Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant Derald Geddes was convicted by a jury of tax obstruction, tax evasion, and three counts of willfully filing false tax returns in the years 2011, 2012, and 2013. He was sentenced to five years in prison, three years of supervised release, and ordered to pay about $1.8 million in restitution. On appeal, he argued: (1) restitution was impermissibly ordered to begin during his imprisonment; (2) 16 conditions of supervised release not pronounced orally at sentencing improperly appeared in the written judgment; and (3) one of those 16 conditions, the risk notification to third parties condition, was invalid under United States v. Cabral, 926 F.3d 687 (10th Cir. 2019). After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s imposition of restitution to the extent it was ordered to be paid outside the term of supervised release and remanded for the court to modify the written judgment. The Court affirmed the district court’s imposition of the mandatory conditions of supervised release in the written judgment and reversed the imposition of the discretionary standard conditions of supervised release. The case was remanded for the district court to conform the written judgment to what was orally pronounced in a manner consistent with the Tenth Circuit's opinion. View "United States v. Geddes" on Justia Law

Hansen promised hundreds of noncitizens a path to U.S. citizenship through “adult adoption,” earning nearly $2 million from his fraudulent scheme. The government charged Hansen under 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), which forbids “encourag[ing] or induc[ing] an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such [activity] is or will be in violation of law.” The Ninth Circuit found Clause (iv) unconstitutionally overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment.The Supreme Court reversed. Because 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) forbids only the purposeful solicitation and facilitation of specific acts known to violate federal law, the clause is not unconstitutionally overbroad. A statute is facially invalid under the overbreadth doctrine if it “prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech” relative to its “plainly legitimate sweep.” Here, Congress used “encourage” and “induce” as terms of art referring to criminal solicitation and facilitation (capturing only a narrow band of speech) not as those terms are used in ordinary conversation. Criminal solicitation is the intentional encouragement of an unlawful act, and facilitation—i.e., aiding and abetting—is the provision of assistance to a wrongdoer with the intent to further an offense’s commission. Neither requires lending physical aid; both require an intent to bring about a particular unlawful act. The context of these words and statutory history indicate that Congress intended to refer to their well-established legal meanings. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) reaches no further than the purposeful solicitation and facilitation of specific acts known to violate federal law and does not “prohibi[t] a substantial amount of protected speech” relative to its “plainly legitimate sweep.” View "United States v. Hansen" on Justia Law

Susan Coons appealed a criminal judgment finding her guilty of forgery. During jury selection, the district court informed the jury panel that the potential jurors had the option to speak with the court “in private” in a separate room if they had information to share that might be embarrassing or intrusive. After general questioning of the panel, the court, Coons, the attorneys for both Coons and the State, and an officer met in a private room and conducted individual questioning of three prospective jurors on the record. Coons argued on appeal that this procedure for individual questioning constituted a trial closure and violated her right to public trial. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court’s findings were sufficient to show an overriding interest but that the court’s limited consideration of the scope of closure and failure to consider alternatives to closure were erroneous. "Although the court identified one interest that may support closure, it did not narrowly tailor to that interest." The Court concluded this error was obvious error and the judgment was reversed. View "North Dakota v. Coons" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed his criminal convictions for forty-two counts of prescribing a controlled substance without a legitimate medical purpose under 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a) and two counts of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. Section 1957. Appellant argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him. He contends that each of his actual patients included in the indictment, despite the fact that they were ultimately pill-seekers addicted to oxycodone, had real ailments to which he properly responded in good faith, and the government did not prove otherwise. He also argues that the two undercover DEA agents presented real MRIs with real injuries, leading Appellant to believe he was treating them appropriately.   The DC Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s judgment of conviction and sentencing. The court held that the evidence at trial was sufficient to convict Appellant, and the court affirmed the district court on its Napue and expert testimony rulings. However, the court reversed the district court on its Brady decision and remand this case for a new trial due to the government’s suppression of the favorable and material Pryor Reports and CCN Report. The court explained that although the Brady error is dispositive of this appeal, the remand will open the possibility of a new trial, and Appellant’s remaining arguments as to the evidentiary questions in the case are likely to arise again on retrial. View "USA v. Ivan Robinson" on Justia Law

