Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Defendant accepted $1,000 and Mets tickets for helping a consulting company obtain a contract with the county for temporary employment of individuals for clean-up after a 2006 flood. He pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B). The presentence report recommended a sentence of 15 to 21 months' imprisonment. USSG 2C1.2(a)(1) set the base offense level at 11; the report added two levels under 2C1.2(b)(1) because the offense involved more than one gratuity and four levels under 2C1.2(b)(3) because the offense involved a public official in a high-level decision-making or sensitive position. It subtracted three levels for acceptance of responsibility (3E1.1). The district court imposed a sentence of 15 months' imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed. Defendant could not hire or fire; could not bind the county; could not act officially on the county's behalf; had administrative, not policymaking, duties; and reported to superiors, who reported to County Commissioners. The high-level government official enhancement was not applied to his superior, also implicated in the bribery scheme. Defendant was, however, responsible for the human resource department. View "United States v. Richards" on Justia Law

In this case, an insurance agency had a contract with an insurance company that allowed the agency to commingle collected insurance premiums with its other funds in its general operating account. The government contended that the premiums collected by the agency were the property of the insurance company and held "in trust" by the agency; it alleged that when the funds were not remitted but used for other purposes, they were embezzled by the agency's treasurer, defendant. Defendant was charged with ten counts of embezzlement of insurance premiums in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1033(b)(1) and one count of conspiracy to commit embezzlement. The court held that under long-standing Arizona law, the contract between the agency and the company, which permitted agency commingling, required monthly agency payments whether premiums were collected or not, and created a right of interest on late payments, created a creditor-debtor relationship, not a trust. The agency had contractual and fiduciary duties to the company, but was not a trustee. Because the funds in question were not held "in trust" by the agency as a matter of law, an essential element of embezzlement was lacking. Therefore, the court reversed the denial of defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. View "United States v. Lequire" on Justia Law

While working as office manager and executive assistant for three successive businesses, defendant embezzled more than $240,000 by making personal purchases on company credit cards, falsifying expense reimbursement claims, and depositing corporate checks in her personal account. She pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, reserving the right to challenge a recommendation of a two-level sentencing increase for abuse of a position of trust, U.S.S.G. 3B1.3. The district court accepted the recommendation, which resulted in a guidelines range of 27 to 33 months, and imposed a sentence of 27 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that it was a "borderline" case for abuse-of-trust enhancement, and deferring to the trial court findings. View "United States v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to several counts of mail and wire fraud, was convicted by a jury of violations of federal campaign finance law, and was sentenced to 292 months in prison. Defendant appealed the resulting judgment of conviction on various grounds, including that the loss calculated for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines improperly included promised returns on defendant's victims' investments. The court affirmed the district court in all respects, and held that (1) defendant waived any statute of limitations challenge to the indictment by pleading guilty; (2) the district court's admission of the Ponzi scheme evidence was not plain error; (3) the district court did not err by calculating the intended loss amount under the Guidelines to include the loss of putative profits that victims reinvested in defendant's Ponzi scheme; (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion when weighing the factors relevant to defendant's sentence; and (5) under the circumstances of the case, the appointment of a new attorney for sentencing was not required. View "United States v. Hsu" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a restitution order imposed by the district court after a jury convicted her of various crimes associated with her involvement in a fraudulent real estate investment scheme. The court held that the district court failed to provide an adequate explanation of its reasoning in calculating the amount of restitution owed to two of the victims and, therefore, vacated that portion of the restitution order. The court remanded for recalculation and explanation of the award pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A. View "United States v. Yeung" on Justia Law

Defendant, a medical doctor, was convicted of distributing fentanyl, a Schedule II narcotic controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and obtaining morphine by misrepresentation, fraud, and deception, 21 U.S.C. 843(a)(3) and was sentenced to 48 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.The government was not required to present expert testimony, in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's unprecedented and undocumented prescriptions of profoundly addicting and potent painkillers, which he personally administered in multiple, private houses and hotel rooms The district court properly enhanced his sentence for obstruction of justice because defendant lied to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents.View "United States v. Pellmann" on Justia Law

Defendant owned and operated a beauty salon in downtown Boston that was lightly damaged by a fire in 2005. Investigators concluded that defendant had set the fire in order to collect insurance proceeds, and he was convicted of attempted arson, 18 U.S.C. 844(i). The First Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in admitting testimony about defendant's conversation about his plan to commit arson and his involvement in an earlier arson and in refusing to declare a mistrial after the prosecutor began a line of questioning concerning polygraph evidence. View "United States v. Mare" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, seven couples who sent money to the defendants (adoption agency and individuals) to facilitate adoptions, in some cases of specific children, believed they had been defrauded and filed federal claims. The case was stayed, pending resolution of state criminal charges. The district court subsequently dismissed claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962. The complaint identified the agency as the enterprise; identified predicate violations of mail fraud and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 341 and 1343, extortion, 18 U.S.C. 1951; transmitting or transferring in interstate commerce goods, wares, merchandise, or money knowing the same to have been stolen, converted, or taken by fraud, 18 U.S.C. 2314; and traveling in interstate or foreign commerce with the intent to distribute the proceeds of extortion, 18 U.S.C. 1952; and alleged a conspiracy among the individual defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Four of plaintiffs' claims adequately alleged predicate acts of mail or wire fraud and adequately alleged a threat of continued criminal activity and, therefore, a pattern of racketeering activity. View "Heinrich v. Waiting Angels Adoption Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of mail fraud and money laundering charges related to two separate fraudulent schemes: the River Shore Scheme and the GenSpec Scheme. On appeal, defendant challenged his convictions and sentences on various grounds. The court concluded that the proof presented at trial in connection with the River Shores mail fraud count materially varied from the allegations contained in the superseding indictment and this variance substantially prejudiced defendant. Therefore, the court reversed his conviction on this count. The court also reversed defendant's money laundering convictions because they were predicated on the River Shores mail fraud count. The court affirmed defendant's mail fraud convictions related to the GenSpec Scheme. Finally, the court held that defendant's other assertions of error lacked merit. View "United States v. Lander" on Justia Law

Defendant, a businessman, was convicted on 10 counts of bank fraud (18 U.S.C. 1344) involving creation of 10 fraudulent entries on the books of a small bank in Benton, Tennessee. At trial, the government offered the theory that defendant and the bank's president jointly created the phony entries in an effort to disguise earlier, troubled loans to defendant's business. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the evidence was insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court improperly excluded evidence that the bank president had, unassisted, previously engaged in a large number of identical frauds. The prosecutor suggested to the jury that acquittal would deliver a financial windfall to defendant. The government offered no direct evidence and insufficient circumstantial evidence to show that defendant knew about or participated in the bank president's fraud, a fraud that the bank president had independent reasons for creating. View "United States v. Parkes" on Justia Law