Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

When purchasing a house, the defendants submitted loan documents containing false incomes and bank statements, and failed to disclose that husband’s company was selling and his wife was buying. The company received $750,000 and rebated money paid above that amount to husband. The $1 million in loans they received resulted in $250,000 extra that was not disclosed as going to the couple. They were able to sell the house four months later for the same inflated amount, without raising any concerns. They failed to disclose on the HUD-1 forms in the second transaction that they would be giving the buyer kickbacks. The buyer received $1,090,573.06 in loans, but defaulted without making a payment. The lender eventually sold the house for $487,500. Defendants were convicted of three counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343 and aiding and abetting wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 2. The Presentence Investigation Report determined that the lender’s loss was $603,073.06 and recommended a 14-point enhancement under USSG 2B1.1(b)(1)(H). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions but remanded for explanation of why the loss was “reasonably foreseeable” and why the sentencing enhancement was proper. Involvement in a fraudulent scheme does not necessarily mean it was reasonably foreseeable that all the subsequent economic damages would occur; there was no evidence that defendants knew they were selling to what turned out to be a fictional buyer. View "United States v. Domnenko" on Justia Law

Defendant, while incarcerated, participated in a fraudulent scheme to obtain tax refunds by using the personal information of other inmates. Defendant pleaded guilty to 41 of the 46 counts with which he was charged. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court should amend its written judgment to conform to its oral pronouncement at sentencing that forfeited funds would be applied toward his restitution obligation. In light of the statutory framework governing restitution and forfeiture, the court held that a district court generally had no authority to offset a defendant's restitution obligation by the value of the forfeited property held by the government which was consistent with the approach taken by the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. Because the district court had no authority to offset defendant's restitution obligation by the amount of funds forfeited to the government, its oral pronouncement directing such was contrary to law. Therefore, defendant could not avail himself of the general rule that discrepancy between an oral pronouncement at sentencing and a written judgment was to be resolved in favor of the oral pronouncement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's written judgment.View "United States v. Joseph" on Justia Law

Thomas and Chapman were part of a scheme to fleece real estate lenders by concocting multiple false sales of the same homes and using the loan proceeds from the later transactions to pay off the earlier lenders. They were convicted of multiple counts of wire fraud. Thomas was also convicted of aggravated identity theft for using an investor’s identity without permission to craft a phony sale of a home that the victim never owned. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting: challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence; a claim by Thomas that there was no proof that he created or used the falsified documents at issue; Chapman’s claim that there was no evidence that he was the Lamar Chapman identified by the evidence, because no courtroom witness testified to that effect; Chapman’s claim that his due process rights were violated when the government dropped a co-defendant from the indictment; and a claim that the government failed to turn over unspecified exculpatory evidence. The court noted testimony from several victims, an FBI investigator, an auditor, and an indicted co-defendant who had already pleaded guilty. View "United States v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Defendant, the former policy director of the House Transportation Committee, appealed his convictions on three counts relating to his receipt of illegal gratuities from Jack Abramoff's lobbying group. The court concluded that, because the indictment alleged that defendant accepted the World Series trip for or because of his official assistance in influencing the language of the federal highway bill, the charge on Count 2 contained the required element, and the district court correctly denied defendant's motion to dismiss. Further, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant on all counts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Verrusio" on Justia Law

Dachman was indicted on and pled guilty to 11 counts of wire fraud for stealing funds elderly individuals had invested in his sleep‐related illness‐treatment companies. By selling shares in those companies, he had raised more than $4 million from 51 people. Although Dachman had a history of seven bankruptcies, he represented that he was a successful businessman and researcher and that he had obtained a Ph.D. from Northwestern University. He actually used the money for personal expenses. At sentencing, the district court denied him credit for acceptance of responsibility and sentenced him to 120 months’ incarceration. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges that the court erred in calculating the loss amount, by denying him credit for acceptance of responsibility, and by imposing an “objectively unreasonable” term of imprisonment in light of his severe infirmities. View "Unted States v. Dachman" on Justia Law

Defendant executed several illegal insider trades involving the stock of the supermarket chain Albertson's using material nonpublic information received from an employee of UBS. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's judgment ordering him to disgorge profits from illegal insider trading, enjoining him from further violating the securities laws, and ordering him to pay prejudgment interest on the entire disgorgement amount. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering disgorgement because the court's cases have established that tippers can be required to disgorge profits realized by their tippees' illegal insider trading. This case was distinguishable only insofar as defendant himself executed the fraudulent trades rather than leave that task to a tippee. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's imposition of an injunction on defendant or in its order that he pay prejudgment interest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "SEC v. Contorinis" on Justia Law

