Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendants, Catherine Floyd and William Dion, were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States of payroll and income taxes and endeavoring to obstruct and impede the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions; (2) the district court did not err in failing to suppress certain evidence; (3) the district court did not err in denying Defendants’ motions for severance and in trying Defendants jointly with their coconspirator; (4) Defendants’ claim that the IRS’s failure to comply with the Federal Register Act engendered dismissal of some of the charges was without merit; and (5) the district court did not err in sentencing Dion. View "United States v. Dion" on Justia Law

Grimes, a former professor of engineering at Pennsylvania State University and the owner of three research companies, pled guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343; false statements, 18 U.S.C. 1001; and money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957, based on his fraudulent conduct involving federal science grants. The plea agreement in indicated that his advisory sentencing range under the USSG would be 41 to 51 months and contained a waiver of Grimes’s direct and collateral appeal rights. Grimes and his attorney signed acknowledgements that they had read the agreement and that the plea was voluntary. During his plea colloquy, Grimes discussed the agreement with the judge and acknowledged that no one could guarantee how the court would sentence him. The district court sentenced Grimes to 41 months’ imprisonment, at the bottom of the Guidelines range of 41 to 51 months. The Third Circuit rejected Grimes’s argument that his appellate waiver was not knowing and voluntary because it contained a waiver of his right to collaterally challenge his guilty plea, conviction, or sentence that did not exempt Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Grimes claimed that he could not have knowingly and voluntarily agreed to waive his appellate rights because his trial counsel faced an inherent, actual conflict of interest in negotiating and advising him on the waiver. View "United States v. Grimes" on Justia Law

Defendant Vicki Dillard Crowe was convicted by a jury on eight counts of mail fraud, and eight counts of wire fraud for her participation in a mortgage fraud scheme. The district court sentenced defendant to sixty months' imprisonment and was ordered her to make restitution. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in calculating the amount of loss associated with her crimes for purposes of U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b), and in denying her motion for new trial, which alleged ineffective assistance on the part of her trial counsel. Defendant's challenge to the district court's calculation of loss raised an issue of first impression for the Tenth Circuit: whether the concept of reasonable foreseeability applied to a district court’s calculation of the "credits against loss" under 2B1.1(b). The Court adopted the Second Circuit’s reasoning in "United States v. Turk," (626 F.3d 743 (2d Cir. 2010)), and held that the concept of reasonable foreseeability applies only to a district court's calculation of "actual loss" under 2B1.1(b), and not to its calculation of the "credits against loss." The Court affirmed defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Crowe" on Justia Law

The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case stemmed from a civil-enforcement action brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") against Defendant-Appellant Ralph Thompson, Jr., in connection with an alleged Ponzi scheme Thompson ran through his company, Novus Technologies, L.L.C. ("Novus"). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the SEC on several issues, including the issue of whether the instruments Novus sold investors were "securities." Thompson's single issue on appeal was that the district court ignored genuine disputes of material fact on the issue of whether the Novus instruments were securities, and that he was entitled to have a jury make that determination. After careful consideration, the Tenth Circuit concluded that under the test articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in "Reves v. Ernst & Young" (494 U.S. 56 (1990)), the district court correctly found that the instruments Thompson sold were securities as a matter of law. View "SEC v. Thompson" on Justia Law

