Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Thiago de Souza Prado was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft. The scheme involved defrauding rideshare and food delivery companies by creating and using fraudulent accounts, and misappropriating the identities of third parties. Prado, who was ineligible to drive for these companies due to numerous driving infractions and his unauthorized status in the U.S., initially used fraudulent accounts created by others and later began creating and renting out his own fraudulent accounts. He obtained driver's license images and Social Security numbers from various sources, including associates and the dark web, and used software to spoof GPS information to inflate driver fees and generate fake referral rewards.The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts sentenced Prado to seventy months in prison. Prado appealed, challenging his convictions and sentence. He argued that he was prejudiced by an amendment to the third superseding indictment during trial and by the district court's refusal to disqualify the prosecution team. He also contended that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found no error in the district court's decision to allow the amendment of the indictment, as it did not alter the substance of the charges. The court also upheld the district court's finding that the wall separating Levy, a former defense attorney who joined the U.S. Attorney's Office, from the prosecution team had not been breached. Additionally, the court determined that any potential errors in calculating loss and Prado's criminal history were harmless, as the district court indicated it would have imposed the same sentence regardless.The First Circuit affirmed Prado's convictions and sentence, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion and that Prado's sentence was reasonable. View "United States v. De Souza Prado" on Justia Law

Two defendants, Hernán Lopez, a top executive at Twenty-First Century Fox, and Full Play Group, S.A., a South American sports marketing company, were convicted of conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud related to a FIFA corruption scandal. They were involved in bribery schemes to secure media rights for various soccer tournaments, including the Copa Libertadores, Copa América, and World Cup qualifiers. The government presented evidence that Full Play bribed officials from several South American soccer federations, while Lopez was implicated in a scheme involving T&T Sports Marketing, a joint venture of Fox and Torneos y Competencias, to secure undervalued media rights contracts through bribery.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York initially denied pre-trial motions to dismiss the indictment but later granted post-trial motions for acquittal under Rule 29(c). The district court reasoned that, following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Percoco v. United States and Ciminelli v. United States, the conduct did not fall within the scope of honest services wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1346, and the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court erred in its conclusion. The appellate court determined that the conduct of Lopez and Full Play did fall within the ambit of § 1346, as it involved bribery, which is a core application of the honest services fraud statute. The court noted that the fiduciary duties breached by the bribed officials were established by their relationships with FIFA and CONMEBOL, and these duties were informed by the organizations' codes of ethics. Consequently, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgments of acquittal and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Joff Stenn Wroy Philossaint pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering. These charges stemmed from his involvement in a scheme to fraudulently obtain Paycheck Protection Plan (PPP) and Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) loans. He was sentenced to 50 months in prison, followed by supervised release, and ordered to pay $3.85 million in restitution. Additionally, a forfeiture judgment of $673,210 was entered against him. On appeal, Philossaint contested the forfeiture amount, arguing it was miscalculated.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially handled the case. Philossaint pled guilty to the wire fraud and money laundering conspiracy charges, and the court accepted a factual proffer detailing his role in the fraudulent loan scheme. The presentence investigation report (PSI) provided additional details, including the specific companies involved and the amounts of the fraudulent loans. The government moved for a preliminary order of forfeiture, but miscalculated the amount by assuming Philossaint received a 10% kickback on every loan funded, which was incorrect.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had committed a clear error in determining the forfeiture amount due to the government's miscalculation. The correct amount of forfeiture should have been $549,226.30, based on the accurate figures of the loan proceeds and kickbacks Philossaint received. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the forfeiture order and remanded the case for further proceedings, noting that the district court did not make any factual findings about whether Philossaint was a leader or mastermind of the scheme, which could affect the forfeiture amount under the Honeycutt v. United States hypothetical. View "USA v. Philossaint" on Justia Law