Over 40 years, Rachuy accumulated almost 30 convictions, mostly for fraud. In a recent scheme, he “purchased” six vehicles by writing bad checks drawn on bank accounts that he knew were closed or had no funds. He was indicted for five counts of transporting stolen vehicles across state lines, 18 U.S.C. 2312, and pled guilty to one count in exchange for the government’s agreement to recommend that the court calculate loss amount based only on checks returned on four bank accounts involved in the purchase of the vehicles; recommend a five‐year prison sentence; and not oppose Rachuy’s request for the return of his property held by authorities. The district court rejected the parties’ recommendation, sentenced him to 90 months’ imprisonment based on its determination that he “is the epitome of a career offender.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the government breached the plea agreement: by referencing Rachuy’s lengthy criminal history, by failing to recommend that his loss amount be based solely on the checks used to purchase the vehicles charged in the superseding indictment; and by reminding the court that it did not have the power to command local and state authorities to release Rachuy’s property.View "United States v. Rachuy" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit health care fraud and three counts of health care fraud. On appeal, defendants challenged their sentences. The court held that, in health care fraud cases, the amount billed to an insurer shall constitute prima facie evidence of intended loss for sentencing purposes. If not rebutted, this evidence shall constitute sufficient evidence to establish the intended loss by a preponderance of the evidence. However, the parties may introduce additional evidence to support arguments that the amount billed overestimated or understated the defendant's intent. In this instance, the court vacated defendants' sentences on the issue of intended loss because the record left the court uncertain as to what the district court understood the law to be with respect to calculating intended loss for sentencing purposes and there was evidence suggesting that defendants may have been aware that Medicare only payed a fixed amount. When viewed in conjunction with the evidence that defendants were the only two named physicians on the clinic's sign, the documents were sufficient to support the district court's finding that Defendant Popov's bills to Medicare were foreseeable to Defendant Prakash. The court vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing.View "United States v. Popov" on Justia Law

Defendants-Appellants David Banks, Kendrick Barnes, Demetrius Harper, Clinton Stewart, Gary Walker, and David Zirpolo were convicted following a jury trial on multiple counts of mail fraud and wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud. Defendants contacted numerous staffing agencies to “assist in providing temporary services. Witnesses from multiple staffing companies testified that a Defendant (or someone acting as Defendants’ agent) approached them and expressed the desire for "payrolling" services. The staffing-company witnesses testified that they were induced into believing that Defendants’ companies were either doing business with major law-enforcement agencies or were on the verge of selling a specialized software to these agencies. These witnesses testified that Defendants (or Defendants’ agents) assured them that this alleged law-enforcement business would enable Defendants’ companies to pay the staffing companies’ invoices, and, critically, that they relied on these representations in choosing to do business with Defendants. Trial testimony from representatives of the law-enforcement agencies with whom Defendants claimed to be doing business revealed the falsity of Defendants’ representations to the staffing companies. When questioned about their failure to pay the staffing companies’ invoices, Defendants gave false assurances that payment would be forthcoming, and they continued to imply that they were doing business with large government law enforcement agencies. In the end, forty-two different staffing companies were left with outstanding invoices totaling in excess of $5,000,000, which could not be submitted to the government agencies, which had no business relationship with Defendants’ companies. Defendants were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from 87 to 135 months. Defendants argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit: (1) their right to a speedy trial was violated when the district court granted multiple continuances of the trial date (at Defendants’ request); (2) the district court compelled co-Defendant Barnes to testify in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and failed to give a proper curative instruction; (3) the district court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of two witnesses Defendants sought to call at trial; and (4) the cumulative effect of the district court’s otherwise harmless errors prejudiced them and required reversal. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Banks" on Justia Law

Williams pleaded guilty to misusing social security numbers, 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)(B), identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(7), making a false statement to an IRS agent, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2), and aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1). The district court used the guidelines in effect at sentencing to calculate his imprisonment range, sentencing him to 56 months’ imprisonment, in addition to 24 months imposed for aggravated identity theft. Because of an upward adjustment for involving more than 10 victims, his guidelines range was higher than it would have been if calculated under the guidelines in effect when Williams committed his crimes. The defense did not raise the issue at sentencing. While his case was on appeal the Supreme Court held that applying the guidelines in effect at sentencing violates the ex post facto clause if it raises the defendant’s imprisonment range. Because the trial judge did not say that he would have given the same sentence if the range had been lower, the Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law