Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Matthew Williams of bank fraud and aggravated identity theft. He appealed, arguing the evidence against him was insufficient. Williams began a mortgage loan application at Pulaski Bank (the “bank”) using his father’s personal and financial information and his status as a Purple Heart veteran. After his father received the application packet in the mail, he called the bank to explain he had not applied for a loan. The bank referred the matter to law enforcement, but continued to work with Williams to process the loan and obtain additional documents to clarify the applicant’s identity. The bank sent Williams a notice of incompleteness because it lacked several required documents, signatures, and a photo identification. In response, Williams provided some of the required documents to the bank, including a fake earnings statement and a letter expressing his intent to proceed with the loan. The bank sent a final notice of incompleteness to Williams. Williams did not respond, and the bank closed his application file. Mr. Williams argues his misrepresentations on the incomplete application could not support a bank fraud conviction because they (1) were not material to the bank’s decision to issue him a loan; and (2) did not impose a risk of loss on the bank. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Matthew Williams of bank fraud and aggravated identity theft. He appealed, arguing the evidence against him was insufficient. Williams began a mortgage loan application at Pulaski Bank (the “bank”) using his father’s personal and financial information and his status as a Purple Heart veteran. After his father received the application packet in the mail, he called the bank to explain he had not applied for a loan. The bank referred the matter to law enforcement, but continued to work with Williams to process the loan and obtain additional documents to clarify the applicant’s identity. The bank sent Williams a notice of incompleteness because it lacked several required documents, signatures, and a photo identification. In response, Williams provided some of the required documents to the bank, including a fake earnings statement and a letter expressing his intent to proceed with the loan. The bank sent a final notice of incompleteness to Williams. Williams did not respond, and the bank closed his application file. Mr. Williams argues his misrepresentations on the incomplete application could not support a bank fraud conviction because they (1) were not material to the bank’s decision to issue him a loan; and (2) did not impose a risk of loss on the bank. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Sixth Circuit upholds allowing jury questions in online extortion case.Using the pseudonym “Dr. Evil,” an extortionist demanded $1 million in Bitcoin in exchange for an encryption key to Mitt Romney’s unreleased tax returns, which he claimed to have stolen from an accounting firm. He posted an image of Mike Myers’s Dr. Evil, from an Austin Powers movie, in the accounting firm’s Franklin, Tennessee office lobby. Agents traced the scheme to Brown, who had not actually stolen Romney’s returns. With 12 convictions for wire fraud and extortion, Brown was given a four-year prison sentence, and ordered to pay restitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction, rejecting arguments that the search warrant lacked probable cause and that Brown was prejudiced by the judge allowing questions from the jury. The affidavit offered “a fair probability” that Brown’s home would contain evidence of the crime. Understanding the evidence required the jury to grasp the Secret Service’s forensic analysis of thumb drives, online posts, and Brown’s computers, Bitcoin, fingerprint matching, and digital photo manipulation-- enough complexity for a court to believe that permitting questions might aid jurors. The court vacated the sentence. Brown’s statements to prosecutors did not significantly impede the investigation, to justify the obstruction of justice enhancement. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the parties asked the Court of Appeal to determine the value of a blank check for the purpose of distinguishing between misdemeanor and felony receiving stolen property after passage of the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47). Respondent Angela Vandiver pled guilty in 2012 to a single felony count of receiving stolen property based on her possession of blank checks she knew had been stolen. She later petitioned to have the conviction redesignated a misdemeanor under the new provisions of Proposition 47 on the ground the checks were worth $950 or less. The State opposed, arguing the balance of the victim’s checking account was greater than $950. The trial court found the value of the blank checks to be de minimis and granted the petition. The State argued on appeal the court erred by: (1) reaching the merits because Vandiver did not attach evidence of value to her petition; and (2) determining the checks’ value was de minimis. The State contended the court should have dismissed the petition as unsupported or found the checks were worth the full amount in the linked checking account and denied the petition on the merits. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Vandiver" on Justia Law

Petitioner Austin Veith pleaded guilty to theft and securities fraud. He asked the trial court to sentence him to probation instead of a term of incarceration. The trial court rejected his request for probation with no incarceration and sentenced Veith to ten years of incarceration on the theft count, and twenty-five years of probation on the securities fraud count. Veith did not object when the judge announced his sentence.  But, he did not sign the probation order acknowledging and accepting the terms and conditions of his sentence of probation. Instead, he filed a motion to correct his sentence pursuant to Crim. P. 35(a), arguing that the probationary portion of his sentence must be vacated because he did not consent to it. The trial court denied the motion, and Veith appealed.  The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that Veith had consented to the terms and conditions of the sentence of probation by requesting probation prior to the hearing, but that his consent did not include certain terms of probation added by the court. As a result, the court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court to remove the terms of probation from his sentence that Veith had not requested before sentencing.I t did not order any modification of the prison sentence. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the legality of Veith’s sentence of probation, and reversed the appellate court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that a trial court cannot impose a sentence of probation without the defendant’s consent. In this case, Veith consented to probation in lieu of incarceration; therefore, the trial court exceeded the scope of Veith’s consent when it imposed a ten-year sentence of incarceration in addition to probation. The trial court lacked authority to impose the sentence of probation.  Accordingly, the Court vacated Veith’s sentence in its entirety, reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, and remanded the case to that court to return the case to the trial court for resentencing consistent with Veith’s plea agreement. View "Veith v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Respondent Angela Vandiver pled guilty in 2012 to a single felony count of receiving stolen property based on her possession of blank checks she knew had been stolen. She later petitioned to have the conviction redesignated a misdemeanor under the new provisions of Proposition 47 on the ground the checks were worth $950 or less. The State opposed, arguing the balance of the victim’s checking account was greater than $950. The trial court found the value of the blank checks to be de minimis and granted the petition. The State contended the court erred by: (1) reaching the merits because Vandiver did not attach evidence of value to her petition; and (2) determining the checks’ value was de minimis. The State contended the trial court should have dismissed the petition as unsupported or found the checks were worth the full amount in the linked checking account and denied the petition on the merits. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "California v. Vandiver" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Bruce Wright of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and of eleven counts of bank fraud arising from his participation in a scheme to submit false draw requests and invoices to obtain bank loans. The district court sentenced Wright to thirty-three months’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay over $1 million in restitution. Wright raised several issues on appeal, concerning jury instructions, withheld impeachment evidence, and bank loss and restitution amounts. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