Richard Evans, a former Captain in the Boston Police Department (BPD), was convicted of wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, federal programs theft, and conspiracy to commit federal programs theft. These charges stemmed from his submission of false claims for overtime pay and his involvement in a scheme to submit such claims. Evans and his subordinates falsely reported working four-hour overtime shifts, even when they worked fewer hours or when the Evidence Control Unit (ECU) was closed.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found Evans guilty on all counts after a five-day jury trial. He was sentenced to one year and one day of incarceration for each count, to be served concurrently, fined $15,000, and ordered to pay $17,390.99 in restitution. Evans appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the willful blindness instruction, and other aspects of the trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Evans' convictions for wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, finding that the willful blindness instruction was appropriate given the numerous "flags of suspicion" that Evans ignored. However, the court vacated Evans' convictions for federal programs theft and conspiracy to commit federal programs theft, concluding that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that the BPD received more than $10,000 in federal benefits during the relevant period, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 666(b). The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

Brian Fenner and Dennis Birkley were convicted of seventeen counts related to a fraud scheme involving the manipulation of Indiana’s mechanic’s lien statute. Fenner, who ran a towing company, and Birkley, who financed the operation, conspired to inflate the value of mechanic’s liens on vehicles and conducted sham auctions to obtain clean titles, which they then sold for profit. The scheme involved towing vehicles from across the country to Indiana, inflating lien values, and holding fake auctions at unreasonable hours to ensure no legitimate buyers attended. Birkley would then falsely claim to have purchased the vehicles at these auctions and apply for clean titles, which extinguished the creditors' interests.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana convicted both defendants on all counts. Fenner and Birkley were sentenced to 70 and 60 months in prison, respectively, and ordered to pay $49,045.84 in restitution. Fenner and Birkley appealed, arguing that the district court made several errors, including allowing improper testimony and violating Fenner’s Sixth Amendment rights by admitting Birkley’s unredacted statement to law enforcement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings. The court held that the testimony of the government witnesses was proper and that any potential errors were harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. The court also found no plain error in the admission of Birkley’s statement, as it was consistent with Fenner’s defense and did not significantly impact the jury’s verdict. Additionally, the court rejected Birkley’s ex post facto argument and upheld the restitution calculation, finding it supported by the evidence.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences of Fenner and Birkley. View "United States v. Birkley" on Justia Law

Robert Lanoue, a Canadian citizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States, pleaded guilty to submitting false claims to the government under 18 U.S.C. § 287. He operated a scuba school that was part of a government program funded by the post-9/11 GI Bill, which reimbursed him for teaching veterans. Lanoue admitted to submitting false and fraudulent claims, resulting in a loss of over $3 million to the Department of Veterans' Affairs. Following his conviction, the government initiated removal proceedings, arguing that his crime was an aggravated felony involving fraud or deceit with losses exceeding $10,000.The Immigration Judge found that Lanoue's crime met the criteria for an aggravated felony and denied his request for a waiver of inadmissibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld this decision, leading Lanoue to petition for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that Lanoue's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 287 categorically involved deceit, as the statute requires knowingly submitting false claims to the government. The court also found that the government had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the loss exceeded $10,000, based on Lanoue's stipulation and plea agreement indicating losses between $1.5 and $3.5 million.Lanoue's argument for a retroactive waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) was rejected. The court noted that to qualify for such a waiver, a lawful permanent resident must have been convicted or admitted to the crime at the time of reentry, which was not the case for Lanoue.The Third Circuit held that filing false claims under 18 U.S.C. § 287 is an aggravated felony involving deceit, and the government sufficiently proved the loss amount. Consequently, Lanoue is removable and ineligible for a waiver. The court denied his petition for review. View "Lanoue v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

Khemall Jokhoo was previously convicted by a jury of multiple offenses, including aggravated identity theft, impersonating a federal officer, and various fraud charges. His sentence was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. After serving his prison term, Jokhoo was found by the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota to have violated the conditions of his supervised release seven times within a month, leading to an additional one-year prison sentence.Jokhoo appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the findings that he failed to work regularly and held unapproved employment with fiduciary responsibilities. He also contended that his sentence was substantively unreasonable, claiming the district court imposed it with a focus on retribution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and found no error in the district court's determination that Jokhoo failed to work regularly. The court noted that Jokhoo worked only one day during the nearly month-long period and had ample time to secure employment during his pre-release period. The court dismissed Jokhoo's argument that he needed time to find a new job after being terminated, as he should have anticipated the job loss due to violating a supervised release condition.The appellate court also concluded that any potential error in finding that Jokhoo held unapproved employment with fiduciary responsibilities was harmless. The district court did not need this finding to revoke his supervised release, as other uncontested violations were sufficient. Additionally, the court found that the district court's mention of retribution did not affect Jokhoo's sentence, as the primary reason for the sentence was his repeated rule violations.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Khemall Jokhoo" on Justia Law

