Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a state court judge and former criminal defense attorney, was convicted of two counts of wire fraud and one count of making false statements, stemming from defendant's use of his position as a state judge to obtain money and sexual favors in exchange for assisting a criminal defendant. Defendant subsequently appealed his conviction and his 60-month concurrent sentences. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial; based on the record, the court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict would have been the same absent any error in the jury instructions and the indictment; and defendant's sufficiency of the evidence challenged failed. The court also held that the district court properly applied the specific offense characteristic; the second uncharged bribe could be used to increase the offense level for defendant's bribery conviction; and any monies rendered for legitimate legal services could not be subtracted from the loss value under U.S.S.G. 2C1.1(b)(2) because defendant and his colleague provided these services after the offense was detected. Therefore, none of defendant's several challenges required a new trial, reversal of conviction, or resentencing.View "United States v. Barraza" on Justia Law

Defendant, a participant in a major mortgage fraud scheme, pled guilty to committing wire fraud as part of that scam and was sentenced to 37 months in prison and ordered to pay $1,792,000 in restitution. His role was to act as a "straw," or fake, buyer of seven properties, and to cause $4,473,161.55 to be transferred from unwitting mortgage companies to their banking partners; he received $90,000 from his co-schemers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The district court acted within its discretion in rejecting defendant's assertion that his sentence should be lower because he gave the government substantial assistance. The court should have explained its rationale in attributing a "reasonably foreseeable" loss amount to defendant. The court also erred in interpreting the minor role sentencing adjustment guideline when it stated that an act otherwise deemed minor could, if repeated, necessarily preclude the adjustment, and that a person playing a necessary role cannot play a minor role. The court should evaluate his role in context of other participants in the scheme, keeping in mind that a minor player is substantially less culpable than the average participant, not the leaders. View "United States v. Leiskuna" on Justia Law

Appellants F. Jeffrey Miller and Hallie Irvin were charged in an eleven-count indictment with a variety of crimes stemming from an alleged conspiracy to defraud mortgage lenders in connection with the subprime housing market. After a month-long jury trial, Miller and Irvin were each convicted on several of the charges and sentenced. They appealed their convictions, citing numerous evidentiary and legal errors. Miller also challenged his sentence. Miller was a builder and developer involved in residential construction in Kansas, Missouri, and other states. With many competing developers marketing their homes to well-qualified buyers, Miller chose to focus his business on buyers with low income and poor credit. The marketing of Miller’s homes was handled by Stephen Vanatta, who would refer potential buyers to a mortgage broker named James Sparks for financing. Because a prior felony conviction for passing a bad check prohibited Vanatta from maintaining a checking account, his portion of commissions were paid by checks issued to his wife, appellant Irvin. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found the district court erred on three of the eleven charges against Defendant Miller, but affirmed the district court in all other aspects. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Irvin" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted for the theft or embezzlement of funds from his employee's IRA accounts in violation of 18 U.S.C. 664. On appeal, defendant argued that his conviction should be reversed because, at trial, the district court barred him from presenting evidence to the jury that he eventually repaid all of the embezzled funds. The court held that because the intent to permanently deprive was neither a required element of, nor a defense to, the conversion or stealing that section 664 criminalized, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded evidence of defendant's eventual repayment of his employees' funds in a bankruptcy proceeding as irrelevant. View "United States v. Van Elsen" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of wire fraud, money laundering, and failure to file tax returns. The district court sentenced him to 90 months imprisonment and ordered over eight million dollars in restitution. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient for his wire-fraud and money-laundering convictions and that his sentence and the restitution were unreasonable. The court held that, based on the totality of the evidence, the jury reasonable returned a guilty verdict. The court also held that the district court was authorized to consider the charged and uncharged conduct in awarding restitution and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering restitution in an amount greater than the loss calculation. The court further held that the district court specifically acknowledged the relevant sentencing factors, that they were advisory, and that it was for the district court to determine a sentence which was sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with those factors. The court finally held that the 90 month sentence was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Jefferson" on Justia Law

