Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction for visa fraud and conspiracy to commit visa fraud, as well as his sentence. Defendant had requested specific jury instructions with respect to the government's burden of proof regarding his knowledge of the fraud for which he was indicted. The district court denied these requests and instead gave a general instruction on acting "knowingly." Defendant challenged those denials as well as the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. The court found these challenges meritless. In calculating defendant's Guidelines sentencing range, the district court relied on four enhancements, three of which defendant challenged on appeal. Though the basis of the district court's application of the leader/organizer enhancement could have been more fully elaborated, the court found that the record supported its application here. Regarding the obstruction-of-justice and number-of-document enhancements, however, the court agreed with defendant that the evidence was insufficient to sustain their use in this case. Therefore, the court vacated defendant's sentence. Defendant also challenged the order of restitution imposed by the district court under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A. Because the court found the record evidence insufficiently specific to demonstrate that each client to whom the court ordered restitution was a "victim" of the fraud, the court vacated the restitution order. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for resentencing, including reconsideration of the restitution award. View "United States v. Archer" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence of 25 months' imprisonment plus five years of supervised release following his guilty plea to ten counts of embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. 656, and eight counts of bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1344. The eighteen counts defendant pleaded guilty to related to two schemes to defraud Wells Fargo: an embezzlement scheme and a check-kiting scheme. On appeal, defendant's primary contention was that because he did not know he was the subject of a pending criminal investigation at the time he committed perjury in a civil suit concerning the very same conduct later charged in the criminal indictment, the district court erred in applying U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 to enhance his sentence for willfully obstructing justice. The court held that because the district court applied the correct legal standard and relied upon probative evidence submitted by the government, the district court did not err in calculating the intended loss at being over $200,000. The court also held that "willful" meant only that defendant had engaged in intentional or deliberate acts designed to obstruct any potential investigation, at the time an investigation was in fact pending; it did not mean that defendant had to know for certain that the investigation was pending. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Gilchrist" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty, in 1997, to multiple counts of fraud, money laundering, and perjury and was sentenced to 78 months' imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and ordered to pay $1,587,321.50 in restitution and to forfeit $337,000. The government obtained a turnover order targeting payments defendant had received from three retirement savings plans provided through his employer under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3613(a). The Seventh Circuit vacated. The targeted funds are a defined benefit plan, a 401(k) plan, and a "non-qualified" plan. The Consumer Credit Protection Act limits garnishment to 25% of the party's "aggregate disposable earnings of any individual workweek," 15 U.S.C. 1673(a), and applies to the periodic payments from a pension or retirement program.View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

Defendant, an apartment building owner convicted of bribery of building officials, (18 U.S.C. 666(a)(2)), was sentenced to 34 months of imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed and remanded for resentencing. The district court provided thorough instructions as to the elements of bribery, defining "knowingly," "corruptly," and "willfully," and was within its discretion in denying a separate instruction on intent. The court correctly excluded testimony of a defense witness and limited defense cross-examination of certain witnesses. The court was within its discretion in holding that defendant was not prejudiced by the lack of prior knowledge of a change of testimony. In sentencing, the court did not follow the correct order of steps set forth in "Gunter," did not compute a definitive loss calculation or offense level to reach its Guidelines range nor did it meaningfully consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct (18 U.S.C. 3553 (a)(6).View "United States v. Friedman" on Justia Law

Defendant, a patent attorney and licensed engineer, the divorced father of children born in 1985, 1986, and 1991, was ordered in 2002 to pay weekly child support of $1,406 per week plus $300 per week toward past medical expenses. He has paid no child support since issuance of the final order. He attempted to appeal the order to the U.S. Supreme Court and filed unsuccessful suits and appeals in four states (New Hampshire, Vermont, Virginia, and Maryland) and in two federal courts, arguing that the order was invalid because the New Hampshire court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Convicted of willful failure to pay child support, 18 U.S.C. 228(a)(3), defendant was sentenced to 24 months in prison. The First Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to support findings that he was able to pay and willfully refused to pay. The district court properly charged the jury on willful blindness. View "United States v. Mitrano" on Justia Law

Defendant was the fiancee of the leader of a Philadelphia drug distribution ring responsible for selling a large amount of cocaine and cocaine base (crack) from 1998 to 2005. In 2005, the couple used drug money to purchase a new home, which was titled in defendant's name. When her fiancee was charged with drug trafficking and firearms offenses, defendant was charged with money laundering in purchasing the house, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). She appealed her conviction. The Third Circuit vacated. The evidence was not sufficient to establish knowledge of a design to conceal on defendant's part. Defendant lied about her income and had the property titled in her name, not to hide her fiancee's involvement (which was obvious), but to get around his bad credit and purchase the house. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Defendant did not inform the government when his mother died, but, for 12 years cashed checks for benefits she had earned under the Civil Service Retirement System, netting $158,000. He pleaded guilty to mail fraud. His Guidelines sentencing range was 21 to 27 months, but the judge sentenced him to 30 months, because she believed that he needed treatment for mental illness and alcoholism and that it would take more than 18 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated. While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held that a sentencing judge is to recognize that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation, 18 U.S.C. 3582(a), and may not increase the length of a prison term in order to facilitate rehabilitation or correction.View "United States v. Kubeczko" on Justia Law

After a pyramid scheme that he had maintained for nearly a decade came to light, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. The district court sentenced him well above the applicable guidelines range to 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the court erroneously applied a 4-level adjustment under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) for defrauding more than 50 victims and a claim that the sentence was substantively unreasonable.View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

Defendant, manager of a kosher meatpacking company, was convicted of 86 counts of bank, wire, and mail fraud; making false statements to a bank; money laundering; and violations of an order of the Secretary of Agriculture. Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence. The court held that there was no evidence in the record that the district court's decision to remain on the case prejudiced defendant's verdict and concluded that the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion for a new trial. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in trying the financial charges first where the district court's order was a practical solution given the nature and number of the charges. The court further held that, with the exception of one count of false statements to a bank which was premised solely on violations of immigration law, any error on this evidence would have been harmless because it would have had no effect on the verdict. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its wide discretion in excluding evidence. The court finally held that, because defendant's offense was falsely stating that the company was in compliance with its laws, the court did not commit plain error with its instruction on harboring illegal aliens; defendant's money laundering convictions were lawful and did not merge with any other of his crimes; there was no error in the district court's loss calculation; and the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion in imposing a 324 month sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Rubashkin" on Justia Law

Defendant, James Gansman, appealed from a judgment convicting him of insider trading under the so-called "misappropriation theory." At issue was whether the district court erred in declining to adopt an instruction proposed by Gansman setting forth a theory of the defense based in part on SEC Rule 10b5-2, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b5-2. The court held that Gansman was entitled to assert a defense theory that he did not have the requisite intent to commit securities fraud, and that in defining the nature of his relationship with Donna Murdoch, a woman with whom he was having an affair, to the jury, he had the right to use language found in Rule 10b5-2. The court held that, nevertheless, Gansman was not entitled to a new trial in the circumstances presented because the slightly modified instruction given by the district court was legally sufficient. Gansman raised a number of other challenges to his conviction, all of which were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Gansman, et al." on Justia Law