George Guldi, a former Suffolk County legislator and disbarred real estate attorney, conspired with his former girlfriend, Victoria Davidson, to deceive a mortgage servicer, Ditech Financial LLC, into wiring them $253,236. The funds did not belong to either of them. A jury convicted Guldi of wire fraud, bank fraud, and conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud. He was sentenced to 36 months of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York oversaw the trial. The jury found sufficient evidence to support the existence of a conspiracy, fraudulent intent, and aiding and abetting. The district court also found no reversible error in its jury instructions on conspiracy, wire fraud, and fraudulent intent. Additionally, the court properly considered Guldi’s medical needs during sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Guldi’s convictions, finding that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s findings and that the district court did not err in its jury instructions. However, the appellate court concluded that the district court erred in applying a two-offense-level enhancement under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for using “sophisticated means” to commit or conceal the offense. The appellate court determined that this procedural error rendered Guldi’s sentence procedurally unreasonable.As a result, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction but vacated and remanded Guldi’s sentence for resentencing consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Guldi" on Justia Law

Federal agents investigated a drug trafficking conspiracy in Fort Wayne, Indiana, using a confidential source to conduct controlled buys from Zachary Barnes. Barnes coordinated the sales, supplied methamphetamine, and directed his co-conspirator, Marquese Neal, to make deliveries. Neal testified that Barnes paid him in marijuana for his services. Barnes was arrested, and law enforcement found drugs and ammunition in his home.Barnes pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and to possess it with intent to distribute. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana applied a two-level enhancement under section 3B1.1(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines for Barnes' role as a manager or supervisor. This enhancement made Barnes ineligible for safety-valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), resulting in a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years. Barnes objected to the role enhancement and the denial of safety-valve relief, but the district court overruled his objections, finding Neal's testimony credible and supported by other evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's application of the role enhancement, agreeing that Barnes' actions—recruiting Neal, coordinating logistics, supplying drugs, and directing deliveries—fit the criteria for a manager or supervisor under section 3B1.1(c). The court also upheld the denial of safety-valve relief, as Barnes' supervisory role made him ineligible. The Seventh Circuit found no clear error in the district court's credibility determinations or factual findings and affirmed Barnes' ten-year sentence. View "United States v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Matthew A. Zayas was indicted on three counts of money laundering and one count of causing or attempting to cause a domestic financial institution to fail to file a currency transaction report under 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(1). After a jury trial, Zayas was acquitted of the money laundering counts but convicted of violating 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(1). The case involved Zayas making three cash withdrawals from his Wells Fargo account, each below the $10,000 reporting threshold, within a short period, which the government argued was an attempt to evade the bank's reporting requirements.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Zayas's motions for a mistrial and judgment of acquittal. Zayas argued that the government constructively amended the indictment by presenting evidence and arguments related to structuring under § 5324(a)(3) instead of the charged § 5324(a)(1). The district court also provided jury instructions that included a definition of "structuring," which Zayas contended was inappropriate for the charge under § 5324(a)(1).The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court held that the government's evidence was consistent with a violation of § 5324(a)(1), as it demonstrated that Zayas made multiple withdrawals exceeding $10,000 in one business day, triggering the bank's duty to file a currency transaction report. The court found that the district court's jury instructions, while including a definition of "structuring," correctly conveyed the elements of § 5324(a)(1). The court also determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in responding to a jury question during deliberations by referring the jury back to the original instructions, which accurately stated the law. View "USA v. Zayas" on Justia Law