Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Criminal Law
United States v. Crowe
Defendant Vicki Dillard Crowe was convicted by a jury on eight counts of mail fraud, and eight counts of wire fraud for her participation in a mortgage fraud scheme. The district court sentenced defendant to sixty months' imprisonment and was ordered her to make restitution. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in calculating the amount of loss associated with her crimes for purposes of U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b), and in denying her motion for new trial, which alleged ineffective assistance on the part of her trial counsel. Defendant's challenge to the district court's calculation of loss raised an issue of first impression for the Tenth Circuit: whether the concept of reasonable foreseeability applied to a district court’s calculation of the "credits against loss" under 2B1.1(b). The Court adopted the Second Circuit’s reasoning in "United States v. Turk," (626 F.3d 743 (2d Cir. 2010)), and held that the concept of reasonable foreseeability applies only to a district court's calculation of "actual loss" under 2B1.1(b), and not to its calculation of the "credits against loss." The Court affirmed defendant's sentence.
View "United States v. Crowe" on Justia Law
United States v. Crundwell
Crundwell, Comptroller of Dixon, Illinois since 1983, pleaded guilty to embezzling about $53 million from the city between 1990 and 2012. She used the money to support more than 400 quarter horses and a lavish lifestyle, which she had previously claimed to be the fruit of the horses’ success. During the last six years of her scheme, the embezzlement averaged 28% of the city’s budget. In exchange for her plea, the prosecutor limited the charge to a single count of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The crime’s impact on the population of Dixon played a major role in the district court’s decision to sentence her to 235 months’ imprisonment, substantially above the Guideline range of 151 to 188 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court pronounced a substantively reasonable sentence after giving Crundwell full opportunity to present evidence and arguments. The judge considered deterrence and addressed every one of her arguments. That he thought less of her cooperation than Crundwell herself did, and gave a lower weight to her age than she requested does not undermine the sentence’s validity. View "United States v. Crundwell" on Justia Law
United States v. Anobah
Anobah was an Illinois-licensed loan officer, employed by AFFC, and acted as a loan officer for at least two fraudulent schemes. Developers Brown and Adams recruited Mason to act as a nominee buyer of a property and referred Mason to Anobah for preparation of a fraudulent loan application. The application contained numerous material falsehoods concerning Mason’s employment, assets, and income, and intent to occupy the property. Anobah, Brown, and others created fraudulent supporting documents. AFFC issued two loans in the amount of $760,000 for the property and ultimately lost about $290,000 on those loans. In the course of the scheme, AFFC wired funds from an account in Alabama to a bank in Chicago, providing the basis for a wire fraud charge. Anobah played a similar role in other loan applications for other properties and ultimately pled guilty to one count of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The district court sentenced him to 36 months of imprisonment, five months below the low end of the calculated guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding application of guidelines enhancements for abuse of a position of trust and for use of sophisticated means in committing the fraud. View "United States v. Anobah" on Justia Law
United States v. Pilon
Through their companies, Pilon and her husband falsely represented that one investment program would generate significant returns that Pilon would use to pay off the investors’ mortgages within two years, and make a bonus cash payment to investors. Many investors refinanced mortgages to invest. With respect to another investment program, Pilon falsely represented that money would be invested in a high-yield fund and that investors would receive 100 percent on their investments within about 90 days. Pilon hinted at religious and humanitarian purposes. Pilon paid early investors’ mortgages with later investors’ money (a Ponzi scheme). About 40 people invested $4,000 to $110,000, losing a total of $967,702. The Illinois Department of Securities ordered Pilon to cease offering investments; she ignored the order. When the scheme unraveled and investors lost their homes, Pilon was indicted for wire fraud. Pilon, a member of a sovereign citizen movement, unsuccessfully moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Immediately before jury selection, Pilon stated her intent to plead guilty; when the government proffered the facts, Pilon denied everything. After testimony by eight government witnesses, Pilon admitted to the scheme and pleaded guilty. In calculating Pilon’s guideline range, the court applied an enhancement for abuse of a position of trust, declined to credit Pilon for acceptance of responsibility, and sentenced Pilon to 78 months’ incarceration, in the middle of the range, and imposed $967,702 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Pilon" on Justia Law
United States v. Miller
Miller and his pastor Wellons wanted to buy investment land for $790,000. Miller formed Fellowship, with eight investment units valued at $112,500 each, to purchase the land and recruited investors. Miller and Wellons did not purchase units, but Miller obtained a 19.5% interest as Fellowship’s manager and Wellons obtained a 4.5% interest as secretary. Miller secured $675,000 in investments before closing and obtained a loan from First Bank, representing that DEMCO, one of Miller’s development companies, needed a $337,500 loan that would be paid within six months. Because DEMCO pledged Fellowship’s property, First Bank required a written resolution. The resolution contained false statements that all Fellowship members were present at a meeting, and that, at this nonexistent meeting, they unanimously voted to pledge the property as collateral. Fellowship’s members, other than Miller and Wellons, believed that the property was being purchased free of encumbrances. After the closing, $146,956.75 remained in Fellowship’s account. Miller then exchanged his ownership in Fellowship for satisfactions of debts. Despite having no ownership interest, Miller modified and renewed the loan. Later Miller told Fellowship members the truth. Miller was convicted of two counts of making false statements to a bank, 18 U.S.C. 1014, and two counts of aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A. The Sixth Circuit affirmed conviction on one count of false statements, but vacated and remanded the other convictions. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law
