Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

Rowena Joyce Scott served as both the president of the board and general manager of Park Southern Neighborhood Corporation (PSNC), a nonprofit that owned a large apartment building in Washington, D.C. During her tenure, Scott exercised near-total control over PSNC’s finances and operations. She used corporate funds for personal expenses, including luxury items and services, and made significant cash withdrawals from PSNC’s accounts. After PSNC defaulted on a loan, the District of Columbia’s Department of Housing and Community Development intervened, replacing Scott and the board with a new property manager, Vesta Management Corporation, which took possession of PSNC’s records and computers. Subsequent investigation by the IRS led to Scott’s indictment for wire fraud, credit card fraud, and tax offenses.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia presided over Scott’s criminal trial. Scott filed pre-trial motions to suppress statements made to law enforcement and evidence obtained from PSNC’s computers, arguing violations of her Fifth and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied both motions. After trial, a jury convicted Scott on all counts, and the district court sentenced her to eighteen months’ imprisonment, supervised release, restitution, and a special assessment. Scott appealed her convictions, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of her suppression motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Scott forfeited her statute of limitations defense by not raising it in the district court. It found the evidence sufficient to support all convictions, including wire fraud and tax offenses, and determined that Scott was not in Miranda custody during her interview with IRS agents. The court also concluded that the search warrant for PSNC’s computers was supported by probable cause, and that Vesta’s consent validated the search. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

Three former members of a religious organization alleged that the organization intentionally misrepresented its history and the use of member tithing payments. They claimed that, had they known the true facts, they would not have joined or contributed financially. The plaintiffs asserted two main theories under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO): first, that the organization’s leaders made fraudulent statements about the group’s history and beliefs that they did not sincerely hold; and second, that the organization misrepresented how tithing funds would be used, including using them for commercial purposes contrary to representations.The United States District Court for the District of Utah initially dismissed the complaint, finding that the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses and the church autonomy doctrine barred adjudication of claims requiring inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs. After amendments to the complaint, the district court allowed a RICO claim based on the tithing theory to proceed, viewing it as a secular dispute. However, after further amendments and additional plaintiffs, the district court ultimately dismissed all claims, holding that the church autonomy doctrine barred claims based on religious misrepresentations and that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead reliance or a pattern of predicate acts for the tithing-based RICO claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. It held that the church autonomy doctrine bars civil RICO claims premised on alleged misrepresentations about religious history or doctrine, as such claims would require courts to adjudicate ecclesiastical questions. Regarding the tithing theory, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege a causal link between the organization’s statements about tithing and their own financial contributions, as required for a civil RICO claim. The court therefore affirmed the dismissal of all claims. View "Gaddy v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus" on Justia Law

The case involves defendants Aghee William Smith II and David Alcorn, who were convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia for their roles in fraudulent schemes that defrauded investors of millions of dollars. The schemes included marketing and selling phony investments in a dental services marketing program and fraudulent spectrum investments. The fraudulent activities primarily targeted elderly victims, resulting in significant financial losses.In the district court, Smith and Alcorn were tried together before a jury in February 2022. They raised three main issues on appeal: a joint constitutional challenge to the district court’s COVID-19 trial protocol under the Public Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment, Smith’s separate challenge to the admission of videotaped depositions under the Confrontation Clause, and Alcorn’s challenge to the imposition of supervised release conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Smith and Alcorn’s joint contention that the COVID-19 trial protocol violated their rights under the Public Trial Clause, finding that the protocol did not constitute a partial courtroom closure and was justified by substantial public health reasons. The court also rejected Smith’s Confrontation Clause challenge, concluding that the government had made a good faith effort to secure the witnesses’ presence at trial and that the witnesses were unavailable due to health concerns.However, the court found merit in Alcorn’s challenge regarding the imposition of supervised release conditions. The district court had failed to properly incorporate the standard conditions of supervised release during the oral pronouncement of Alcorn’s sentence, leading to a Rogers error. As a result, the Fourth Circuit vacated Alcorn’s sentences and remanded for resentencing.In summary, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Smith’s convictions and sentences, affirmed Alcorn’s convictions, but vacated Alcorn’s sentences and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

The court case involves defendants Juan Alberto Ortiz-Orellana and Minor Perez-Chach, who were convicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering statute (VICAR). Ortiz and Perez were part of a gang known as MS-13 and were separately charged with murders related to their involvement in the gang in Maryland. Ortiz was also convicted of VICAR conspiracy to commit murder, discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and murder resulting from the same crime. Perez, on the other hand, was also convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and an alien in possession of a firearm and ammunition. Both defendants appealed their convictions and sentences.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the government seizure of historical cell site location information (CSLI) without a warrant did not violate the defendants' Fourth Amendment rights due to the good faith exception. The court also upheld the use of summary exhibits and denied the defendants' claim that their sentences were substantially unreasonable. The court agreed with Ortiz that his firearm convictions must be vacated because the underlying offenses for each VICAR count could not qualify as a "crime of violence" after a recent ruling. The court also rejected Ortiz's claim that his RICO and VICAR convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. As a result, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for resentencing on certain counts. View "US v. Ortiz-Orellana" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the drug-trafficking and money-laundering convictions of Benjamin Galecki and Charles Burton Ritchie for their distribution of "spice," a synthetic cannabinoid product. The defendants were found guilty of manufacturing and distributing spice through their company, Zencense Incenseworks, LLC. The drug-trafficking charges were based on the premise that the cannabinoid used, XLR-11, was treated as a controlled substance because it was an "analogue" of a listed substance. The court rejected the defendants' arguments that their convictions should be set aside due to Fourth Amendment violations, insufficient evidence, and vagueness of the Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986. However, the court reversed their mail and wire fraud convictions due to insufficient evidence. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "USA V. GALECKI" on Justia Law