After losing his job as a stockbroker and financial advisor and his accompanying health insurance, Appellant applied for and received subsidized health insurance for several years. Russell represented on each application that he had no income to report and was unemployed, but Appellant was working under the table during those years. After a government investigation and an ensuing jury trial, Appellant was convicted of making false statements in connection with the payment of health care benefits. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the jury instruction on the definition of willfulness was not error; (2) the government presented sufficient evidence that Appellant's false statements were material to support the conviction; (3) the district court did not err in excluding certain testimony as state-of-mind hearsay; and (4) neither the prosecutor's statements during closing arguments nor his questions in eliciting testimony from a witness necessitated reversal. View "United States v. Russell" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendants Salvatore DiMasi, the former Speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, and Richard McDonough, a lobbyist, were convicted of several crimes, including honest-services fraud and conspiracy to commit honest-services fraud, resulting from a scheme to funnel money to DiMasi in exchange for political favors. The district court sentenced DiMasi to ninety-six months' imprisonment and McDonough to eight-four months' imprisonment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendants' convictions; (2) the trial court did not prejudicially err in instructing the jury; (3) the trial court did not err in its challenged evidentiary rulings; and (4) the trial court did not err in sentencing Defendants. View "United States v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Defendants in this case were a Puerto Rico legislator and a Commonwealth businessman who were charged with unlawfully exchanging favorable action on legislation for a trip to Las Vegas to attend a prize fight. After a jury trial, Defendants were convicted of, inter alia, federal program bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. 666. Defendants appealed, contending, among other issues, that the district court erred in instructing the jury to find guilt on the section 666 counts based on a gratuity theory rather than a bribery theory. The First Circuit Court of appeals (1) vacated Defendants' section 666 convictions, holding that because section 666 does not criminalize gratuities in addition to bribes, the district court erred in its instructions; and (2) directed the district court to enter a judgment of acquittal on Defendants' conspiracy charges, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause entitled both men to acquittal on their respective conspiracy charges. View "United States v. Bravo-Fernandez" on Justia Law

The Comptroller is sole trustee and chooses investments for the employee pension fund of the state of New York and its local governments. The Comptroller’s general counsel recommended against investing in a fund managed by FA; the general counsel then received anonymous e-mails demanding that he recommend the investment and threatening to disclose information about the general counsel’s alleged affair. Some of the e-mails were traced to the home computer of Sekhar, a managing partner of FA, who was convicted of attempted extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a). The Act defines “extortion” as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.” The jury specified that the property at issue was the general counsel’s recommendation to approve the investment. The Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. Attempting to compel a person to recommend that his employer approve an investment does not constitute “the obtaining of property from another” under the Hobbs Act. Congress generally intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses. Extortion historically required the obtaining of items of value, typically cash, from the victim. The Act’s text requires not only deprivation, but the acquisition of property; the property, therefore, must be transferable. No fluent English-speaker would say that “petitioner obtained and exercised the general counsel’s right to make a recommendation,” any more than he would say that a person “obtained and exercised another’s right to free speech.” View "Sekhar v. United States" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of seventeen counts of mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and aggravated identity theft. Appellant appealed, arguing (1) the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him by admitting testimony of a forensic examiner about another examiner's prior examination; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his aggravated identity theft convictions. The First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Appellant's convictions on all counts, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty of aggravated identity theft; and (2) the district court did not plainly err in admitting the testimony of the forensic examiner about the conclusions in another examiner's report, as the statements did not affect Appellant's substantial rights. View "United States v. Soto" on Justia Law

The government alleged Defendant-Appellant Richard Clark, along with other co-conspirators, manipulated shares of several penny-stocks by using false and backdated documents to make those shares publically tradable, then coordinated the trading among themselves to create the false appearance of an active market for those shares. The shares were sold after the prices surged. The conspirators laundered the proceeds through multiple bank accounts and nominees (a "pump-and-dump" scheme). Defendant was charged and convicted on multiple counts for his participation in the scheme. He appealed his conviction to the Tenth Circuit, arguing: (1) the pretrial placement of a caveat on his property violated his constitutional rights; (2) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; (3) the district court erred in refusing to appoint additional or substitute counsel better versed in complex securities issues; (4) the district court erred by failing to sever his case from his co-conspirator's; and (5) his rights under the Speedy Trial Act were violated by a fourteen-month delay between filing of the indictment and the start of trial. The Tenth Circuit addressed each of Defendant's contentions in its opinion, but found no discernible error. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law