United States v. Orillo
Orillo, her husband (a doctor), and another owned Chalice, a home health care provider. Chalice was an enrolled provider with Medicare and could seek reimbursement of home health care through that program. Orillo falsified forms by altering the codes and information that had been completed by the Chalice nurses to make the patient’s condition appear worse and the health care needs greater than the actuality. Those alterations caused Medicare software to generate different reimbursement rates Orillo also aided her husband in paying kickbacks to a Chicago doctor in return for referrals of Medicare patients. Orillo pled guilty to healthcare fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347 and paying kickbacks to physicians for patient referrals under a federal health care program, 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b and 18 U.S.C. 2, and was sentenced to 20 months’ imprisonment. Orillo conceded that her scheme caused a loss, to Medicare, in excess of $400,000, and agreed to entry of a $500,000 forfeiture judgment.The district court determined that the loss amount for the healthcare fraud count was $744,481 and ordered her to pay that amount in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Orillo’s argument that the loss and restitution amount should be limited to only those stemming from visible alterations. View "United States v. Orillo" on Justia Law
Unted States v. Berkowitz
The Berkowitz family has a history of IRS problems. Yair began participating in his father’s schemes in 1999, acquiring the information of dead people and federal prisoners to prepare fraudulent tax returns. Between 2003 and 2009, 58 individuals received refund checks in a conspiracy that involved more than 3,000 false state and federal tax returns. Yair received tax returns from Marvin in Israel, mailed the returns from various U.S. postal codes to avoid IRS suspicion, and controlled accounts where proceeds were deposited. When refund checks issued, Yair traveled to pick them up and made payments to co‐conspirators. In 2006, IRS agents told Yair that money he received from Marvin was obtained by fraud. Yair denied knowledge of the scheme. He began to reduce his direct involvement, but continued to receive money from the scheme and met with an undercover IRS agent about expanding the fraud. The scheme was uncovered. Yair, Marvin, and others were charged with conspiracy to defraud the IRS, wire fraud, and mail fraud. Yair pleaded guilty only to wire fraud based on a 2006 PayPal transfer of $250. At sentencing, the district court followed the Presentence Report’s recommendation and ordered Yair to pay more than $4 million in restitution along with his prison sentence; his liability was joint and several with his co‐defendants. The Seventh Circuit found the award appropriate and affirmed.View "Unted States v. Berkowitz" on Justia Law
United States v. Fish
Investigation of Rabbi Fish began when Dwek, charged with bank fraud, informed law enforcement that several New York and New Jersey rabbis were laundering money through tax-exempt Jewish charities called gemachs. In a sting operation, Dwek approached Fish about laundering the claimed proceeds of fraudulent schemes. The “proceeds” were actually provided by the government. Fish participated in 12 money laundering transactions involving more than $900,000. Dwek would deliver bank checks made out to gemachs and rabbis and would receive cash in exchange, less a commission of about 10 percent. Fish gave Dwek SIM cards for his cell phone and warned Dwek to sweep his car and phones for detection devices and to use code when speaking to associates. In recordings made by Dwek, Fish stated that he had several money laundering connections, knew how much cash certain individuals had available at specified times, had met the “main guy” running the network, and that the cash came from the diamond and jewelry business. Fish pled guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h). The parties agreed that Fish’s total offense level would be at least 21; the government reserved the right to argue for a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2S1.1(b)(3) for sophisticated money laundering. The district court applied the enhancement and sentenced Fish to 46 months. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Fish" on Justia Law
United States v. Edwards, et al.
Defendants Jeffrey W. Edwards and Frontier Holdings appealed the district court's order of restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A. Edwards' convictions stemmed from his involvement in a scheme to solicit funds from investors by promising astronomical returns and then using the funds for extravagant personal expenditures. The court concluded that the district court correctly ignored Edwards' finances when determining the amount of restitution; the district court did not clearly err by ordering restitution to Camencita Jocson for losses caused by a related scheme; the district court properly found that Edwards owed restitution to victims whose related counts were dismissed at trial; and there was insufficient evidence supporting the restitution order to Teana Reece's alleged victims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions; affirmed the restitution order generally; vacated the restitution order in respect to Reece's alleged victims; and remanded for a hearing to determine whether they were entitled to restitution. View "United States v. Edwards, et al." on Justia Law
United States v. Gray
Gray’s friend Johnson offered to act as co‐borrower to help Gray buy a house, if Gray promised that she would only be on the loan as a co‐borrower for two years. In return, Johnson received a finder’s fee from the daughter of the builder-seller (Hinrichs). Mortgage broker Bowling sent their application to Fremont, a federally insured lender specializing in stated‐income loans, with which the lender typically did not verify financial information supplied by applicants. Bowling testified that he told both women that they would be listed as occupants, that their incomes would be inflated, and what the monthly payment would be. The closing proceeded; Gray and Johnson received a $273,700 mortgage from Fremont and, on paper, a $48,300 second mortgage from Hinrichs. Gray and Johnson acknowledge that the application that they signed contained several false statements. Bowling became the subject of a federal investigation. Sentenced to 51 months’ imprisonment, he agreed to testify against his clients. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of Gray and Johnson under 18 U.S.C. 1014, which prohibits “knowingly” making false statements to influence the action of a federally insured institution. Rejecting an argument that the district court erred by denying an opportunity to present testimony to show Bowling’s history of duping clients, the court stated that his prior wrongdoing was not very probative of Gray’s and Johnson’s guilt. View "United States v. Gray" on Justia Law