Former DeKalb County Chief Executive Officer W. Burrell Ellis, Jr. was indicted in 2013 on fifteen counts of attempted extortion and other acts of alleged corruption. He was re=indicted in early 2014 on thirteen counts relating to attempted extortion, theft, coercion, bribery and perjury. The first indictment was nolle prossed, and his first trial ended in a mistrial. Ellis was retried in 2015 on nine counts: four counts of attempt to commit theft by extortion, three counts of perjury, one count of bribery and one count of theft by extortion. The extortion charge came from Ellis' alleged attempt to procure a $2500 political campaign contribution from a DeKalb County vendor by threatening to cut the vendor's contract with the County if the Vendor did not pay. The perjury charges stemmed from Ellis allegedly lying to a Special Purpose Grand Jury about his role in cutting the contract of the same DeKalb County vendor. On appeal, Ellis contended, among other things, that his rights to substantive due process and equal protection of the laws were violated based on the inapplicability of the former version of OCGA 45-11-4 to his case, and that the trial court erred with respect to various evidentiary matters at his trial. The Supreme Court found that, although the trial court properly concluded that the inapplicability of former OCGA 45-11-4 to Ellis’ case did not result in any violation of his constitutional rights, the Court nevertheless reversed Ellis’ convictions based on certain evidentiary errors that occurred at his trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part to allow for a retrial on the charges of criminal attempt to commit theft by extortion and perjury. View "Ellis v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael R. Veon, a twenty-two-year member and eventual Minority Whip of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, was entitled to $20,000 annually to cover business expenses associated with maintenance of a district office, as well as $4,000 for postage. Pursuant to House Democratic Caucus (“Caucus”) procedures, Veon could seek additional funds from Caucus leadership if he exhausted his $20,000 allocation, and it was not uncommon for Caucus members to do so. In 1991, Veon formed the Beaver Initiative for Growth (“BIG”), a non-profit corporation. BIG received all of its funding from public sources, primarily through the Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development (“DCED”). Veon's Beaver County district office initially shared space with BIG, but opened two more district offices, for which the rent easily exceeded his caucus allotment. Veon was criminally charged with various offenses relating to BIG paying the district offices' rents. After some charges were withdrawn, Veon went to trial on nineteen counts. In the portion of the jury charge that was relevant to Veon’s appeal to the Supreme Court, the trial court defined the pecuniary requirement in the conflict of interest statute. The statute prohibited public officials from leveraging the authority of their offices for “private pecuniary benefit;” at issue here was whether or not that benefit extended to what the trial court in this case referred to as “intangible political gain.” In addition, another issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Commonwealth could receive restitution following prosecution of a public official for a crime involving unlawful diversion of public resources. The Court concluded the trial court committed prejudicial error in its jury charge regarding conflict of interest, and that it erred in awarding restitution to the DCED. Veon's judgment of sentence was vacated, the matter remanded for a new trial on conflict of interest, and for other proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Veon" on Justia Law

Former FBI agent Robert Lustyik wanted to help his friend and business partner, Michael Taylor, in return for payment. Taylor owned American International Security Corporation (AISC), a company that offered security and defense contracting services. The Department of Defense awarded AISC a contract in 2007 to provide training and related services to Afghan Special Forces. In mid-2010, the United States began investigating AISC regarding fraud and money laundering in connection with the 2007 contract. In September 2011, the United States filed a civil forfeiture action against assets owned by Taylor and AISC, which resulted in the seizure of more than $5 million dollars from AISC’s bank account. Lustyik used his status as an FBI agent to impair the government’s investigation of Taylor, including attempting to establish Taylor as a confidential source. Lustyik was indicted on charges related to the obstruction of justice. Prior to trial, Lustyik pleaded guilty to all charges in the indictment without a plea agreement. After his plea, his lead counsel withdrew and Lustyik obtained new counsel. On the eve of sentencing, counsel sought an order allowing him to obtain security clearance to review classified material he believed might be relevant for sentencing. The district court, having previously reviewed the documents, deemed them irrelevant to the sentencing issues, denied the motion, and subsequently sentenced Lustyik to 120 months’ imprisonment. Lustyik argued on appeal that the district court’s order denying his counsel access to the classified materials violated his Sixth Amendment rights at sentencing. Finding that the district court’s decision was not presumptively prejudicial to Lustyik’s advocacy at sentencing, nor did the district court abuse its discretion in concluding the documents were not relevant for sentencing, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Lustyik" on Justia Law