Justia White Collar Crime Opinion Summaries

The defendant, originally named Walter Glenn Primrose, assumed the identity of Bobby Edward Fort, a child who died in infancy, and lived under that identity for over thirty years. His wife likewise appropriated the name of another deceased infant. Primrose obtained various official documents, including passports, a driver’s license, a Social Security card, and Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reports System (DEERS) identification cards under the Fort name. He also served in the United States Coast Guard and worked for a Department of Defense contractor using the assumed identity. His actions came under investigation after discrepancies were flagged by the Department of State, revealing the true identity behind the Fort name, which led to criminal charges.The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii presided over Primrose’s trial. He was charged with conspiracy to make materially false statements to the Department of Defense, aggravated identity theft, making false statements in passport applications and use, and conspiracy to make false statements in passport applications. Primrose represented himself with standby counsel. The jury found him guilty on all counts. Following his conviction, Primrose appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and advancing a novel theory that long-term use of an assumed identity should confer legal rights to that identity, analogous to adverse possession in property law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Primrose’s adverse possession theory, holding that there is no legal basis for acquiring another person’s identity by long-term use. It found sufficient evidence supporting the jury’s findings that Primrose knowingly and willfully made false statements, committed aggravated identity theft, and fraudulently obtained and used passports. The Ninth Circuit affirmed all convictions. View "USA V. PRIMROSE" on Justia Law

A psychiatrist in Massachusetts operated his own private practice and, between 2015 and 2018, submitted fraudulent bills to a range of private and public health insurers, including Medicare and several major insurance companies. The fraudulent conduct included billing for over a thousand sessions at times when either he or the purported patient was out of the country. When insurers began to scrutinize his claims and requested additional billing records, he delayed responses and provided falsified records to support his claims. Eventually, at least one insurer halted payments pending his compliance, and another made payments contingent on preauthorization. Following federal investigation, the psychiatrist was indicted and, in October 2023, convicted by a jury on fourteen out of fifteen counts related to the fraud.In the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, the sentencing judge calculated his guidelines range based on a loss amount equating to the total billed—about $19 million—which resulted in a twenty-level sentencing enhancement. He was sentenced to ninety-nine months on the main counts, with additional concurrent sentences, and was ordered to pay approximately $6.5 million in restitution and a similar amount in criminal forfeiture. The defendant challenged both the intended loss calculation used for sentencing and the restitution amount.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court applied a burden-shifting framework, allowing the billed amount as prima facie evidence of intended loss, and found that the defendant did not provide sufficient evidence to show he intended to obtain less than he billed, even considering his status as an in-network provider. The appellate court also rejected his argument that restitution should be offset by claims for legitimate, unpaid services, holding that such offsets are not appropriate in the context of criminal restitution. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions in all respects. View "US v. Kinrys" on Justia Law

A fraudulent investment scheme orchestrated by Martin Silver and a co-conspirator caused millions of dollars in losses to several entities, including two investment funds and a bank. Silver, who was a managing partner at an investment advisory firm, pled guilty to conspiracy and substantive counts of wire and securities fraud. As part of his sentence, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ordered him to pay over $300 million in restitution, specifying a $40,000 lump-sum payment before incarceration and subsequent monthly payments equal to 10% of his income after release. At sentencing, Silver reported significant assets, which later increased in value post-release, although his income remained small.After his release, Silver made only minimal payments as required by the restitution schedule. The government, supported by the victims, moved in the district court to compel immediate turnover of Silver’s appreciated assets for restitution and to modify his payment schedule. The district court ordered Silver to liquidate and pay the appreciated value of his assets but declined to order turnover of the full asset value or further modify the payment schedule, reasoning that the statutory requirements for such modifications were not met.The petitioners sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, arguing that the district court should have ordered turnover of all of Silver’s assets. The Second Circuit held that under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, where a restitution judgment does not make payment due immediately and includes a fixed payment schedule, and the defendant is in compliance, the government is not entitled to enforce a turnover order for assets beyond the payment schedule. As a result, the court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus, affirming the district court’s decision. View "In re: IIG Structured Trade Fin. Fund, Ltd." on Justia Law

