Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Former Georgia police sergeant Van Buren used his credentials on a patrol-car computer to access a law enforcement database to retrieve license plate information in exchange for money. His conduct violated a department policy against obtaining database information for non-law-enforcement purposes. The Eleventh Circuit upheld Van Buren's conviction for a felony violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (CFAA), which covers anyone who “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access,” 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2), defined to mean “to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”The Supreme Court reversed. An individual “exceeds authorized access” when he accesses a computer with authorization but then obtains information located in particular areas of the computer (files, folders, databases) that are off-limits to him. Van Buren “access[ed] a computer with authorization” and “obtain[ed] . . . information in the computer.” The phrase “is not entitled so to obtain” refers to information one is not allowed to obtain by using a computer that he is authorized to access.“Without authorization” protects computers themselves from outside hackers; the “exceeds authorized access” clause protects certain information within computers from "inside hackers." One either can or cannot access a computer system, and one either can or cannot access certain areas within the system. The Act’s precursor to the “exceeds authorized access” language covered any person who, “having accessed a computer with authorization, uses the opportunity such access provides for purposes to which such authorization does not extend.” Congress removed any reference to “purpose” in the CFAA. On the government’s reading, an employee who sends a personal e-mail or reads the news using a work computer may have violated the CFAA. View "Van Buren v. United States" on Justia Law

Jarigese was the vice president of Castle Construction and the president of its successor, Tower, when he signed three contracts for public construction projects. Each contract was designated by Markham’s mayor, Webb, as “design-build” projects, not subject to a public bidding process. Webb invited only one company to submit a proposal for a new city hall, a senior living facility, and the renovation and expansion of a park district building. Webb signed each contract on behalf of Markham. Webb solicited bribes, which were paid to KAT Remodeling. Webb later testified that he had formed KAT years earlier and used its bank account as a repository for bribes. KAT never performed work of any kind. Jarigese hand-delivered bribes, by check and by cash. Webb understood that Jarigese had created an invoice from KAT to disguise the nature of the payment. Evidence at trial showed that Webb solicited bribes from others, using the same pattern.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Jarigese’s convictions for nine counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343 and 1346, and one count of bribery, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(2). Evidence of Webb’s solicitation of other bribes was not evidence of “other bad acts” but rather was directly relevant to proving the charged scheme. The evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and there was no evidence of unwarranted discrepancy with respect to Jarigese’s 41-month sentence. View "United States v. Jarigese" on Justia Law

Jensen was charged as a coconspirator in a felony indictment alleging a scheme under which members of the Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Department issued hard-to-obtain concealed firearms permits in exchange for substantial donations to an independent expenditure committee supporting the reelection campaign of Sheriff Smith. Jensen is a sheriff’s department captain identified as the individual within the sheriff’s department who facilitated the conspiracy. Jensen unsuccessfully moved to disqualify the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office from prosecuting him, alleging that that office leaked grand jury transcripts to the press days before the transcripts became public which created a conflict of interest requiring disqualification. He also joined in codefendant Schumb’s motion to disqualify the office due to Schumb’s friendship with District Attorney Rosen and Rosen’s chief assistant, Boyarsky.The court of appeal rejected Jensen’s arguments for finding a conflict of interest requiring disqualification: the grand jury transcript leak, Schumb’s relationships with Rosen and Boyarsky, and a dispute between Rosen and Sheriff Smith about access to recordings of county jail inmate phone calls. The trial court could reasonably conclude Jensen did not demonstrate that the district attorney’s office was the source of the leak. Jensen himself does not have a personal relationship with Rosen or Boyarsky. The trial court could reasonably conclude that Jensen did not establish a conflict of interest based on the existence of a dispute between the district attorney and the elected official with supervisory power over Jensen. View "Jensen v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Schumb was charged as a coconspirator in a felony indictment alleging a quid pro quo scheme in which members of the Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Department issued hard-to-obtain concealed firearms permits in exchange for substantial monetary donations to the reelection campaign of Sheriff Smith. Schumb is an attorney with a history of fundraising for elected officials; he accepted the donations as a treasurer of an independent expenditure committee supporting Sheriff Smith’s reelection. Schumb is a friend of Rosen, the elected Santa Clara County District Attorney, and previously raised funds for Rosen’s campaigns.Schumb unsuccessfully moved to disqualify the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office from prosecuting him, arguing that his friendships with Rosen and Rosen’s chief assistant, Boyarsky, created a conflict of interest making it unlikely Schumb would receive a fair trial. Schumb asserted that he intends to call Rosen and Boyarsky as both fact and character witnesses at trial and. despite their personal connections to the case, neither Rosen nor Boyarsky made any effort to create an ethical wall between themselves and the attorneys prosecuting the case. The court of appeal vacated and directed the lower court to enter a new order disqualifying the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office in Schumb's prosecution. View "Schumb v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Bochenek was convicted of identity theft for the knowingly unauthorized use of another person’s credit card information to purchase cigarettes. Before trial, Bochenek argued that the venue provision pertaining to identity theft, 720 ILCS 5/1-6(t)(3), which allows for proper venue in the county in which the victim resides, was unconstitutional. Bochenek maintained that the acts constituting the offenses occurred at a gas station in Lake County and not where the victim resides, in Du Page County.The circuit and appellate courts and the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the provision. Based on the nature of the crime, the constitutional mandate that criminal trials occur in the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed is satisfied. The offense of identity theft may be deemed to have been committed where the physical acts occurred as well as where the intangible identifying information is “located,” namely the victim’s residence. View "People v. Bochenek" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of one count of making a materially false statement to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2), holding that Defendant's arguments on appeal lacked merit.Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) Defendant's argument that multiple circumstances may have caused the jury to convict him of a second statement that had not been charged, causing a mismatch or variance between the indictment and the proof, was unavailing; (2) there was no clear prosecutorial misconduct in either the opening or the closing arguments; (3) Defendant waived his claim regarding the indictment not going to the jury and the verdict form; and (4) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial. View "United States v. Chen" on Justia Law

