Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

The Hagens (Leah and Michael) were convicted by a jury of conspiring to defraud the United States and to pay and receive health care kickbacks. Each was sentenced to 151 months of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release, plus restitution. Both Hagens appealed, arguing that the district court erred in excluding evidence, refusing to instruct the jury on an affirmative defense, and imposing a sentencing enhancement and restitution.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Hagens' convictions and sentences. The court found that the excluded evidence, which consisted of witness testimony, was irrelevant and cumulative. Thus, the district court did not err in excluding it. Even if the exclusion of the evidence wasn't warranted, the court determined that any error below was harmless.The court also held that the Hagans failed to put sufficient evidence forward justifying their requested jury charge on the safe-harbor affirmative defense. Finally, the court rejected the Hagens' claim that the lower court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement for the couple's "sophisticated money laundering scheme." The court explained that evidence suggested the Hagens manipulated their wire transfer payments to conceal the kickback scheme, which justified the enhancement. View "USA v. Hagen" on Justia Law

Klund purports to supply electrical parts. In 1991 and in 1993, he was convicted for fraudulent misrepresentations involving defense contracts. Disqualified from the award of government contracts, from 2011-2019, Klund bid on defense contracts using shell corporations, aliases, and the names of employees and relatives. He certified that one shell company was a woman-owned business, eligible for special consideration. Klund bid on 5,760 defense contracts and was awarded 1,928 contracts worth $7.4 million. Klund satisfactorily performed some of his contracts; the Department paid $2.9 million for these goods. But he knowingly shipped and requested payment for 2,816 nonconforming electrical parts and submitted invoices for parts that he never shipped.Klund pleaded guilty to wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and money laundering. The PSR calculated the intended loss at $5.7 million and the actual loss at $2.9 million. Since Klund fraudulently obtained contracts intended for woman-owned businesses, the PSR did not apply an offset for the cost of goods actually delivered under those contracts. An 18-level increase in Klund’s offense level applied because the loss was more than $3,500,000 but not more than $9,500,000, U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1)(J). With an advisory range of 87-108 months, Klund was sentenced to 96 months’ imprisonment with a mandatory consecutive sentence of 24 months for aggravated identity theft. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the loss calculations. View "United States v. Klund" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the restitution order entered by the district court holding Defendant jointly and severally liable for all sums illicitly obtained by the charged conspiracy in this case, holding that the restitution order was not an abuse of the district court's discretion.Defendant, a lawyer formerly licensed in Florida, and his co-conspirators organized a scheme designed to defraud investors of millions of dollars. The conspirators convicted at least five people to invest substantially in the scheme. One of the victims eventually contacted authorities, and Defendant and his co-conspirators were charged with a single count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Defendant pleaded guilty. The district court sentenced Defendant to twenty-nine months of immurement followed by supervised release and ordered him to pay restitution in the amount of $3,473,701. The First Circuit affirmed the restitution order, holding that where a defendant is convicted as a member of a wire-fraud conspiracy, a district court has discretion to order him to reimburse the victims of the scheme, jointly and severally with his co-conspirators, for all reasonably foreseeable losses created by the fraudulent scheme. View "United States v. Ochoa" on Justia Law

After a five-day trial, a jury convicted Defendant of healthcare fraud, conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, paying kickbacks in connection with a federal healthcare program, and conspiracy to pay and receive healthcare kickbacks. The district court sentenced him to 120 months in prison. On appeal, Defendant challenged his healthcare fraud convictions—but not his kickback convictions—on a number of grounds. The charges arose out of Defendant’s involvement in the submission of claims to Medicare for genetic cancer-screening (CGx) tests for beneficiaries who did not have cancer or familial history of cancer and that were not ordered by the beneficiaries’ primary care physicians.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that given the statutory and regulatory landscape, it agreed with the district court that the indictment was sufficient to charge Defendant with healthcare fraud. The indictment charged that CGx tests in question were not for beneficiaries who were being treated for cancer or who had a familial history of cancer and were not ordered by the beneficiaries’ treating physicians. Moreover, the government did not need to present evidence excluding every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or that was wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, provided that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. View "USA v. Ivan Andre Scott" on Justia Law

Palma worked for FCA starting in 2013 and allegedly participated in a scheme that manipulated FCA's new diesel engine’s function during testing to produce artificially impressive results with respect to features that FCA was targeting to customers, including fuel economy greater than 30 mpg and a frequency of fluid changes similar to that of gasoline-powered cars. When the vehicles were tested for emissions, the program activated Exhaust Gas Recirculation, sacrificing fuel economy. When the vehicles were tested for fuel economy, Recirculation was lowered, increasing emissions. Palma knew that these results were critical to receiving the “best-in-class” fuel economy ratings and that the vehicles did not meet EPA requirements. A sticker affixed to the cars stated they complied with regulations and provided detailed emissions information, as influenced by Palma's scheme. FCA sold more than 100,000 of these vehicles. Customers who purchased the vehicles said that the misleading representations were material to their purchase decisions.Palma was charged with 13 counts, including conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349. The district court held that there was an insufficient causal nexus between Palma’s conduct and customers being induced to purchase vehicles and that Palma’s conduct was less a deprivation of consumer property and more a deception of regulators. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of that count, reasoning that Palma was only charged with conspiracy, not wire fraud itself, and the indictment alleges adequate facts tying Palma to a fraudulent scheme. View "United States v. Palma" on Justia Law