A former high-ranking Navy Admiral served for nearly forty years before retiring. During his last assignment, he interacted with Next Jump, Inc., a company providing leadership training. Despite staff recommendations against further contracts, the Admiral privately negotiated with Next Jump’s executives. They discussed post-retirement employment for him, with substantial compensation and equity, contingent on facilitating a Navy contract. The Admiral pushed through the contract, deviating from usual procedures, and began working for Next Jump after retirement. Subsequent feedback on the training was negative. He later admitted to investigators he had been improperly influenced.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case after the Admiral was indicted for conspiracy to accept a bribe, bribery, conflict of interest, and concealment of a material fact. At trial, the government presented evidence of a “contract for a job” arrangement and concealment of the agreement. The jury convicted him on all counts. The District Court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms. Next Jump’s co-CEOs were tried separately; their first trial ended in a hung jury and they were acquitted upon retrial.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Admiral’s appeal, which challenged evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and the fairness of the trial. The Circuit Court held that the evidentiary rulings were either proper or harmless given the overwhelming evidence. Although it identified a legally erroneous jury instruction regarding mens rea for bribery, the error was invited by defense counsel and thus not grounds for reversal. The Court affirmed the convictions, concluding no cumulative error deprived the Admiral of a fair trial. View "USA v. Burke" on Justia Law

Chinwendu Alisigwe, a lawful permanent resident, was suspected by international law enforcement agencies of using fraudulent passports and identification documents to open bank accounts in the names of real individuals. Between 2017 and 2020, he opened thirty-six accounts, deposited millions from fraudulent schemes, transferred money to disguise its origins, and sent funds abroad. In 2019 and again in 2021, officers at John F. Kennedy International Airport stopped Alisigwe, manually searched his cellphone, and found evidence of identity theft and communications with co-conspirators.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Alisigwe’s motion to suppress evidence from the cellphone searches, reasoning that such searches require reasonable suspicion, and finding that law enforcement had reasonable suspicion both times due to ongoing investigations and evidence linking Alisigwe to fraudulent documents. The district court also imposed sentencing enhancements: an eighteen-point enhancement for intended loss under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J), and a two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice under § 3C1.1 based on Alisigwe’s testimony at a duress hearing, which the court found to be fabricated.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The main holding is that no suspicion is required before the government searches a traveler’s cellphone at the border; routine border searches of property, including cellphones, are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court further held that the First Amendment does not impose an independent warrant requirement for border searches of cellphones. The court also upheld the district court’s application of sentencing enhancements for both intended loss and obstruction of justice. View "United States v. Alisigwe" on Justia Law

A former Alabama State Trooper was accused of murdering his wife, allegedly staging a car accident to collect life insurance proceeds. The prosecution's case was circumstantial, relying heavily on witness testimony and evidence suggesting financial motive. After initially failing to indict, the Alabama Attorney General’s Office pursued the case, resulting in the trooper’s conviction and a sentence of death. However, a lengthy series of postconviction proceedings revealed that the prosecution had committed several Brady violations, including withholding exculpatory evidence that implicated alternative suspects and supported the defense’s theory. This led to the trial court granting a new trial and later dismissing the indictment with prejudice due to willful prosecutorial misconduct, a decision eventually reversed by the Supreme Court of Alabama, which ordered a second trial.During the second trial, the new trial judge issued a preclusion order barring mention of prior prosecutorial misconduct or the procedural history. The defendant argued this order violated his constitutional rights, specifically the Confrontation Clause and his right to present a complete defense. He was again convicted of capital murder for pecuniary gain and sentenced to life without parole. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court of Alabama denied certiorari.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. The court held that, although Alabama’s misconduct was egregious, the limitations imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) prevented granting habeas relief. The Eleventh Circuit found no procedural default, but ruled that neither the preclusion order nor the sufficiency of the evidence claim warranted relief under AEDPA’s standards. The district court’s judgment denying habeas relief was affirmed. View "Martin v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Nancy Martin embezzled millions of dollars from her employers over several years. After discovery of her actions, her employers obtained an $11 million default judgment against her in Kansas state court when she failed to appear, apparently following the advice of her attorney. Subsequently, Martin was federally indicted for bank fraud and for assisting in the filing of false tax documents, related to her failure to report the embezzled funds. On the advice of counsel, she pled guilty to one count of bank fraud and one count of tax fraud. The federal district court sentenced her to concurrent prison terms and ordered $3.9 million in restitution.Martin initially appealed her conviction and sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, but her appeal was dismissed due to the appeal waiver in her plea agreement. She then filed a motion in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. She claimed her attorney failed to inform her of potential defenses related to the bank fraud charge and the necessity of willfulness for the tax charge. The district court denied her motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, finding her legal theories insufficient and concluding she had not demonstrated prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial de novo and held that Martin was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether her counsel’s failure to advise her of a potential defense to bank fraud constituted deficient performance, and whether she suffered prejudice as a result. Additionally, the court found that the district court erred in its legal analysis regarding willfulness for the tax charge and remanded for further proceedings to properly assess prejudice. The district court’s denial was therefore reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Martin" on Justia Law