Elgin met Garbutt at an international convention. Garbutt, who holds dual citizenship, moved from Belize into Elgin’s Gary, Indiana home and worked on her successful campaign to become Trustee of Calumet Township. Elgin hired Garbutt to work at the Trustee’s Office as her “executive aide” at a salary of $60,000 per year. Garbutt’s unofficial duties included Elgin’s political campaign work. He understood that he should not perform political work at the Township Office but began to do so. Elgin also hired her friend Shelton, who also worked on Elgin’s campaign. Elgin and Garbutt had a falling out. Elgin demoted Garbutt, docked his salary barred him from attending meetings, and took away his government car. Garbutt eventually began a partnership with an FBI agent who directed him to conduct warrantless searches of his co‐workers’ offices.Elgin took a plea deal, Shelton was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud, after learning, mid‐trial, about the warrantless searches. The district court denied Shelton's post‐trial motion for relief. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court erred in finding that Shelton lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy in her office. Garbutt’s document collection, undertaken at the direction of the FBI, violated her Fourth Amendment rights. No warrant would have issued without the information gathered as a result of the unlawful searches; the evidence obtained from the search authorized by that warrant should have been suppressed. View "United States v. Shelton" on Justia Law

In 1989, Bilzerian was convicted on nine counts of securities fraud, making false statements to the Securities and Exchange Commission, and conspiracy to commit certain offenses, and defraud the SEC and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The Southern District of New York sentenced Bilzerian to four years in prison, imposed a $1.5 million fine, and ordered him to disgorge $62,337,599.53.In 2012, Bilzerian’s wife, Steffen, filed a pro se complaint in the Claims Court seeking an $8,243,145 tax refund under 26 U.S.C. 1341. The dispute stems from transactions that Bilzerian made in 1985-1986 related to the purchase and sale of certain common stocks, for which he was convicted of securities fraud. Steffen and Bilzerian later filed a second amended complaint as joined parties.In 2018, the court dismissed that complaint with prejudice. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs cannot establish a reasonable belief of having an unrestricted right to the disputed funds when the money was first reported as income. A reasonable, unrestricted-right belief cannot exist where a taxpayer knowingly acquires the disputed funds via fraud. The “taxpayer’s illicit hope that his intentional wrongdoing will go undetected cannot create the appearance of an unrestricted right.” View "Steffen v. United States" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of conspiracy to commit various financial crimes, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and converting government property, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief as to any of his assignments of error.This case arose from Defendant's participation, along with several coconspirators, in a scheme to defraud the federal government by falsifying tax returns. A jury convicted him of multiple counts, and the judge sentenced him to eighty-four months in jail. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's claims of error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings were unavailing; and (2) the judge properly applied two sentencing enhancements. View "United States v. Grullon" on Justia Law

In 2014, after a jury found Michael Destry Williams guilty of ten counts of tax-evasion and fraud offenses, the district judge sentenced him to seventy-one months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. Williams began the five-years’ supervision on August 22, 2018, and was set to end it on August 21, 2023. On August 27, 2019, a probation officer filed a Petition for Summons on Person Under Supervision, alleging three violations of Williams’s supervision. All three violations allegedly stemmed from Williams’s asserted belief that he was an American National and was not subject to the same legal system as United States citizens. The court ordered a sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment, with credit for time served. On appeal, Williams challenged this sentence as substantively unreasonable. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Williams' sentence. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law