Danial Curtis was convicted of the unauthorized use of personal identifying information. At trial, a bank teller testified Curtis entered the bank where she worked producing a check for cashing. The teller noticed several "red flags" on the check; her manager testified to noticing the same red flags. The manager contacted the account holder to inquire if the check was authorized; the account holder testified she had thrown out any checks she had remaining once she closed the account. Representing himself, Curtis called a friend who testified Curtis was not attempting to cash the check, but was only attempting to see if the check was valid. Based on the evidence presented, the district court found beyond a reasonable doubt Curtis willfully presented the check to cash, and found Curtis guilty of the unauthorized use of personal identifying information "to obtain money without the authorization of consent of the holder of the account, and the value of the money exceeded $1,000." On appeal, Curtis argued there was insufficient information presented to support his conviction. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed Curtis' conviction. View "North Dakota v. Curtis" on Justia Law

Carolyn Nelson appealed her conviction from a bench trial for the crime of accomplice to theft. Nelson was the president of the Oberon School Board. Laura Schnieber-Bruns and her business, Victim Survivor the Voice, LLC, were engaged to perform services for the school. The exact nature of the services was disputed, but an agreement signed by Nelson and Schnieber-Bruns described the work as “investigate, research, compile and deliver ongoing actions request of the Oberon School Board.” The agreement specified a “set-up fee” of $7,500, an “on-going management” fee of $7,500, and a $200 hourly rate for “services outside the scope of this Agreement.” Schnieber-Bruns was later charged with class A felony theft for taking more than $150,000 from the Oberon School “through a deceptive scheme pursuant to” the agreement. She pleaded guilty by an Alford plea. Nelson challenged her conviction as an accomplice. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. The Court declined to address issues Nelson did not raise at the district court or brief on appeal under the obvious error standard of review. View "North Dakota v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Matthew Mazur appealed his third sentencing for multiple criminal offenses arising out of a fraudulent investment scheme. The sole issue raised on appeal of his reduced 23-year prison sentence was that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss a five-year white-collar enhancement for loss greater than $500,000. Mazur argued the trial court was required to dismiss this enhancement because its imposition “result[ed] in a sentence of greater than 20 years.” Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Mazur" on Justia Law

Seven codefendants appeal their various convictions stemming from a multi-million-dollar healthcare conspiracy involving surgery-referral kickbacks at Forest Park Medical Center in Dallas, Texas. They challenge convictions under the Anti-Kickback Statute (“AKS”), the Travel Act, and for money laundering. The defendants in this case are, with three exceptions, the surgeons whom Forest Park paid to direct surgeries to the hospital—Won, Rimlawi, Shah, and Henry. One exception is Forrest— she is a nurse. Another is Jacob—he ran Adelaide Business Solutions (Adelaide), a pass-through entity. The other is Burt—he was part of the hospital’s staff. Defendants raise many of the same issues on appeal, often adopting each other’s arguments.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that the state law at issue here is the Texas Commercial Bribery Statute (TCBS). Here, it does not matter if the physician was acquitted because there could still be sufficient evidence in the record that defendants “offer[ed]” a benefit in violation of the TCBS regardless of whether any physician accepted it.  Further, the court explained that even assuming no rational jury could have found a single conspiracy, the surgeons fail to show that this error “prejudiced their substantial rights.” Henry and Forrest do not raise this point at all. Won and Shah address it only briefly and fail to provide any record citations to support the proposition that “clear, specific, and compelling prejudice” resulted in an unfair trial. View "USA v. Shah" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a Section 2255 motion in the district court challenging her restitution order in a case in which Petitioner was convicted of wire fraud and aggravated identity theft. The district court dismissed the motion on the ground that restitution claims are not cognizable in a Section 2255 motion. Petitioner then filed a second-in-time Section 2255 motion asserting new grounds for relief. The district court denied it as an unauthorized second or successive motion filed in violation of 28 U.S.C. Section 2255(h). Pursuant to Circuit Rule 22-3(a), the district court referred the matter to this court, which opened the matter as an application for authorization to file a second or successive motion.
The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s s application for leave to file a second or successive motion. The panel held that the district court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s first motion constitutes an adjudication “on the merits” for purposes of the second-or-successive bar. The panel explained that when an initial petition or motion is dismissed because its claims cannot be considered by the court or do not otherwise establish a ground for habeas relief, regardless of their underlying merits, any later-filed petition or motion is second or successive. Accordingly, to the extent Petitioner's second motion raises claims that could have been adjudicated on the merits when she filed her first motion, that aspect of her second motion is second and successive for purposes of Section 2255(h). Because Petitioner has not argued or otherwise made a showing that she meets the requirements of Section 2255(h), the panel denied her application to file a second or successive motion. View "TONG V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" on Justia Law