Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Michael Reeder appealed a Court of Appeals decision affirming his conviction on 14 counts of securities fraud and 14 counts of theft in the first degree. He argued: (1) subpoenas duces tecum issued by a special inquiry judge (SIJ) to financial institutions for Reeder's private bank records violated his constitutional rights under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution; and (2) his sentence violated principles of double jeopardy because the trial court imposed multiple punishments for the same offense. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Reeder's conviction and sentence. View "Washington v. Reeder" on Justia Law

Defendants-appellants James Riley and Ryan Robinson appealed their convictions on three counts each of commercial bribery. The charges were based on the premise that Riley, who was the insurance broker for Pechanga Resort and Casino, paid bribes to Robinson, who was the chief financial officer of the casino, in order to permit Riley to charge excessive fees for insurance products he obtained for the casino. On appeal, defendants argued that there was insufficient evidence that they acted “corruptly” (i.e., with the specific intent to injure or defraud Robinson’s employer, as required by the statute). They also argued, in response to the Court of Appeal's request for supplemental briefing, that there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions on two of the counts against each of them because the evidence showed that as of the date of those charged offenses, Robinson was no longer employed by Pechanga Resort and Casino. The Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence that Robinson was not employed by Pechanaga Resort and Casino as of the dates alleged in counts 6 through 9 compelled reversal of the defendants’ convictions on those counts. However, the Court also concluded that there was substantial evidence to support their convictions on counts 4 and 5. View "California v. Riley" on Justia Law

From 2002 to 2007, Defendant-appellant Jerold Sorensen, an oral surgeon in California, concealed his income from the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and underpaid his income taxes by more than $1.5 million. He used a “pure trust” scheme, peddled by Financial Fortress Associates (“FFA”), in which he deposited his dental income into these trusts without reporting all of it to the IRS as income. Over the years, he also retitled valuable assets in the trusts’ names. In 2013, after a series of proffers, the government charged him with violating 26 U.S.C. 7212(a) for corruptly endeavoring to obstruct and impede the due administration of the internal-revenue laws. A jury convicted him of the charged offense. On appeal, Sorensen argued his conduct amounted to evading taxes so it was exclusively punishable under a different statute; that the prosecution misstated evidence in its closing rebuttal argument; and (7) cumulative error. Furthermore, he argued the district court erred: (2) by refusing his offered jury instruction requiring knowledge of illegality; (3) by giving the government’s deliberate-ignorance instruction; (4) by instructing the jury that it could convict on any one means alleged in the indictment; and (5) by refusing to allow him to provide certain testimony from a witness in surrebuttal. Finding no merit to any of these contentions, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Sorensen's conviction. View "United States v. Sorensen" on Justia Law

The government successfully prosecuted defendant-appellant Joseph Kupfer in two trials, alleging Kupfer and his wife conspired to enable Dr. Armando Gutierrez (a media consultant) to increase his compensation under a State contract without any additional work. In exchange for the increase, Gutierrez allegedly gave kickbacks to Kupfer through Kupfer’s consulting company. The government alleged that Gutierrez had disguised the kickbacks as payments for Kupfer’s work on a separate media campaign involving voter awareness. In the first trial, the jury found Kupfer and his wife guilty of tax evasion. In the second trial, the jury found Kupfer guilty of stealing and participating in a conspiracy to steal federal government property with Gutierrez. The district court entered a judgment of conviction for these crimes and sentenced Kupfer to ten years in prison. Kupfer appeals the conviction and sentence on all counts. After review, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error as to Kupfer's conviction. The Court did concluded that the district court miscalculated the sentence, reversed and remanded for resentencting. View "United States v. Kupfer" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Calhoun (and two co-conspirators) prematurely sought to appeal a district court order denying his motion to quash the indictment against them. The 60-count indictment arose out of Defendant’s grand jury testimony. In it, Defendant was charged with 50 counts of mail and wire fraud and conspiracy to commit the same. Absent a “final decision,” the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for want of subject matter jurisdiction. On remand, Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the Government, whereby Defendant pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire or mail fraud and reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to quash. The district court sentenced Defendant to five years probation. The court did not impose a fine or order restitution. Defendant again appealed, arguing that a “division of loyalties,” i.e., conflict of interest, on the part of his retained counsel prompted his incriminating grand jury testimony, thus tainting the indictment. Specifically, Defendant asserted that his criminal counsel, Tom Mills (hired and paid by Texas Capital Bank on the recommendation of his civil counsel Larry Friedman) encouraged Defendant to incriminate himself before the grand jury for the purpose of assisting the Bank in its efforts to overturn a $65 million civil judgment related to the scheme. Defendant says the conflict rendered his criminal counsel ineffective in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, thereby requiring suppression of his grand jury testimony and quashing of the indictment. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. "Precedent, both our own and that of the Supreme Court, provides us no alternative but to recognize that Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not attach until August 15, 2012, the date he was formally charged by way of indictment. Unfortunately for Defendant, his right to counsel claim centers on his counsel’s conduct prior to that date. Defendant has no remedy without a right. [. . .] Sure, Defendant did not want to be indicted . . . But the Government made no such promise." Defendant acknowledged at the hearing on his motion to quash that "'after I had given substantial help, then I would be granted probation.' Defendant understood this to mean 'a deal had been made and I would get probation at worst.' Then, after the prosecutor advised him that he would receive a downward departure for his assistance, Defendant testified before the grand jury. Defendant may not have received the deal he had hoped for, but he undoubtedly received the deal he expected." View "United States v. Calhoun" on Justia Law