Defendant, a physician assistant, evaluated patients and prescribed their physical therapy. The clinics where Defendant worked then billed the patients' health insurance both for the evaluations and for the subsequent physical therapy. The problem—for Defendant and for the health-insurance company—was that the “patients” didn’t really need the physical therapy and didn’t actually receive any treatment. When the health insurance company grew suspicious of the abnormally high rate of physical-therapy prescriptions from the clinics, it cooperated with an FBI investigation into the clinics. That investigation led a grand jury to indict Defendant on eight healthcare fraud-related charges. After a trial, a jury convicted Defendant on three counts. On appeal, Defendant raised several challenges to his conviction—sufficiency, evidentiary, and instructional—and to his sentence.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that sufficient evidence allowed the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knew the bills were fraudulent. Moreover, the court wrote that the minimal leading questions Defendant points to here do not allow Defendant to overcome the overwhelming evidence of his guilt at trial. Moreover, the court reasoned that here, the district court sentenced Defendant to 48 months— below his Guidelines range of 51–63 months. Given that Defendant had previously participated in very similar schemes, been investigated by the Florida regulatory board for similar conduct, and had attempted to defraud the victim of millions of dollars, the court could not say that the 48-month sentence the district court imposed—slightly below the Guidelines range—was an abuse of discretion. View "USA v. Carlos Alfredo Verdeza" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to participate in racketeering activity. In the plea agreement, Defendant and the government agreed, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), that a sentence of 360 months imprisonment was appropriate. However, Defendant also filed a sentencing memorandum arguing that the district court should depart or vary downwards by 60- months from the agreed-upon 360-month sentence to account for five years that Defendant was detained in administrative segregation prior to his plea. The district court accepted Defendant’s plea, which bound the district court under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) to sentence Defendant to the agreed-upon sentence. The district court sentenced Defendant at the same hearing to the 360-month term of imprisonment specified in the plea agreement. Before doing so, the district court denied Defendant’s request for the 60-month downward variance. On appeal, Defendant argued that his 360-month sentence is unreasonable because the district court failed to properly “account for the five years of solitary confinement” that Defendant endured before his rearraignment.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that at the sentencing hearing, the district court noted Defendant’s motion for a downward variance based on his time spent in administrative segregation and denied the motion because of “the defendant’s role in the offense.” Given Defendant’s involvement in attempted and completed murders in the course of the racketeering conspiracy, the court wrote that it cannot say that the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. Moreover, Defendant’s argument on appeal ignores that he got the benefit of his bargain with the government. View "USA v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Theopalis Gregory, a former City of Wilmington Council President and Delaware lawyer, was convicted by jury for official misconduct. The charges stemmed from a $40,000 discretionary grant Gregory earmarked for his non-profit organization before leaving office. He personally received at least $15,000 of the grant after he left office. On appeal, Gregory argued the jury instructions were flawed because the trial judge did not define for the jury “official functions,” a necessary element of an official-misconduct conviction. He also argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction because he was not performing official functions when he earmarked funds for his nonprofit. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Gregory’s conviction: Gregory did not object to the jury instructions, and the trial judge did not plainly err when he instructed the jury using the words of the statute. Further, the Court was satisfied that the jury had more than sufficient evidence to find that Gregory was performing official functions when he earmarked the $40,000. View "Gregory v. Delaware" on Justia Law

According to the indictment, Defendant, a citizen of Switzerland and a partner in a Swiss wealth-management firm, and co-Defendant, a citizen of Portugal and Switzerland and an employee of a different Swiss wealth-management firm (together, “Defendants”), engaged in an international bribery scheme wherein U.S.-based businesses paid bribes to Venezuelan officials for priority payment of invoices and other favorable treatment from Venezuela’s state-owned energy company. A grand jury returned a nineteen-count indictment charging Defendants with various offenses stemming from their alleged international bribery scheme. The district court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that the district court’s grant of Defendants’ motions to dismiss was improper because the indictment adequately conforms to minimal constitutional standards. Further, the indictment did not violate co-Defendant’s due process rights. Moreover, the court wrote the district court’s conclusion that Section 3292 failed to toll the statute of limitations is erroneous. The court explained that the totality of the circumstances indicates that a reasonable person in co-Defendant’s position would not have equated the restraint on his freedom of movement with formal arrest. View "USA v. Murta" on Justia Law

The Hagens (Leah and Michael) were convicted by a jury of conspiring to defraud the United States and to pay and receive health care kickbacks. Each was sentenced to 151 months of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release, plus restitution. Both Hagens appealed, arguing that the district court erred in excluding evidence, refusing to instruct the jury on an affirmative defense, and imposing a sentencing enhancement and restitution.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Hagens' convictions and sentences. The court found that the excluded evidence, which consisted of witness testimony, was irrelevant and cumulative. Thus, the district court did not err in excluding it. Even if the exclusion of the evidence wasn't warranted, the court determined that any error below was harmless.The court also held that the Hagans failed to put sufficient evidence forward justifying their requested jury charge on the safe-harbor affirmative defense. Finally, the court rejected the Hagens' claim that the lower court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement for the couple's "sophisticated money laundering scheme." The court explained that evidence suggested the Hagens manipulated their wire transfer payments to conceal the kickback scheme, which justified the enhancement. View "USA v. Hagen" on Justia Law

Appellant Mark Dunham, was a door-to-door salesman for Capital Connect. On or about June 15, 2016, Appellant rang the doorbell of Eloise Moody, an 81- year-old lady recently widowed and diagnosed with cancer. When Moody answered, Appellant pointed at the “Central Security Group” alarm sign in Moody’s front yard and said: “I’m here to update your security.” Appellant also said, referring to the Central Security Group sign, “I’ll put a light on it, make it visible from the street” which he explained would be helpful to “update the neighborhood.” Appellant was not wearing a uniform or name tag and did not say what company he worked for. Moody, therefore, understood Appellant to be employed by her alarm company (Central) and that he was intending to place a light on the sign in her front yard. Appellant managed to gain access to Moody's home and convinced her to cancel her existing security contract and enter a five-year agreement with Capital Security at a higher cost. Appellant was charged with deceptive business practices to which he pled not guilty. A jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to one year in jail. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction and whether the jury charge erroneously authorized a non-unanimous verdict. Based on its construction of Texas Penal Code § 32.42(b), and its review of the record, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the Court agreed with the court of appeals on both points: (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; and (2) jury unanimity was not required on the specific manner and means of the offense because it was not an “essential element” of the offense. View "Dunham v. Texas" on Justia Law