The dean of a school gave the New Jersey State Senator a "low show" well-paid job in exchange for the senator's efforts as Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee to obtain funding for the school. The senator also attempted to use a "no show" job as an attorney for county social services to increase his pension benefits. Both were convicted of honest services fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343 and 1346 and bribery in connection with a state agency that receives federal funds (18 U.S.C. 666(a)). The senator was also convicted of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341) for the pension scheme. The senator was sentenced to 48 months and the dean to 18 months in prison. The court entered a joint restitution order for $113,187. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding sufficient evidence to support each conviction. The government's requests that grand jury witnesses voluntarily not disclose "any matters" that occurred during those proceedings did not interfere with defense access to witnesses so as to merit reversal. The court properly instructed the jury on honest services fraud or bribery, in light of the Skilling decision, and acted within its discretion in regard to testimony by the director of pension services. View "United States v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of obstruction of justice, witness tampering, and conspiracy and sentenced to 120 months in prison and payment of fines and assessments. In a separate trial he was convicted of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering and sentenced to 360 months, to run concurrently. in a consolidated appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court properly denied an entrapment instruction; there was never any meeting of defendant and the government agents and, hence, no inducement. Wiretap evidence was properly admitted. There was no evidence that the warrant contained intentional or reckless falsehoods and there was probable cause. Evidence concerning the amount of loss was properly admitted with respect to both cases and sentencing was reasonable, regardless of the defense theories about other possible causes of the loss.View "United States v. Poulsen" on Justia Law

The former Pennsylvania State Senator was sentenced to 55 months' imprisonment, a $411,000 fine, and $2,340,839 in restitution, after conviction on 137 counts of fraud, tax evasion, and obstruction of justice. His former aide was sentenced to imprisonment of one year and one day, a $45,000 fine, and joint and several restitution of up to $792,802, after conviction on 45 counts. The Third Circuit affirmed the senator's conviction, but vacated both sentences. The court acted within its discretion in admitting evidence concerning the state Ethics Act. The content and enforcement of the Act were relevant to the claim that there were rules that the senator broke repeatedly, that those rules were clear enough for him to understand, and to show that he was deceiving the Senate when he misrepresented or omitted aspects of his actions and expenditures to avoid the perception that he had violated those rules. A juror's social media comments did not merit a new trial, nor did another juror's exposure to excluded evidence. The district court's failure to calculate a final guidelines range left the court unable to review the procedural and substantive bases of the sentence and affects the substantial rights of the parties; the court abused its discretion with respect to several aspects of sentencing. View "United States v. Fumo" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of obstruction of justice, witness tampering, and conspiracy, in connection with offering a bribe for favorable testimony in a business fraud case, was sentenced to 84 months' imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in refusing to give an entrapment jury instruction, in defining the corrupt intent required to convict as "characterized by improper conduct." Defendant acted for profit, was not reluctant to commit the offense, made the initial suggestion of the offense, and had little to no inducement from the government. The definition amounted to "invited error" and was not manifestly unjust. The sentence was reasonable; defendant knew the size and scope of the underlying crime at the outset. View "United States v. Demmler" on Justia Law

In 2004, defendant spent approximately $38,000 on home repairs for a Chicago alderman, a crucial player in defendant's attempt to have industrial property rezoned for commercial and residential development. Defendant also convinced business associates to donate, at his expense, to the alderman's aunt's congressional campaign. During an investigation, defendant fabricated an invoice for the home repairs, purportedly sent from his general contractor to defendant. The Seventh Circuit affirmed convictions for bribing a local official (18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2)); exceeding federal campaign contribution limits through straw-man donations (Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1),441f & 437g(d)(1)(A)(ii)); and endeavoring to obstruct justice (18 U.S.C. 1503(a)). The government was not required to establish a specific quid pro quo of money in exchange for a legislative act. The district court acted within its discretion in holding an adversarial in camera hearing to determine the existence of the crime-fraud exception. Section 441f unambiguously proscribes straw man, as well as false name, contributions. View "United States v. Boender" on Justia Law