Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of mail fraud arising from a scheme in which he overpaid for commodities to the benefit of certain customers while managing a grain elevator for Bunge. The district court ordered defendant to pay $1,561,516.25 in restitution to Bunge, which included $87,536.65 in attorney's fees and expenses Bunge paid to an outside counsel during the investigation of defendant's fraudulent scheme and his prosecution. The court affirmed the portion of the district court's restitution award which does not include attorney's fees; vacated the portion awarding attorney's fees and expenses; and remanded to the district court to specifically address whether the attorney's fees incurred after the government initiated its own investigation were "necessary" under 18 U.S.C. 3663A(b)(4). View "United States v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael R. Veon, a twenty-two-year member and eventual Minority Whip of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, was entitled to $20,000 annually to cover business expenses associated with maintenance of a district office, as well as $4,000 for postage. Pursuant to House Democratic Caucus (“Caucus”) procedures, Veon could seek additional funds from Caucus leadership if he exhausted his $20,000 allocation, and it was not uncommon for Caucus members to do so. In 1991, Veon formed the Beaver Initiative for Growth (“BIG”), a non-profit corporation. BIG received all of its funding from public sources, primarily through the Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development (“DCED”). Veon's Beaver County district office initially shared space with BIG, but opened two more district offices, for which the rent easily exceeded his caucus allotment. Veon was criminally charged with various offenses relating to BIG paying the district offices' rents. After some charges were withdrawn, Veon went to trial on nineteen counts. In the portion of the jury charge that was relevant to Veon’s appeal to the Supreme Court, the trial court defined the pecuniary requirement in the conflict of interest statute. The statute prohibited public officials from leveraging the authority of their offices for “private pecuniary benefit;” at issue here was whether or not that benefit extended to what the trial court in this case referred to as “intangible political gain.” In addition, another issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Commonwealth could receive restitution following prosecution of a public official for a crime involving unlawful diversion of public resources. The Court concluded the trial court committed prejudicial error in its jury charge regarding conflict of interest, and that it erred in awarding restitution to the DCED. Veon's judgment of sentence was vacated, the matter remanded for a new trial on conflict of interest, and for other proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Veon" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of three counts of attempting to cause a financial institution to not file a required currency transaction report (a CTR), in violation of 31 U.S.C. 5324(a)(1). For the first time on appeal, defendant contends that the government and the district court constructively amended the indictment, allowing her to be tried and convicted of violating section 5324(a)(3), and not section 5324(a)(1). Defendant also argues for the first time that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her convictions. The court concluded that, although the instructions given by the district court were not perfect, they did not, under plain error analysis, amount to a constructive amendment of the indictment. The court also concluded, under a plain error analysis, that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Leon" on Justia Law

From 2006-2013, Lewis fraudulently held herself out as a Fidelity account representative to at least 12 “investors,” ages 75-92. Although she had been a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority registered broker, 1990-2006, she was neither a registered broker nor affiliated with Fidelity. Lewis set up joint accounts for her investors, including her name on each. Lewis obtained debit cards and forged signatures on checks associated with the accounts to embezzle more than $2 million. She pled guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343; the government agreed to recommend no more than 10 years’ imprisonment. The court imposed a sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit remanded for resentencing based on her conditions of supervised release. Before the resentencing hearing, Lewis filed a motion, arguing for the first time, that the government had breached the plea agreement. The district court denied the motion, holding that Lewis had waived this argument, then again sentenced Lewis to a 15‐year term. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the court’s refusal to consider Lewis’s argument. The court erred by not affirmatively acknowledging that it could have considered it, but the error was harmless because it alternatively rejected the argument, and the argument is meritless. The court did not err with respect to the vulnerable-victim enhancement; the sentence was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, defendant-appellant Eldon Boisseau was convicted of tax evasion The district court determined that Boisseau, a practicing attorney, willfully evaded paying his taxes by: (1) placing his law practice in the hands of a nominee owner to prevent the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from seizing his assets; (2) causing his law firm to pay his personal expenses directly given an impending IRS levy, rather than receiving wages; and (3) telling a government revenue officer that he was receiving no compensation from his firm when in fact the firm was paying his personal expenses. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and argued that the district court wrongly convicted him: (1) without evidence of an affirmative act designed to conceal or mislead; and (2) by concluding that proof satisfying the affirmative act element of tax evasion was sufficient to prove willfulness. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Boisseau" on Justia Law

