth hearing, the district court reimposed its original sentence. The court held that the sentence manifested a clerical error which the district court should have corrected. The court also held that, in light of the necessary corrections in the sentence, the district court’s refusal to remedy the TOP collection was error. Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court to require the government to return defendant's tax refunds and to cease withholding payments. View "United States v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Defendant, a lawyer and real estate broker, appealed the district court's imposition of criminal forfeiture in the amount of $1,273,285.50, arguing that the district court erred when it declined to consider defendant’s age, health, and financial condition when it issued the forfeiture order. Defendant was convicted of charges related to his participation in a kickback scheme involving the construction of new Dick Sporting Goods stores. The court held that the court reviewing a criminal forfeiture under the Excessive Fines Clause may consider - as part of the proportionality determination required by United States v. Bajakajian - whether the forfeiture would deprive the defendant of his future ability to earn a living. However, the court held that courts should not consider a defendant’s personal circumstances as a distinct factor. In this case, the court concluded that the challenged forfeiture is constitutional because it is not “grossly disproportional” to the gravity of defendant’s offenses. View "United States v. Viloski" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to an offense related to a scheme to defraud the DOE and the district court ordered each defendant involved in the scheme to pay restitution. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of the Government's proposed application of restitution payments to a codefendant (Otto). The court concluded that a more appropriate mechanism for the court to apply is a hybrid approach to restitution payments where multiple defendants are held liable for injuries caused by a common scheme. In this case, the district court’s concern - that requiring payment from Otto would render both Otto and another codefendant (Reed) responsible for restitution in excess of the loss attributable to their conduct - is misplaced. Payments requested by the defendants encompass overlapping injuries due to each defendant's conduct. The court concluded that any funds received by the defendants should be applied to the total sum owed by all defendants. In doing so, payments from Otto would also reduce the overall sum owed by defendant. Further, the district court's analysis similarly does not align with the Mandatory Victim's Restitution Act's (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A, rules regarding liability apportionment. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Sheets" on Justia Law