The question presented in this case is whether Appellants, a cannabis entrepreneur and two cannabis businesses, have standing to bring claims arising pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), based on alleged harms to their cannabis business and related property. The district court granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss with prejudice, holding that Appellants lacked standing to bring their RICO claims. The court also dismissed Appellants’ Lanham Act claims on standing grounds as well as their state law claims, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Appellants appealed the district court’s order only as to their RICO claims.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that while Appellants had Article III standing, they lacked statutory standing under RICO. As to Article III standing, the panel held that Appellants satisfied the injury requirement, which requires a showing of an invasion of a legally protected interest because cannabis-related property interests are recognized under California law. Appellees argued that Appellants’ alleged injuries were not redressable because they related to a cannabis business, which was illegal under the Controlled Substances Act. The panel held that the fact that Appellants sought damages for economic harms related to cannabis was not relevant to whether a court could, theoretically, fashion a remedy to redress their injuries. Further, the panel held that Appellants lacked statutory standing to bring their claims under RICO Section 1964(c).  The panel concluded that the statutory purpose of RICO and the congressional intent animating its passage conflicted with the California laws recognizing a business and property interest in cannabis. View "FRANCINE SHULMAN, ET AL V. TODD KAPLAN, ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence of 36 months imprisonment for wire fraud, which is an upward variance from the guidelines range of 8 to 14 months. The district court imposed that sentence after Defendant pleaded guilty to providing false information to obtain an $85,000 Economic Injury Disaster Loan under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act. He challenged the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court appropriately considered the relevant Sections 3553(a) factors, provided a sufficiently compelling justification for varying from the guidelines range, and imposed a sentence that is both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The court explained that the district court was not required to state on the record that it explicitly considered each Section 3553(a) factor or to discuss each factor. It is enough that the record reflects the court’s consideration of the sentencing factors and the parties’ arguments. Further, the court held that the district court did not rely on any clearly erroneous facts in making its decision and adequately explained why it didn’t consider this to be a mine-run case, particularly because Defendant used his education and ability to exploit a government relief program. Moreover, the court wrote that the record shows that the district court considered the importance of deterrence along with other Section 3553(a) factors in varying upward. Those factors included the applicable guidelines range, Defendant’s history and characteristics, the seriousness of his crime, the nature and circumstances of it, and the need to promote respect for the law and to provide just punishment. View "USA v. Vinath Oudomsine" on Justia Law

Appellant Mark Dunham, was a door-to-door salesman for Capital Connect. On or about June 15, 2016, Appellant rang the doorbell of Eloise Moody, an 81- year-old lady recently widowed and diagnosed with cancer. When Moody answered, Appellant pointed at the “Central Security Group” alarm sign in Moody’s front yard and said: “I’m here to update your security.” Appellant also said, referring to the Central Security Group sign, “I’ll put a light on it, make it visible from the street” which he explained would be helpful to “update the neighborhood.” Appellant was not wearing a uniform or name tag and did not say what company he worked for. Moody, therefore, understood Appellant to be employed by her alarm company (Central) and that he was intending to place a light on the sign in her front yard. Appellant managed to gain access to Moody's home and convinced her to cancel her existing security contract and enter a five-year agreement with Capital Security at a higher cost. Appellant was charged with deceptive business practices to which he pled not guilty. A jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to one year in jail. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction and whether the jury charge erroneously authorized a non-unanimous verdict. Based on its construction of Texas Penal Code § 32.42(b), and its review of the record, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the Court agreed with the court of appeals on both points: (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; and (2) jury unanimity was not required on the specific manner and means of the offense because it was not an “essential element” of the offense. View "Dunham v. Texas" on Justia Law

Defendant challenges his convictions of healthcare fraud, illegal kickbacks, and money laundering and the related restitution award and forfeiture judgment. After Defendant filed this appeal, President Trump commuted his sentence of imprisonment and rendered any challenge to it moot. In his remaining challenges, Defendant argued that his indictment should have been dismissed because of prosecutorial misconduct, that the district court erroneously admitted expert opinion testimony against him, that the admissible evidence against him was insufficient to sustain his convictions, and that the restitution award and forfeiture judgment should be vacated.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that that the presidential commutation renders Defendant’s appeal of his prison sentence moot but does not otherwise affect his appeal. Second, the court explained that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to dismiss the indictment or to disqualify the prosecutors due to misconduct. Third, the court affirmed the admission of the expert-opinion testimony. Fourth, the court affirmed the restitution amount as not clearly erroneous. And fifth, the court held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Defendant of money laundering and that the forfeiture judgment based on money laundering was lawfully calculated. View "USA v. Philip Esformes" on Justia Law

Mongol Nation is an unincorporated association whose members include the official, or “full-patch,” members of the Mongols Gang. A jury convicted the association of substantive RICO and RICO conspiracy violations; it also found various forms of Mongol Nation property forfeitable. That property included the collective membership marks—a type of intellectual property used to designate membership in an association or other organization. The district court denied forfeiture of those marks, holding that the forfeiture would violate the First and Eighth Amendments.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that in Mongol Nation’s appeal, it argued for the first time that it is not an indictable “person” under RICO because the indictment alleges that the association was organized for unlawful purposes only. The panel concluded that this unpreserved argument is non-jurisdictional. The panel did not resolve the Government’s contention that Mongol waived it. The panel wrote that regardless of the merits of Mongol Nation’s argument, it mischaracterizes the allegations in the indictment.    On the Government’s cross-appeal of the order denying its second preliminary order of forfeiture, the panel did not need to decide whether forfeiture of the membership marks would violate the First and Eighth Amendments. Nor did the panel reach the question of whether the marks may be forfeitable without the transfer of any goodwill associated with the marks. The panel held that the forfeiture was improper for a different reason—the Government effectively sought an order seizing and extinguishing the Mongols’ right to exclusive use of its marks without the Government itself ever seizing title to the marks. View "USA V. MONGOL NATION" on Justia Law