Hannon, an attorney, represented Barber in litigation against the victim, Barber’s former domestic partner, Dr. Magno. In December 2006, the parties agreed that Barber would fund a college trust for their children. Barber paid $27,500.32 to Hannon as the trustee of the children’s funds and authorized Hannon to open a bank account. In February 2011, the victim became aware that the children’s funds had been misappropriated. Hannon may have used the money to cover legal fees owed by Barber. Charged with grand theft by embezzlement by a fiduciary (Pen. Code 487(a), 506), Hannon ultimately pled no contest to misdemeanor theft by embezzlement. The trial court placed him on probation for two years, ordered him to perform 240 hours of community service, and ordered him to pay $40,800 in restitution to the victim: $25,000 in attorney’s fees, $15,000 in lost wages, and $800 in mileage. The court of appeal rejected challenges to the restitution award and held that the victim was entitled to file a victim impact statement on appeal, pursuant to the Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008 (Marsy’s Law, Proposition 9 (2008)), but may not raise present legal issues not raised by Hannon or facts not in the record below View "People v. Hannon" on Justia Law

Company A was incorporated in Florida in 2008. Doe was its president and “sole proprietor,” but a November 2008 document purports to memorialize Doe’s sale of all shares of Company A to Company B for $10,000. Numerous filings and tax documents suggested that Doe maintained control and ownership of Company A after the transfer. Multiple individuals have sued Doe and his businesses in state courts around the country based on Doe’s business practices. Doe and the companies became the subjects of a federal grand jury. The government obtained access to Doe’s email. Doe filed an interlocutory appeal to prevent its disclosure. While the appeal was pending, the district court granted permission to present the email to the grand jury, finding that although the email was protected by the work product privilege, the crime-fraud exception to that doctrine applied; in 2016, the grand jury returned a 17-count indictment, charging conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, conspiracy, mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The damage of disclosure has already been done. Should a jury convict the defendants, they will have another, equally adequate opportunity to claim privilege. View "In re: Grand Jury Matter #3" on Justia Law

Defendants Johnson and Everson were charged with conspiracy to prepare false and fraudulent income tax returns. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant the Government's initial motion for waiver of a jury trial, there is no constitutional right to a non-jury trial, and defendants failed to assert a claim of prejudice before the district court and their requests for waiver of a jury trial were intelligently made. The court also concluded that the district court did not clearly err in adopting the PSR’s calculation method in estimating the amount of tax loss generated by defendants' fraudulent activity. Finally, the court concluded that the time frame allotted to defendants to prepare their defense did not constitute plain error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to a multi-count indictment for crimes related to his involvement in a fraudulent Medicare scheme. On appeal, defendant challenges his 97 month sentence. The court concluded that defendant's principal argument that using the 2009 Guidelines definition of “victim” to enhance his sentence violates the Ex Post Facto Clause is foreclosed by precedent; defendant waived his argument that even if the 2009 Guidelines apply to his sentence, the Medicare beneficiaries were not “victims” within the meaning of the 2009 definition but were more like co-conspirators; and defendant's remaining claims are without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Shakbazyan" on Justia Law

Defendant, the owner and operator of a freight service that couriered items to and from the United States and Canada, was found guilty of nine counts of tax-related offenses. Defendant was charged with violating 26 U.S.C. 7212(a), which imposes criminal liability on one who ʺcorruptly or by force or threats of force . . . endeavors to intimidate or impede any officer or employee of the United States acting in an official capacity under this title.” Another portion of the statute, often referred to as the ʺomnibus clause,ʺ imposes criminal liability on one who ʺin any other way corruptly . . . obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title.ʺ On appeal, defendant argued that the court, like the Sixth Circuit, should construe the phrase ʺthe due administration of this titleʺ in the omnibus clause to include only a pending IRS action of which a defendant was aware. The court rejected defendant's argument and joined three of its sister circuits in concluding that section 7212(a)ʹs omnibus clause criminalizes corrupt interference with an official effort to administer the tax code, and not merely a known IRS investigation. The court also concluded that an omission may be a means by which a defendant corruptly obstructs or impedes the due administration of the Internal Revenue Code under section 7212(a). Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not commit procedural error by using the manner of calculating the tax loss and restitution amounts that it did, or by deciding not to apply a two‐level reduction to defendant's base offense level for acceptance of responsibility. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Marinello" on Justia Law