While serving a sentence for manslaughter and assault in a South Carolina prison, the defendant used a contraband cell phone to pose as an underage girl on a dating app. He initiated contact with a 22-year-old Michigan man, referred to as B.G., and exchanged sexually explicit messages and images. After revealing (falsely) that the girl was underage, the defendant, posing as the girl’s grandparent, threatened to expose B.G. to his family and law enforcement unless B.G. sent money. The defendant then sent explicit messages to B.G.’s ex-fiancée and her mother and publicly posted accusations of pedophilia on social media. Shortly after these threats and exposures, B.G. died by suicide.A federal grand jury indicted the defendant on charges including attempted extortion under the Hobbs Act, stalking with intent to harass and intimidate, and multiple counts of wire fraud. A jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan found him guilty on all counts. At sentencing, the district court applied the Sentencing Guideline for extortion by force or threat of injury or serious damage (U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2), and added enhancements for discharge of a firearm and for the victim sustaining life-threatening injury, resulting in a total sentence of 272 months’ imprisonment. The defendant objected to the choice of Guideline, the enhancements, and the consecutive nature of the sentences, but the district court overruled these objections.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the district court correctly used the extortion Guideline rather than the blackmail Guideline. However, the appellate court concluded that the enhancements for firearm discharge and life-threatening injury were procedurally unreasonable, as there was no evidence the defendant willfully caused B.G.’s suicide. The court affirmed the application of the correct Guideline but reversed the application of the enhancements, remanding for resentencing without them. View "United States v. Boyd" on Justia Law

The defendant engaged in a long-running scheme to illegally export components for night-vision and thermal-vision rifle scopes, which are classified as “defense articles” under federal law, from California to Russia. He did so without obtaining the required export license from the U.S. State Department and concealed his activities through offshore banking. Over nearly a decade, his illicit exports generated over $9 million in international wire transfers.After federal investigators uncovered the operation, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California charged him with conspiracy to export defense articles without a license under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and its implementing regulations, as well as two counts of money laundering. The defendant pleaded guilty to all three counts without a plea agreement and was sentenced to nine years in prison. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. He claimed his lawyer failed to challenge the validity of the conspiracy regulation under which he was convicted and did not properly inform him about the money-laundering charges. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of this motion de novo. The court held that the AECA authorized the State Department to promulgate regulations criminalizing conspiracies to violate export restrictions, so counsel’s failure to challenge the regulation was not deficient. The factual record also foreclosed the defendant’s claim regarding the money-laundering pleas. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the § 2255 motion and declined to expand the certificate of appealability to include additional claims. View "USA V. MORGOVSKY" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a former Senior Reimbursement Manager at a national pharmacy provider, alleged that her employer engaged in a scheme to overcharge government healthcare programs such as Medicare and Medicaid. She claimed the company exploited billing system discrepancies and other tactics to cause overpayments, including billing for deceased patients and miscoding pharmacy types for higher reimbursements. The company allegedly concealed these overpayments in its internal accounting and, after a period, transferred the unreturned funds into its own revenues. The plaintiff reported these practices to management and internal audit, but the issues persisted.After filing a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, the plaintiff amended her allegations. The District Court dismissed all federal claims with prejudice, finding that the plaintiff did not meet the heightened pleading standards for fraud required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) for “direct” False Claims Act (FCA) claims (those based on submitting fraudulent invoices or statements to the government). The court also denied leave to further amend the complaint, and denied reconsideration.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s direct FCA claims, holding that she did not identify any specific fraudulent submissions to the government, nor adequately allege that such information was solely within the defendants’ control. However, the Second Circuit vacated the dismissal of the “reverse” FCA claim, which is based on knowingly retaining government overpayments. The court found the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the company had an obligation to return identified overpayments and knowingly concealed or improperly avoided that obligation. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the reverse FCA claim. View "United States v. Amerisource Bergen Corp." on Justia Law