King pled guilty in Arkansas state court to 1,577 counts of forgery and theft of property for embezzling more than $700,000 from the school district where she worked. The court sentenced King to 80 years imprisonment, within the guidelines range. King had no criminal history and claims she accepted the plea because of threats that her husband and son would also be charged. Five months later, the court reduced King’s sentence to 20 years imprisonment, under Arkansas Code 16-90-111, which allows a trial court to “correct an illegal sentence at any time” or to “correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within . . . ninety (90) days after the sentence is imposed.” The state appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court, which reinstated King’s 80-year sentence, finding the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the reduction because the 90-day period for doing so had expired. King sought federal habeas relief. Although the district court was clearly sympathetic, it found no grounds for habeas relief. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that King is not entitled to habeas relief based on her disagreement with the Arkansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of Arkansas law. View "King v. Kelley" on Justia Law

King pled guilty in Arkansas state court to 1,577 counts of forgery and theft of property for embezzling more than $700,000 from the school district where she worked. The court sentenced King to 80 years imprisonment, within the guidelines range. King had no criminal history and claims she accepted the plea because of threats that her husband and son would also be charged. Five months later, the court reduced King’s sentence to 20 years imprisonment, under Arkansas Code 16-90-111, which allows a trial court to “correct an illegal sentence at any time” or to “correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within . . . ninety (90) days after the sentence is imposed.” The state appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court, which reinstated King’s 80-year sentence, finding the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the reduction because the 90-day period for doing so had expired. King sought federal habeas relief. Although the district court was clearly sympathetic, it found no grounds for habeas relief. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that King is not entitled to habeas relief based on her disagreement with the Arkansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of Arkansas law. View "King v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Leslie Camick was convicted of mail fraud, wire fraud, making a material false statement to the U.S. Patent Office, three counts of aggravated identity theft, and obstruction of justice, all stemming from his unlawful use of his deceased brother’s name and identity. Following his conviction and sentencing, defendant was ordered to pay restitution. On appeal, he argued the evidence was insufficient to convict him on each count. He also challenged the district court’s restitution determination. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit reversed defendant's convictions for mail fraud, wire fraud, material false statement, and aggravated identity theft, as well as portions of the restitution award, finding that the evidence presented at trial was indeed insufficient to support those charges. But the Court affirmed the conviction for obstruction of justice. View "United States v. Camick" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Leslie Camick was convicted of mail fraud, wire fraud, making a material false statement to the U.S. Patent Office, three counts of aggravated identity theft, and obstruction of justice, all stemming from his unlawful use of his deceased brother’s name and identity. Following his conviction and sentencing, defendant was ordered to pay restitution. On appeal, he argued the evidence was insufficient to convict him on each count. He also challenged the district court’s restitution determination. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit reversed defendant's convictions for mail fraud, wire fraud, material false statement, and aggravated identity theft, as well as portions of the restitution award, finding that the evidence presented at trial was indeed insufficient to support those charges. But the Court affirmed the conviction for obstruction of justice. View "United States v. Camick" on Justia Law

Katherine Fleming was indicted on two counts of identity fraud and two counts of financial transaction fraud. She entered a negotiated guilty plea, which allowed for deferred sentencing and participation in a drug court program. Her plea agreement specified that she would be sentenced to eight years of probation if she completed the drug court program, but she would be sentenced to ten years, with the first four to be served in prison and the remaining six to be served on probation, including residential substance abuse treatment, if she failed to complete the program. The agreement also provided that she would make restitution payments under either scenario. After more than two years in the program, Fleming was terminated from the drug court program for failure to comply with its rules. Consistent with the plea agreement, the trial court then imposed a ten-year sentence, the first four to be served in prison and the remaining six to be served on probation, including residential substance abuse treatment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine under what circumstances a defendant may receive sentence credit for participation in a drug court program established under OCGA 15-1-15. After that review, the Court held that no sentence credit for participation in a drug court program was warranted in this particular case. View "Fleming v. Georgia" on Justia Law