Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Matthew Mazur appealed his third sentencing for multiple criminal offenses arising out of a fraudulent investment scheme. The sole issue raised on appeal of his reduced 23-year prison sentence was that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss a five-year white-collar enhancement for loss greater than $500,000. Mazur argued the trial court was required to dismiss this enhancement because its imposition “result[ed] in a sentence of greater than 20 years.” Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Mazur" on Justia Law

Seven codefendants appeal their various convictions stemming from a multi-million-dollar healthcare conspiracy involving surgery-referral kickbacks at Forest Park Medical Center in Dallas, Texas. They challenge convictions under the Anti-Kickback Statute (“AKS”), the Travel Act, and for money laundering. The defendants in this case are, with three exceptions, the surgeons whom Forest Park paid to direct surgeries to the hospital—Won, Rimlawi, Shah, and Henry. One exception is Forrest— she is a nurse. Another is Jacob—he ran Adelaide Business Solutions (Adelaide), a pass-through entity. The other is Burt—he was part of the hospital’s staff. Defendants raise many of the same issues on appeal, often adopting each other’s arguments.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that the state law at issue here is the Texas Commercial Bribery Statute (TCBS). Here, it does not matter if the physician was acquitted because there could still be sufficient evidence in the record that defendants “offer[ed]” a benefit in violation of the TCBS regardless of whether any physician accepted it.  Further, the court explained that even assuming no rational jury could have found a single conspiracy, the surgeons fail to show that this error “prejudiced their substantial rights.” Henry and Forrest do not raise this point at all. Won and Shah address it only briefly and fail to provide any record citations to support the proposition that “clear, specific, and compelling prejudice” resulted in an unfair trial. View "USA v. Shah" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a Section 2255 motion in the district court challenging her restitution order in a case in which Petitioner was convicted of wire fraud and aggravated identity theft. The district court dismissed the motion on the ground that restitution claims are not cognizable in a Section 2255 motion. Petitioner then filed a second-in-time Section 2255 motion asserting new grounds for relief. The district court denied it as an unauthorized second or successive motion filed in violation of 28 U.S.C. Section 2255(h). Pursuant to Circuit Rule 22-3(a), the district court referred the matter to this court, which opened the matter as an application for authorization to file a second or successive motion.
The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s s application for leave to file a second or successive motion. The panel held that the district court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s first motion constitutes an adjudication “on the merits” for purposes of the second-or-successive bar. The panel explained that when an initial petition or motion is dismissed because its claims cannot be considered by the court or do not otherwise establish a ground for habeas relief, regardless of their underlying merits, any later-filed petition or motion is second or successive. Accordingly, to the extent Petitioner's second motion raises claims that could have been adjudicated on the merits when she filed her first motion, that aspect of her second motion is second and successive for purposes of Section 2255(h). Because Petitioner has not argued or otherwise made a showing that she meets the requirements of Section 2255(h), the panel denied her application to file a second or successive motion. View "TONG V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" on Justia Law

Defendant, a California licensed attorney, challenged (1) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for transmitting extortionate communications in interstate commerce to sportswear leader Nike, attempted Hobbs Act extortion of Nike, and honest-services wire fraud of the client whom Defendant was purportedly representing in negotiations with Nike. Defendant further challenged the trial court’s jury instruction as to honest-services fraud and the legality of a $259,800.50 restitution award to Nike.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the trial evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for the two charged extortion counts because a reasonable jury could find that Defendant’s threat to injure Nike’s reputation and financial position was wrongful in that the multi-million-dollar demand supported by the threat bore no nexus to any claim of right. Further, the court held that the trial evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for honest-services fraud because a reasonable jury could find that Defendant solicited a bribe from Nike in the form of a quid pro quo whereby Nike would pay Defendant many millions of dollars in return for which Defendant would violate his fiduciary duty as an attorney. The court further explained that the district court did not exceed its authority under the MVRA by awarding restitution more than 90 days after initial sentencing, and Defendant has shown no prejudice from the delayed award. Finally, the court wrote that the MVRA applies in this case where Nike sustained a pecuniary loss directly attributable to those crimes as a result of incurring fees for its attorneys to attend the meeting demanded by Defendant at which he first communicated his extortionate threat. View "United States v. Avenatti" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of illegally structuring two separate land-sale contract payments of around $270,000 each. On appeal, Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Defendant asserts that the court should vacate his conviction due to a plainly erroneous jury instruction.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that in reviewing the record to determine how a jury might reasonably conclude that he structured deposits to avoid the $10,000 reporting requirement, it appears that Defendant made 22 cash deposits below $10,000 over seven days to satisfy the first payment. Then, Defendant made 38 cash deposits under $10,000 over the course of around seven and a half months to satisfy the second payment. there is sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions. The court explained that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, it concludes that a “reasonable construction of the evidence would have allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”   Further, the court concluded that the instructions properly listed the statutory elements for structuring in violation of 31 U.S.C. Section 5324(a)(3), and the jury concluded that the government satisfied its burden of proof on these points. That the government could not prove Bird intended to evade Form 4789 specifically does not undermine the soundness of the verdict. Finally, the court explained that Defendant and the government jointly proposed the jury instructions that the district court ultimately used. By supplying the instructions, Defendant invited any purported error. Consequently, the court declined to review his challenge to the jury's instructions. View "USA v. Zachary Bird" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason O’Donnell was a candidate for mayor of Bayonne, New Jersey in 2018. During the campaign, he allegedly accepted $10,000 in cash in a paper Baskin- Robbins bag from an individual. The State argued that in exchange for the money, defendant promised to appoint the individual as tax counsel for the city. The State charged defendant under the bribery statute. Defendant did not win the election. He contended the applicable statute did not apply to him because it did not cover candidates who accepted improper payments but were not elected. The trial court dismissed the indictment, finding that N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2(d) did not apply to defendant. The Appellate Division reversed. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed: the bribery statute applied to any “person” who accepts an improper benefit -- incumbents, candidates who win, and candidates who lose. The statute also expressly states that it is no defense to a prosecution if a person “was not qualified to act.” View "New Jersey v. O’Donnell" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Derald Geddes was convicted by a jury of tax obstruction, tax evasion, and three counts of willfully filing false tax returns in the years 2011, 2012, and 2013. He was sentenced to five years in prison, three years of supervised release, and ordered to pay about $1.8 million in restitution. On appeal, he argued: (1) restitution was impermissibly ordered to begin during his imprisonment; (2) 16 conditions of supervised release not pronounced orally at sentencing improperly appeared in the written judgment; and (3) one of those 16 conditions, the risk notification to third parties condition, was invalid under United States v. Cabral, 926 F.3d 687 (10th Cir. 2019). After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s imposition of restitution to the extent it was ordered to be paid outside the term of supervised release and remanded for the court to modify the written judgment. The Court affirmed the district court’s imposition of the mandatory conditions of supervised release in the written judgment and reversed the imposition of the discretionary standard conditions of supervised release. The case was remanded for the district court to conform the written judgment to what was orally pronounced in a manner consistent with the Tenth Circuit's opinion. View "United States v. Geddes" on Justia Law

Hansen promised hundreds of noncitizens a path to U.S. citizenship through “adult adoption,” earning nearly $2 million from his fraudulent scheme. The government charged Hansen under 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), which forbids “encourag[ing] or induc[ing] an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such [activity] is or will be in violation of law.” The Ninth Circuit found Clause (iv) unconstitutionally overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment.The Supreme Court reversed. Because 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) forbids only the purposeful solicitation and facilitation of specific acts known to violate federal law, the clause is not unconstitutionally overbroad. A statute is facially invalid under the overbreadth doctrine if it “prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech” relative to its “plainly legitimate sweep.” Here, Congress used “encourage” and “induce” as terms of art referring to criminal solicitation and facilitation (capturing only a narrow band of speech) not as those terms are used in ordinary conversation. Criminal solicitation is the intentional encouragement of an unlawful act, and facilitation—i.e., aiding and abetting—is the provision of assistance to a wrongdoer with the intent to further an offense’s commission. Neither requires lending physical aid; both require an intent to bring about a particular unlawful act. The context of these words and statutory history indicate that Congress intended to refer to their well-established legal meanings. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) reaches no further than the purposeful solicitation and facilitation of specific acts known to violate federal law and does not “prohibi[t] a substantial amount of protected speech” relative to its “plainly legitimate sweep.” View "United States v. Hansen" on Justia Law

Susan Coons appealed a criminal judgment finding her guilty of forgery. During jury selection, the district court informed the jury panel that the potential jurors had the option to speak with the court “in private” in a separate room if they had information to share that might be embarrassing or intrusive. After general questioning of the panel, the court, Coons, the attorneys for both Coons and the State, and an officer met in a private room and conducted individual questioning of three prospective jurors on the record. Coons argued on appeal that this procedure for individual questioning constituted a trial closure and violated her right to public trial. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court’s findings were sufficient to show an overriding interest but that the court’s limited consideration of the scope of closure and failure to consider alternatives to closure were erroneous. "Although the court identified one interest that may support closure, it did not narrowly tailor to that interest." The Court concluded this error was obvious error and the judgment was reversed. View "North Dakota v. Coons" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed his criminal convictions for forty-two counts of prescribing a controlled substance without a legitimate medical purpose under 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a) and two counts of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. Section 1957. Appellant argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him. He contends that each of his actual patients included in the indictment, despite the fact that they were ultimately pill-seekers addicted to oxycodone, had real ailments to which he properly responded in good faith, and the government did not prove otherwise. He also argues that the two undercover DEA agents presented real MRIs with real injuries, leading Appellant to believe he was treating them appropriately.   The DC Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s judgment of conviction and sentencing. The court held that the evidence at trial was sufficient to convict Appellant, and the court affirmed the district court on its Napue and expert testimony rulings. However, the court reversed the district court on its Brady decision and remand this case for a new trial due to the government’s suppression of the favorable and material Pryor Reports and CCN Report. The court explained that although the Brady error is dispositive of this appeal, the remand will open the possibility of a new trial, and Appellant’s remaining arguments as to the evidentiary questions in the case are likely to arise again on retrial. View "USA v. Ivan Robinson" on Justia Law